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Social Science and the Collectivization of *Hubris*
JOSEPH J. SPENGLER

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Heinrich Brüning: A Review and a Memoir
ALFRED VAGTS

Reviews

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Political Science Quarterly

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Social Science and the Collectivization of *Hubris*

JOSEPH J. SPENGLER
Duke University

> The university had been able to repulse all of its enemies save those that its own hubris had created within its ranks.[1]
>
> The underlying cause of our problem [the dollar crisis]—described by some as 'the arrogance of power'—remains with us. . . . Our global involvements must be more realistically proportioned to our resources.[2]
>
> The most instructive revelation may be how little faith the leaders had in those they led—a classic case of the arrogance of the powerful.[3]
>
> Economists have much to be modest about [and] much to be sad about.[4]

In ancient times the *I Ching*'s counsel to man not to press beyond "his own limitations" seems to have been widely supported. The Greek poet Pindar described "unattainable aspirations" as a source of "madness";[5] and Plato warned against giving "too great power to anything" or "too much authority to the mind" lest

[1] Robert A. Nisbet, *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma: The University in America, 1945-1970* (New York, 1971), 241.

[2] Robert Lekachman, "Hubris and the Dollar," *The New Leader*, May 31, 1971, p. 3.

[3] "Pentagon Papers: The Secret War," *Time*, June 28, 1971, p. 16.

[4] W. R. Allen, in Randall W. Hinshaw, *The Economics of International Adjustment* (Baltimore, 1971), 134.

[5] Pindar, *Nem.*, XI, 47.

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"everything [be] overthrown."[6] In recent times, however, advantage has been associated with man's meeting challenges—even those of his own making—with his overreaching himself, though not too immoderately. The injunction against immoderate overreaching is more likely to be honored in the breach in an age of highly concentrated power.[7]

As the epigraphs to this essay suggest, concern with immoderateness or arrogance—what the ancient Greeks called *hubris*—may again be developing in the realm of applied natural and social science. For, as will be indicated, policies of overreaching not only have imposed heavy costs on the public at large, repeated failure is threatening also to undermine man's inclination to overreach even with moderation, heretofore a principal source of progress. Of this we have evidence in the emergence of a *fin de siècle* mood that threatens to blanket out support not only of the "technology of haste" and futurologists' dreams of tomorrow's "endless horizons,"[8] but also of science as well. Indeed, there is danger that man, finding the growth of knowledge unequal to removing his ignorance and curing his ills, may slacken in his search for ways out.[9] In this essay I deal with the growing recognition of *hubris*, its adverse effects, and the means to its control, especially in the economic world. For purposes of illustration I use mainly American data, since it is in the United States more than elsewhere that *hubris* now flourishes.

Early Manifestations of Hubris

While *hubris* is of ancient vintage, it was among the Greeks, anticipators of modern unfettered inquiry if not also of unfettered application of the results of inquiry, that *hubris* found greatest condemnation. The *hubris*, or arrogant and unwarranted pride, of which they wrote permeated mainly individual, not collective, behavior.

[6] Plato, *Laws*, III, 691.

[7] A. O. Hirschman, *Development Projects Observed* (Washington, D. C., [1967]), chap. 1; Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1939), esp. I-VI.

[8] Cp. Bentley Glass, "Science: Endless Horizons or Golden Age," *Science*, CLXXI, Jan. 8, 1971, pp. 23-29.

[9] Max Ways, "Don't We Know Enough To Make Better Public Policies?" *Fortune* (April 1971), 64 ff. See also Reinhard Bendix, *Embattled Reason* (New York, 1970), 348.

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It was an evil of which the individual was guilty, but he was capable of inflicting widespread injury only when he was a powerful individual, as was Xerxes.[10] *Hubris* was considered to be destructive of the cardinal virtues—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom—of their unity and balance, all essential to political stability and the good life. According to this view, anticipated in the traditional wisdom of Greece and subsequently stressed in her belletristic and philosophical literature (for example, Homer, Herodotus, Aeschylus, Thucydides, Plato), *hubris* was the "chief sin," the principal fountain of bad judgment and disaster, the main source of political instability, and (later writers believed) the cause of the destruction of the imperial power of Athens.[11]

The doctrine of the four virtues passed into Christendom and with it condemnation of *hubris*, or its Latin equivalent, *superbia*.[12] It received little or no attention from such sects as the Gnostics, some of whose virtues are remindful of those regnant today among the lumpenintelligentsia.[13] Eventually St. Thomas Aquinas described "pride" as "the movement by which the will is borne towards ends beyond its real limits," as "primarily the revolt of a being against its own nature; it is the permanent and deliberate refusal to accept its own limitations."[14] He condemned excessive pride in general, but did not link its ill effects closely with the behavior of scientists as such. Several centuries later, Erasmus hinted at such an outcome, though hardly at its possibly collective form and without reference to still nonexisting social scientists.

In *The Praise of Folly*, Erasmus ridiculed what verged on *hubris* among contemporary "scientists" and theologians. Of these scientists, men concerned with the physical rather than the social world, Erasmus observed that "they feel that they are the only men with

[10] According to Herodotus, VII, 10, Artabanus warned Xerxes (much as able generals have warned Western politicians against military ventures in Asia) against undertaking the conquest of Greece.

[11] See C. M. Bowra, *The Greek Experience* (New York, 1959), IV, esp. 99-101; W. R. Agard, *The Greek Mind* (New York, 1957), 68.

[12] John Ferguson, *Moral Values in the Ancient World* (London, 1958), chap. 3, pp. 46-51.

[13] See Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston, 1958), Part III; R. M. Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity* (2d ed.; New York, 1966), I.

[14] Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956), 299-300, 483, nn. 57-58.

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any wisdom, and all other men float about as shadows. . . . They postulate causes . . . as if they had exclusive knowledge about the secrets of nature, designer of elements, or as if they visited us directly from the council of the gods"; and of the theologians that "they draw exact pictures of every part of hell, as though they had spent many years in that region. . . . It is their claim that it is beyond the station of sacred discourse to be obliged to adhere to the rules of grammarians. . . . They share this honor with most intellectuals."[15]

Greek, Roman, medieval, and even early modern writers found the ill effects of *hubris* to be incident in the main upon the excessively arrogant individual. Ill effects were more widely incident only when *hubris* animated political or military leaders to overreach themselves and visit misfortune upon their followers. Outside the military realm, *hubris* could at first become a source of misfortune only in the area of theology, since theologians were relatively numerous and identified with the Universal Church, which in turn had behind it the apparatus of the state; and they could on occasion direct this apparatus against the welfare of the common man, as they did in the age of the Crusades against the Saracens and the world of Islam. At that time scientists still had too little skill as scientists and, though they sometimes were organized in guilds, too little collective power to be driven by *hubris* to generate harm. Only the Devil's Apprentice was capable along these lines, and even he was without a hypothetical counterpart in the as yet uncultivated social sciences.

Foundations for the emergence of a "scientistic *hubris*" began to be laid within the century succeeding the death of Erasmus. Francis Bacon, perhaps more than any other writer, developed the view that knowledge is power and that science bestows power. A scientistic *hubris* could not, however, come into being until the natural sciences and mathematics had made great discoveries possible and thus played a John-the-Baptist role to a social science still in the preparturition stage. These critical discoveries came in the age and aftermath of Newton, in a late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century France that lacked the leavening influence of a Locke and a Burke. The leading product of this exuberance, the École Polytechnique, not merely generated interest in science, engineering, and machines as well as confidence in the omnipotence of pure science and the efficacy of

[15] Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly* (1517), in John P. Dolan, ed., *The Essential Erasmus* (New York, 1964), 142, 147.

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engineering organization; it also gave rise to a feeling "that there were no limits to the powers of the human mind and to the extent to which man could hope to harness and control all the forces which so far had threatened and intimidated him." For, as Hayek has observed, "never will man penetrate deeper into error than when he is continuing on the road which has led him to success."[16] In the school's heyday, however, its influence, though not confined to natural scientists, had but limited impact upon social scientists as such.

The philosophy that permeated the École Polytechnique did, however, exercise considerable influence upon those with an interest in social planning and/or an approach founded upon historicism. The most influential of these were Saint-Simon and August Comte together with their associates and some of those in what became the Hegelian tradition.[17] While it may be said that *hubris* affected some of these individuals, the state had not yet become economically powerful enough, nor had these individuals acquired sufficient analytical and administrative leverage within the apparatus of the state, to affect the community very adversely. Moreover, their numbers were both few and counterbalanced by economists in the tradition of Smith and Say, a tradition subsequently reinforced by the approach of Karl Menger and his associates. Furthermore, professional economists continued to be too small in number and too uninfluential to foment a *hubris*-oriented intellectual climate.

Postclassical Developments

Even in the late nineteenth century the place occupied by social science in the realm of science was too unimpressive to generate *hubris* at the individual level or make possible its collectivization. The changes that took place in and after the closing years of this century, though not confined to the United States, were more intense and rapid here than elsewhere. American experience therefore epitomizes the changes that took place. It is correct to say that here, as elsewhere, social scientists, among them economists, never on top, were hardly on tap until shortly before or during World War I. Social scientists did, however, play a role in rising governmental

[16] F. A. Hayek, "The Source of the Scientific Hubris: L'Ecole Polytechnique," in *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Glencoe, 1952), 105-16, esp. 105, 110, 112.

[17] See the illuminating account in Hayek, Part 2. See also E. Halévy, *The Era of Tyrannies* (New York, 1965), 21-104.

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agencies (the Bureau of the Census, for example, was established in 1903) and found demands for their skills emanating from the inability of progressivist reformers to solve the problems to which they directed attention.[18] Until then, and perhaps even then, social scientists did little more than survive in an atmosphere of what Lord Durham might have called "benign neglect" and with the boundaries of the respective social sciences still only vaguely defined.

The status of social science was influenced in part by that of natural science, but not greatly until the turn of the century. For, as Henry Adams reports, only then did men become conscious of the replacement of a slowly rising curve of scientific progress by a "law of acceleration," that could, by 1938, produce "a world that sensitive and timid creatures could regard without a shudder,"[19] one from which the "one great emperor—Coal" might be dethroned by fissionable and fusionable materials.[20]

Whereas today full-time intellectuals in America are said to number about one million—5,000 times as many as in Periclean Athens[21] —their number was small around 1900. Moreover, those who were active had not yet attained the power to support effectively social scientists whom they believed capable of developing a civilization to which eventually modern literature was to become increasingly hostile.[22] The annual number of college graduates was low—27,000 in 1900—with the fraction of persons of college age who went to college not rising above 3 per cent until about 1890 and above 5 per cent until about 1910. Furthermore, as late as 1900, intellectuals had not yet recovered from the impact of specialization and the resulting atomization of their formerly detached and universalist

[18] See Gene M. Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership* (New York, 1969), chap. 2. On how little attention economists as economists commanded among formulators of policy, see Joseph J. Spengler "Evolution of Public-Utility Industry Regulation: Economists and other Determinants," *South African Journal of Economics*, XXXVII (1969), 3-31. On the progress of professionalization, see G. J. Stigler, *Essays in the History of Economics* (Chicago, 1965), chap. 3.

[19] Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York, 1905; New York, 1931), chap. 35 and p. 415.

[20] On when coal will be displaced, see M. K. Hubbert's paper in Harry Foreman, ed., *Nuclear Power and the Public* (Minneapolis, 1970).

[21] These estimates, attributed to George Stigler, appear in the unsigned article, "The Flourishing Intellectuals," *Time*, May 21, 1965, p. 32.

[22] For example, see Lionel Trilling, *Beyond Culture* (New York, 1965), 3.

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outlook into a multiplicity of outlooks, particularly those associated with Marxism, fascism, and progressivism.[23] Of adherents to these, the most relevant to the present discussion is "the intellectual as progressive"; for it is he who places complete trust in science, the ballot box, "the march of history," social engineering, and now futurology, always in a utopian context that overemphasizes technological solutions and neglects the constraints flowing both from the individual and from the social structure as such. Only occasionally are the dangers of wisdom stressed.[24]

The Great Depression of the 1930s, together with the resulting increase in public employment, augmented the demand for economists, and their number increased. They could not acquire much influence and administrative leverage, however, until macroeconomics of Keynesian and post-Keynesian vintage had come into being and general acceptance and governments had assumed a great deal of responsibility, particularly for maintaining so called full employment. Only then could *hubris* begin to flourish among economists. Neither Walras nor Marshall fathered *hubris*. It was Keynes who made possible the rise of an economic mandarinate, together with an intellectual climate conducive to *hubris* and its capacity for generating negative as well as favorable externalities.

Growth of social scientists in number, especially after 1945, has strengthened other forces favorable to *hubris*, at least insofar as the spirit of tribalism has tended to hold in check critical discussion of professional incapacity. Ever more outlets for their wares were found in industry (about one-sixth of whose Ph.D.'s are social scientists),[25] in government (with federal social-science employment increasing 54 per cent in 1960-68), and in education—in outlets made possible in part by a 124 per cent increase in GNP between 1949 and 1969. Social science doctorates increased 135 per cent in 1960-69, and social science doctoral candidates, 144 per cent in

[23] See Thomas Molnar, *The Decline of the Intellectual* (New York, 1961); G. B. de Huszar, ed., *The Intellectuals* (Glencoe, 1960).

[24] For example, see E. M. Cioran, *The Fall Into Time* (New York, 1970). Anthony Downs argues that many problems, especially urban ones, are social rather than technological; Downs, "New Directions for Urban Research," *Technology Review*, LXXIII (1971), 26-35.

[25] See Matthew Radom, *The Social Scientist in American Industry* (New Brunswick, 1970); cp. this with D. C. Pelz and F. M. Andrews, *Scientists in Organizations* (New York, 1966).

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1960-68.[26] It is anticipated that the annual number of social science doctoral degrees, 1,716 in 1958, will be 8,946 by 1977, more than the society can absorb.[27]

Increase in the number of social scientists has been accompanied by a great increase in the number of social science journals and articles, so many that the flow of print now obscures as well as facilitates the flow of essential information, too often treated as if it were a free good.[28] Indeed, a conscientious scholar sometimes finds himself in the position of Pavlov's dog, so battered with printed stimuli that he hardly knows where to turn. Hence, most articles, whether useful or not, are virtually forgotten within a few years, thus producing little effect beyond providing the author with what might be called "occupational therapy."

Increase in the number of social scientists has also been accompanied by a marked growth in the financial support of social science research, though not by a corresponding amount of analytical progress and information suited to solve man's ills, social and otherwise. After all, at least some "research" is carried on mainly to enable the social scientist to increase his income and reduce his teaching load; much of it deals with trivia, is informed by little imagination, and is of little relevance beyond the pretense that it could prove socially useful. It is largely confined to quantitative inquiry into observable behavioral regularities, to the neglect both of other sources of information and of intermediate variables that condition degrees of regularity and seldom are to be gotten at with the instruments of a single discipline. It tends to remain under the empire of a self-sustaining elite which, with the assistance of governmental and founda-

[26] A series of ten books, each on one social science, comprising *The Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey* (Englewood Cliffs, 1967-69) and prepared under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the Social Science Research Council, has been issued recently. See also *The Behavioral and Social Sciences. Outlook and Needs* (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), issued jointly by the National Academy of Sciences and the Social Science Research Council.

[27] *Ibid.*, 312-13. On deceleration in the growth of markets for Ph.D.'s, see A.M. Cartter, "Scientific Manpower for 1970-1985," *Science*, CLXXII, Apr. 9, 1971, pp. 132-40.

[28] Some of the problems are discussed in *Communication System and Resources in the Behavioral Sciences*, Publication 1575, National Academy of Sciences (Washington, D. C., 1967). See also Bentley Glass, *The Timely and the Timeless* (New York, 1970), and D.J. de Solla Price, *Science Since Babylon* (New Haven, 1961).

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tion funds, controls the perimeters of inquiry, at least on the part of those in search of support, status, and promotion, and thereby transforms what should be quality-enforcing rules into rules making for licensure, monopoly, and thought control. Up to now, however, social scientists have not been able effectively to wrap themselves up in the white robes of serendipity.

Hubris *Emerges: Natural Science*

Social science, economics in particular, has benefited greatly, at least until recently, from the post-1945 aura which has surrounded natural science. Never in its history has the kudos of science, together with its support, and its self-confidence, been so great. Up to now, therefore, science has easily survived the growing hostility of the once friendly intellectual, by now becoming angry at the alleged misuse of science by some of those coming to Washington in the Camelot invasion of 1960 or disturbed at his own inability to fathom or appreciate a "culture" narrowly pragmatic and in the pay of the Leviathan. Science survives in part, of course, because its critics, often contemptuous of those whom Joseph Kraft has called "ordinary Americans" and "middle America" (and intellectuals have sometimes regarded as aspirants to a "pornutopia"),[29] have aroused a reciprocal and offsetting contempt at the hands of the "common man."

Growth of expenditure upon "research and development," much of it inspired by Sputnik and thermonuclear competition (as evidenced by the fact that about one-half of this expenditure has been defense-space related), may serve as an index of the increasing importance attached to science, especially natural science and engineering.[30] This expenditure, essentially exclusive of outlay upon capital, increased in the aggregate (in real terms) about 7.6 per cent per year between 1955 and 1970, but with real outlay upon "basic" research growing even faster, close to 10.5 per cent per year. Meanwhile, Gross National Product rose only about 3.4 per cent per year.

[29] See Kraft's discussion of "intellectuals" in his column which appeared on the *Durham Sun*'s editorial page, Dec. 9, 1968. See also Arthur Koestler, *The Sleepwalkers* (New York, 1959).

[30] The data presented are taken or derived from U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970* (Washington, D. C., 1970).

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Since 1967, however, money expenditure upon basic research as well as upon "research and development" has not quite kept pace with rising prices. Of these funds, about 55 per cent have been of federal origin. Accordingly, the slowing down of federal expenditure, together with inflation, has been reducing the *real* support of science in recent years.

The share of social science in federal as in public-plus private funds devoted to "research and development" is minuscule even though social scientists constituted about one-fifth of all scientists and engineers in 1969 and about 9 per cent of the scientists employed by the federal government in the 1960s. Of the federal funds devoted to "research" in 1960 and 1968, the share of the social sciences was that of Lazarus, under 2 per cent and 3.6 per cent, respectively. Of the funds devoted to "research and development" just over one per cent went to social science in 1968.

Having become accustomed to a high rate of increase in the *real* support available for research—about 20 per cent per year even in social science in 1963-68—scientists are experiencing a sense of intense deprivation at the failure of this support to grow in recent years, together with the collapse of aerospace and defense-related outlets for their activities. Adjustment is proving much more difficult, of course, for natural scientists, who, unlike social scientists, have not been hardened by having had to live on support at a more Spartan level.

This sense of deprivation has in turn aroused protest and concern. It is being insisted that, in our internecine world, survival depends upon scientific progress, a goal made ever harder to attain by the rapidity with which research apparatus becomes obsolete and the ineffectiveness with which this apparatus is used,[31] a state of affairs especially characteristic of educational, medical, governmental, and other undertakings not subject to the discipline of the market. The "public policy doctrine of academic science," however, remains boosterish and "vainglorious" as it has become "for too many years",[32] and support continues to be given to the view that the federal government must support science lest unemployment develop.

[31] See H. A. Krebs, "The Goals of Science," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CXV, Feb. 17, 1971, pp. 1-3.

[32] Harold Orlans, "Science And Polity, Or How Much Knowledge Does A Nation Need?" *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CXV, Feb.

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Exaggerated as well as arrogant claims are made, sometimes in such a manner that the cause of the scientists is weakened.[33] For example, it has been alleged that discoveries made over a period of five years in so called space medicine have "relieved human misery" more than those "made in medicine in the preceding fifty."[34] It is said that within thirty years the share of expenditure upon research and development could profitably run as high as 25-50 per cent of the gross national product; that each Ph.D. (in science) generates 100 jobs; that, contrary to fact, science accounts for a very large share of the increase in national output.[35] To claims of this sort are added the Delphic forecasts of futurologists who make book on man's prospective problems and options as of (say) the year 2000. The questionable allocation of funds is ignored, as when the federal government in 1965 spent $1.5 billion on medical research, compared with over $7.5 billion on space-oriented "research," including manned moon flights which cost about twenty times as much as unmanned flights.[36]

Exaggerated and cost-disregarding claims can only be interpreted as manifesting both a great deal of *hubris* and a threat to the state's support of the social scientist; for the latter cannot back up the

17, 1971, pp. 4-9, esp. p. 4. On "disgusting publicity and propaganda" in support of science, see Erwin Chargoff, "Preface to a Grammar of Biology, *Science*, CLXXII, May 14, 1971, pp. 637-42.

[33] P. M. Boffey reports that governmental personnel interested in helping scientists gain higher funding for science found "that the ineptness and arrogance of scientists made them ineffective allies" in these efforts. See Boffey, "Science Policy," *Science*, CLXXI, March 15, 1971, p. 874. It is said that "leaders of aerospace sometimes displayed an unconscious arrogance, in their case the arrogance of commanding an elite knowledge"; "Aerospace: The Troubled Blue Yonder," *Time*, April 5, 1971, p. 91. L.M. Branscomb, director of the National Bureau of Standards, writes: "Many people feel that humanity is threatened by the *vanity* of those who believe only good can come from so thoroughly satisfying a process as scientific creativity"; Branscomb, "Taming Technology," *Science*, CLXXI, March 12, 1971, pp. 972 (my italics). See also J.R. Pierce's editorial, "A Time to Take Stock," *Science*, CLXXI, April 9, 1971.

[34] This statement was made in 1966 by a high government official; see the letter of Warren Weaver, in *Science*, CLXXI, Feb. 26, 1971, p. 752.

[35] See Orlans. "More research expenditures do not seem to lead to more technical progress," L. C. Thurow concludes; Thurow, "Research, Technical Progress and Economic Growth," *Technology Review*, LXXIII (March 1971), 44-52.

[36] This estimate is reported by Warren Weaver in his letter in *Science*, 752. The spacemen who would escape the confines of the earth do not, of course, find the greater outlay uneconomic.

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rhetoric of his submissions with thermonuclear credentials at a time when close to half of all federal support of science remains defense- and space-oriented. The now common argument for more and more scientific personnel recalls the argument of the mercantilists when they reasoned as if the elasticity of a country's demand for gold was almost infinite, with this demand flowing in ever larger measure from the state.

The potential danger lurking in exaggerated scientific and technological claims may assume manifold form; it has found expression recently in the collapse of Rolls-Royce, caught in "the trap of technological pride" which led it to undertake commitments far beyond its resources: "The Rolls-Royce collapse is a tale of illusions on every side—illusions of technological omnicompetence by Rolls-Royce, of export grandeur by the British government, and of driving a hard bargain by Lockheed." The lessons to be learned have been had at a very high price:

> A government can be too eager for exports. For a buyer like Lockheed, the lowest price is not necessarily the best deal, because a delivery failure by a crucial supplier can involve both in calamity. Most important, perhaps, men who think themselves so much the masters of complex technology that they can control its costs and timing may be riding for a shattering fall.[37]

Unfortunately many critics fail to distinguish between science viewed as an instrument and the uses to which science is put. As a result, science and scientists are condemned by those who object to uses to which it is put. The manifestation of *hubris* by natural scientists probably contributes to this unfavorable reaction and what has become a "senseless war on science."[38]

Hubris *Emerges: Social Science*

Hubris becomes a matter of concern only insofar as its adverse consequents affect others than the *hubris*-animated source of these effects. Should these effects be entirely incident upon their agent and hence self-regarding, there is no occasion for public concern. Unfortunately, *hubris* may give rise to externalities, often predominantly

[37] "Rolls-Royce: The Trap of Technological Pride," *Time*, Feb. 22, 1971, pp. 84, 86. See also the article, "Aerospace," in *Time*, 91.

[38] L. Lessing, "The Senseless War on Science," *Fortune*, (Mar. 1971), 88 ff. See also Branscomb.

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adverse and usually incident upon uncompensated victims. These effects, moreover, tend to be accentuated in a society such as America by both state and nonstate agencies. In the past *hubris* was seldom the occasion for alarm, since it was unaccompanied by externalities. This is largely true even today of natural science. For, while the findings of the natural scientist can be misapplied, they are less likely to be so than are the findings of the social scientist, which tend to become policy oriented. As J.M. Clark observed in contrasting discoveries of natural science with those of social science, discovery of the theory of relativity made no "perceptible difference to the man driving a car or operating a lathe."[39] In contrast, the social scientist, if he obtains public power directly or through the instrument of policies based upon his theories and models, can inflict adverse externalities on many people. Social science, in short, is more externality prone than natural science, in part because it is "relevance" prone.[40]

Since 1945, two major changes have taken place, the ascendance of the apparatus of state over the individual and lesser collectives and the infiltration of social science, together with its practitioners, into the apparatus of state—oblivious to the moral of Aesop's fable about the fate of the frogs who made a king stork possible or to the apparent decline of Liebermanism in a Soviet Union dominated by military "metal eaters." The ascendancy of the state, initially facilitated by war, ever favorable to the concentration and mobilization of economic power,[41] has since been facilitated by ideology and that accessibility to personal power which many anticipate from enlargement of the overall role of the state. Indicative of the increasing role of the state is the rise of the ratio of total government expenditure to national income from 11.9 per cent in 1929 to 39.1 per cent in 1970, a level much above the fraction (about 14 per cent) of the nation's assets under public ownership.[42]

[39] J. M. Clark, *Alternative to Serfdom* (New York, 1960), 112.

[40] On the propensity of economists to be "relevant," see Rand Guffey, "Econ. 101 . . . ," *Wall Street Journal*, Mar. 22, 1971, p. 1.

[41] For example, see Halévy, 265-85. See also F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, 1944), XII-XIII; and on the costs of centralized planning, P.J.D. Wiles, "Economic Activation, Planning, and the Social Order," in Bertram Gross, ed., *Action Under Planning* (New York, 1967), 138-85. For what was often an unfashionable albeit prescient view, see Ely Devons, *Papers on Planning and Economic Management*, ed. A. Cairncross (Manchester, 1970).

[42] On ownership, see D.A. and Virginia G. Flagg, "An Empirical Application

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Indicative also is A. Cairncross's comment on Eric Roll's *The World After Keynes*,

> respecting the limitations of economics in the face of the issues described. Less and less is being left to the market and more and more requires the intervention of government and other agencies whose operations are not circumscribed like the market by economic factors, but are shot through with politics, administrative convenience or feasibility, and a whole range of psycho-social considerations. . . . Judgment about issues rests on the view one takes of the wisdom and potency of government action and of the likelihood that the failure of governments will bring into play more automatic and sometimes more powerful market forces.[43]

Indicative of growing confidence in the contribution of economists to public policy was the assumption by the federal government, under the Employment Act of 1946, of the management of national economic policy "to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power"—a commitment inspired by Keynes's *General Theory* and one which some economists believed realizable, given the technical competence and the empirical and political capacity of at least some members of the profession. While less confidence has been manifest in social scientists other than economists, they too have been upgraded—political scientists by growing interest in governmental processes and structures, sociologists by growing concern respecting urban, welfare, and race-connected problems, and both by the "need [of economists] for a partnership with other disciplines in tackling" many issues.[44] Moreover, steps are under way to produce an annual social report parallel to the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers, though some fear such a social

of Measures of Socialism to Different Nations," *Western Economic Journal*, VIII (1970), 233-40.

[43] Eric Roll, *The World after Keynes* (New York, 1968) reviewed by A. Cairncross, *Economic Journal*, LXXX (1970), 111. See also A. Leijonhufvud, *On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes* (New York, 1968), esp. Parts I and VI.

[44] Quotation from Cairncross, 111. Cairncross does not have in view an "interdisciplinary economics" but the need to resort to several disciplines when one alone does not supply the answer. See R.L. Heilbroner, "On the Limited 'Relevance' of Economics," *The Public Interest*, No. 21 (1970), 80-93; R.M. Solow, "Science and Ideology in Economics," *ibid.*, 94-107. On the reluctance of economists to give adequate weight to technology, see P.M. Boffey, "Technology and World Trade: Is There Cause for Alarm?" *Science*, CLXXII, Apr. 2, 1971, 37-41.

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report would embody governmentally sanctioned value judgments that belong within the domain of the individual.[45]

Social science, unfortunately for policy makers, presents much more difficult problems than does inorganic or even organic science. The number of variables and parameters involved is much greater, and the microcosm to be subjected to analysis is seldom so separable from systems of which the microcosm is a part. The counsel of the social scientist needs, therefore, to be much more qualified than that of the natural scientist. The transmutation of even careful and complete social science findings into terms of policy tends to result in dangerously simple instruments. Thus, Tilford Gaines, commenting on the source of a consistent pattern of errors in forecast models, described it as "the undue importance the models attach to changes in fiscal and monetary policies" since these are "subject to the manipulation of the policy authorities" though not "so uniquely able to generate a multiplicative impact upon total economic activity" as the policy makers assume. Daniel Patrick Moynihan is correct, therefore, in describing the tendency to oversimplify as "the great single temptation of our time" and "the great corrupter," much as Jacob Burkhardt foresaw.[46]

Let us illustrate Moynihan's observation by writing

$$O = f\,(V_i, W_i, U_i, P_i)$$

where O denotes response or mode of behavior, V_i designates the variables of which a social scientist takes note, W_i denotes important neglected variables, U_i denotes variables which are both neglected and unimportant, and P_i denotes parameters (which condition response to variables and most of which are susceptible to change over time). Policy respecting O and based solely on V_i tends to be inadequate and may produce unintended and adverse effects. Moreover, the effects of policy, when they are adverse, may be observed only quite long after a policy has been introduced, given the slowness with which feedbacks are registered and reacted to, particularly when bureaucrats are arbitrary and arrogant. The resulting dangers, especially pronounced in a society dominated by oligopoly and big trade unions, were anticipated in 1947 by J.M. Clark in his com-

[45] See U. S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward A Social Report* (Washington, D. C., 1969).

[46] See Gaines's monthly "Economic Report," issued by Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (New York), Mar. 1971, p. 1; for Moynihan's remarks, see Ways, 118.

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ments on "After Keynes What?"[47]

In his presidential address to the 1970 annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Professor W. Leontief took cognizance of the state of economic analysis and its adequacy for the tasks to which it is being put:

> the consistently indifferent performance in practical applications is in fact a symptom of a fundamental imbalance in the present state of our discipline. The weak and all too slowly growing empirical foundation clearly cannot support the proliferating superstructure of pure, or should I say, speculative economic theory.[48]

Presumably, what Leontief observes is equally applicable to practitioners of other social science disciplines. Representative is their contribution to the development of our almost miraculously defective welfare system.

The performance of the American economy since the establishment of the president's Council of Advisers might prove illustrative if contrasted closely with the advice (if any) given by the council to the president. Crude comparison of the period 1904-29 with 1945-70[49] indicates little improvement in the overall level of employment and a not much higher rate of increase in average output. The most striking difference is the increasing tendency of the American economy to inflation and all the evils and immoralities associated with inflation. Between 1904 and 1929, the consumer price index rose about 89 per cent, and between 1945 and 1970, about 115 per cent. Of this inflation virtually all was war connected in the earlier period whereas only something like three-fifths was war connected in the later period when uncurbed speculative activity as well as governmental fiscal and monetary policy contributed to inflation. Very little effort has been made, however, to reimburse those defrauded by government-created inflation, much of it intended to cure short-term unemployment—with about one-half running four weeks or

[47] Clark, chap. 4. On the insensitivity of big governmental organizations, see Robert Moses, "Does Federal Reorganization Matter?" *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 9, 1971, p. 4. On deficit finance in the 1930s, see J. R. Davis, "Chicago Economists, Deficit Budgets, and the Early 1930's," *American Economic Review*, LVIII (1968), 476-82.

[48] W. Leontief, "Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts," *American Economic Review*, LXI (March 1971), 1.

[49] Output and employment data are from the *Annual Report of the Council of Advisers*, Feb. 1971, pp. 19-22.

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less—and much of it the product of man-made barriers to employment—of unwillingness to change jobs, of unattractive tradeoffs between work and relief, and perhaps of entry into the labor force with unreal expectations and small intent to find employment. There is little assurance that inflation will generate the increase in employment sought in the United States or the economic development sought in economically lagging countries. Indeed, as R.A. Mundell points out, inflation causes unemployment in the United States and undermines that country's economic power and standing.[50]

Even as war and governmental whim create an unstable economy, often too dependent upon highly specialized and inflexible industries (such as the aerospace industry) that tend to collapse upon withdrawal of support, so does inflation generate an unstable economy prone to shrink upon withdrawal of its unnatural and necessarily transitory stimulus. In contrast, when the public sector is small and every decision maker free to make the most of his flexible, disposable, and usually market-oriented resources, the flow of expenditure is relatively stable and continuous, especially in economies with low rates of population growth and reduced emphasis upon nonconsumables.

The dangers lurking in the public sector are great, since that sector is under the empire of whim, unwarranted confidence in the cybernetic capacity of governmental bureaucrats, and the search of politicians for survival in a politically Hobbesian world. Not surprisingly, therefore, according to one study the public sector "has been the major source of cyclical instability" while monetary policy has served to exacerbate inflationary pressures.[51] Confidence in federal management of the national economic framework, whipped up by the New Frontiersmen and their fellow travelers in the early 1960s, has since been dissipated. "The late Sixties," writes Ways,

[50] R.A. Mundell, *The Dollar and The Policy Mix: 1971*, Essays in International Finance, No. 85 (Princeton, May 1971). See also H.G. Johnson, "Is Inflation the Inevitable Price of Rapid Development or a Retarding Factor in Economic Growth?" *Malayan Economic Review*, XI (1966), 22-28; G. S. Dorrance, "The Effect of Inflation on Economic Development," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* (March 1963), 25-31; Arthur Burns, "The Basis for Lasting Prosperity," *Monthly Review* of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (Jan. 1971), 2-7; Leijonhufvud.

[51] Paul W. McCracken, "Economic Policy in the Age of the Employment Act," in I.H. Siegel, ed., *Manpower Tomorrow: Prospects and Priorities* (New York, 1967), 73-86, esp. 74, 77.

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"brought another round of disillusionment," great inflation, high unemployment, and no growth, "a combination that had been considered improbable under almost any set of policies."[52] Even the integrity of policy makers is called into question by the report of a close student of the political scene to the effect that he finds it profitable to base his speculative undertakings in the market on the supposition that an American president always begins pump priming in the third year of his administration in order to stimulate employment and his party's chances at election time.[53]

The dangers that lurk in turning control of economies over to simplistic disciples of dead philosophers cannot be matched by those lurking in policies advocated by sociologists and political scientists, again in disregard of the complexity of the societal system and subsystems to which the latter would apply policies transmuted out of a few selected and imperfectly representative observations. All can, however, contribute to a climate of opinion insensitive to costs, externalities, and many relevant elements, processes, functional relations, and underlying concerns.[54] Such insensitivity is partly responsible, however, for the passage of the educational legislation of the 1960s, now found largely to have failed. It probably contributed to the steady conversion of Sweden's "middle way" into a stasis-ridden society, and, one author suggests, "con" game masquerading as a welfare state.[55]

Controlling Hubris

Guarding society against the evil effects of *hubris* calls for corrective action, particularly by social scientists themselves, since the recurrence of the adverse effects of unwise policies imputed to social scientists could destroy confidence in their skills and thus deprive society of what it badly needs. There is need for at least three courses of action. The first need, now probably the least attainable of major needs, consists in modification of the political structure. Decentralization of economic and political authority and decision-making would be most effective. It would deprive *hubris*, wherever it devel-

[52] Ways, 66.

[53] "Allen's Law," *Time*, Feb. 15, 1971, p. 14.

[54] On such disregard, see E.J. Mishan, *The Costs of Economic Growth* (New York, 1967), and Mishan, *Welfare Economics* (New York, 1964).

[55] "Caught in the Middle," *Barron's*, Mar. 1, 1971, pp. 1, 8.

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oped, of most of its leverage and capacity for harm, particularly if decision makers remained subject to an effective system of penalties and rewards as well as to disciplining tests of performance—conditions which are consistent with the realization of objectives of countrywide impact. A reversal of the centralizing trends underway for nearly three centuries thus is indicated, together with the cybernetizing of vast, insensitive, and ever-expanding federal bureaucratic structures (such as the Department of Defense) and the diminution of the national managerial and fiscal role of the state, currently lauded by social scientists as well as by subjective proletarians and lumpenintelligentia. There is need, second, to immunize social and other scientists against *hubris*, though not by shortening the scientific reach more than its grasp. This can be done in two ways: (a) by stressing the empirical bases, mechanisms, and complexities of the systems through which policies must be carried out, together with the heavy social costs associated with ill-conceived policies; and (b) by emphasizing the inadequacies of the social sciences, particularly in respect to their capacity to generate effective problem-solving techniques.[56] Third, foundations and other suppliers of research funds can contribute notably by allowing more support to imaginative research and inquiry and less to pedestrian and expensive quantitative trivia, by demanding *real* evidence of policy potential when research is defended on such ground, and by weakening the control currently exercised over socal-science practice and policy by a self-extending "elite."

Max Ways notes the need for "a public temper both more humble and more resolute."[57] Improvement in the communication of information between the scientific community and the underlying population could stimulate feedback, making for greater responsibility in both quarters. Such improvement needs to assume at least two forms, improvement in terminology and increase in the relevance of "information." "Semantic aphasia . . . habitual and prolonged abuse

[56] See Joseph J. Spengler, "Is Social Science Ready?" *Social Science Quarterly*, L (1969), 449-68; also the many accounts of the failure of economists to contribute effectively to the solution of problems confronting underdeveloped countries, such as, S. Wellisz, "Lessons of Twenty Years of Planning in Developing Countries," *Economica*, XXXVIII (1971), 121-35. See also representative pieces in G.M. Meier, ed., *Leading Issues in Economic Development* (2d ed.; New York, 1970); also C. P. Snow, *Public Affairs* (New York, 1971).

[57] Ways, 128.

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of words," common to all social science, needs to be given up.[58] Mathematical models need to map more closely upon the real world. Witness K.E. Boulding's description of a recent *magnum opus* on economic growth as an "interesting mathematical exercise, which throws very little light on the conditions of any real world."[59] It has even been implied that while economists proclaim cures for many nonexistent diseases, they are able to cope with few that do, in fact, afflict man. Thus F.H. Hahn writes that "there is something scandalous in the spectacle of so many people refining the analysis of economic states which they give no reason to suppose will ever, or have ever, come about." Moreover, they mislead people to believe that they "actually know how an economy is to be controlled. . . . It is an unsatisfactory and slightly dishonest state of affairs."[60]

Given improvement in the communication of social science information and more realistic assessment of the comparative serendipity component of social science, the pressure of the market for the wares of social science will greatly reduce its affliction with *hubris*. Adeptness at modest communication of useful knowledge is bound to increase in utilitarian significance as the public at large becomes increasingly aware that social scientists are writing in too great measure for each other—taking in each other's esoteric verbal wash, so to speak. Having become aware of this state of affairs, philanthropoids, agents of the state, and currrently captive audiences will demand a greater return on their investment in social science. The resulting outcome, especially the resulting increase in serviceability, should augment the overall demand for the services of social scientists and allow them to displace products of law schools and engineering-oriented planner factories from areas of public and private need. These areas are often badly served by engineers who

[58] Melvin Maddocks, "The Limitations of Language," *Time*, Mar. 8, 1971, pp. 36-37. See also Joseph J. Spengler, "Notes on the International Transmission of Economic Ideas," *History of Political Economy*, II (1970), 133-51; W. G. Bennis, "The Failure and Promise of the Social Sciences," *Technology Review* (Oct.-Nov. 1970), 39-42; Paul Halmos, "Social Science and Social Change," *Ethics*, LXIX (1959), 102-19; Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York, 1968), III, 1839-42. Many critiques of the use of ambiguous or ineffective language could be cited.

[59] K. E. Boulding, review in the *Journal of Economic Literature*, VII (1969), 1162. Cp. G. C. Harcourt's review in *ibid.*, IX (1971), 92.

[60] F. H. Hahn, "Some Adjustment Problems," *Econometrica*, XXXVIII (1970), 1-2.

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neglect the sensitivity of man to the market and the system of penalties and rewards, by lawyers with their emphasis upon the adversary principle, unempirical descendant of the duel and the ordeal,[61] and by what Richard Hofstadter described as "a massive adversary culture," one making for conflict when what is needed, as Kenneth Boulding has observed, is greater recourse to self-correcting mechanisms.[62] Needed also is aesthetic sensibility and awareness of the best of what the world community of man has produced over the centuries.

[61] See Joseph J. Spengler, "Cost of Specialization in a Service Economy," *Social Science Quarterly*, LI (1970), 237-62, esp. 248-49, 257, 259-61.

[62] See the *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XXIV, No. 8 (1971), 16-17, reporting an address by Daniel P. Moynihan together with comments by Boulding.

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Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1946-1970*

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For centuries man has recognized the utility of urbanization as a causal variable explaining individual political behavior. Recent research, however, has yielded contradictory results. While Huntington and others assert that urbanization involves the creation of both stabilizing and destabilizing political influences, Inkeles and Nie *et al.* find little evidence that urbanization exerts any significant independent influence upon man's political behavior.[1] In an attempt to clarify the role of urbanization in the political processes of relatively less developed nations, this paper investigates the relationship between urbanization and the qualitative aspects of political participation in Colombia between 1946 and 1970.

Imprecise definitions have been a perennial source of confusion in the study of urbanization. Although they are often closely related, urbanization is not modernization or industrialization or urban mi-

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968), 300-01; Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 1138; Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Parts I and II," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 368, 819.

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gration. It is a process of population concentration which can be measured by the rate of change in the rural-urban distribution of a nation's population.[2] In Latin America, urbanization has been the result of migration, a falling death rate, and a steady, very high birth rate.

Theory and Countertheory

In traditional urbanization theory, the political effects of urbanization are said to be caused by alterations in social relationships.[3] Urbanization is usually accompanied by a societal shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, from interpersonal relations of status to relations of contract.[4] Only rarely have these changes in social interaction occurred without simultaneous or prior urbanization. The effects upon the individual are primary-group breakdown, the destruction of traditional norms and values, and, in the absence of reintegrating mechanisms, the development of large-scale alienation and personal anomie.[5] At this point, the peculiar conditions created

[2] Hope Tisdale, "The Process of Urbanization," *Social Forces*, XX (1942), 311; John D. Durand and César Peláez, "Patterns of Urbanization in Latin America," in Clyde V. Kiser, ed., *Components of Population Change in Latin America*, Part II of *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XLIII (1965), 180.

[3] A notable exception is Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, 1958). While Lerner's famous thesis posits a causal chain from urbanization to political participation and economic development, his work is directed toward a communications theory of modernization. See also D. Lerner, "A Scale Pattern of Opinion Correlates: Communication Networks, Media Exposure, and Concomitant Responses," *Sociometry*, XVI (1953), 266-71; D. Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization," in Lucien W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), 327-50. Lerner's concepts have been applied in an analysis of Colombia by Everett M. Rogers, *Modernization Among Peasants, The Impact of Communication* (New York, 1969), 44 ff.

[4] Sir Henry James Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (5th ed.; London, 1874), 170 ff.; Ferdinand Tönnies, *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)*, trans. and ed. Charles P. Loomis (New York, 1940); Max Weber, *The City*, trans. and ed. Don Martindale and Gertrude Neuwirth (Glencoe, 1958); Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in Kurt H. Wolff, trans. and ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (New York, 1964), 152-53, 163, 328; Emile Durkheim, *On the Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1964).

[5] Much of the literature produced by the Chicago school of sociology helped to popularize this conception. In particular, see Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (1928), 881-93; Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (1938), 1-24; L. Wirth, "Urban-Rural Differences," in Elizabeth Wirth Marvick and Albert J. Reiss Jr., eds., *Community Life and Social Policy*

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not by urbanization but by the economic system determine the political effects of a large pool of anomic or potentially anomic individuals. If economic growth permits substantial upward mobility, anomic activity will lack the scope and intensity necessary to create political disorder.[6] If, on the other hand, an anomic population is confronted by a stagnant, underdeveloped economy, feelings of economic deprivation will tend to create a sizable societal substratum, the radical poor.[7] Unless economic conditions improve and provide a modicum of satisfaction to these marginal urbanites, "at some point, the slums of Rio and Lima, of Lagos and Saigon, like those of Harlem and Watts, are likely to be swept by social violence, as the children of the city demand the rewards of the city."[8]

Traditional theorists argue, furthermore, that even without social violence, concentration of the radical poor in large urban centers is conducive to political instability, for it is in the cities that political

(Chicago, 1956), 172-76. Critiques include Wilbert E. Moore, "A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (1960), 810-17; Francisco Benet, "Sociology Uncertain: The Ideology of the Rural-Urban Continuum," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VI (1963), 1-23; William H. Key, "Rural-Urban Social Participation," in Sylvia Fleis Fava, ed., *Urbanism in World Perspective* (New York, 1968), 305-11; Theodore Caplow, "The Social Ecology of Guatemala City," *Social Forces*, XXVIII (1949), 132; Gustavo Pérez Ramírez, R.P., "La urbanización y el cambio social en Colombia," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* (Puerto Rico), IX (1965), 203-08.

[6] See, for example, Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London, 1967), 65. Theoretically, it is equally possible to minimize anomic activity by the creation of an illusion of mobility through the dispersion of prestige goods to the lower strata of society. See Lloyd A. Fallers, "A Note on the Trickle Effect," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVIII (1954), 314-21; and the concise summary in Marion J. Levy Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton, 1966), II, 784-88.

[7] Glaucio Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in Brazil," in I.L. Horowitz, ed., *Revolution in Brazil* (New York, 1964), 195; Charles Harr, "Latin America's Troubled Cities," *Foreign Affairs*, XLI (1963), 536-49; Ramírez, 215. The theory of the radical poor is summarized and criticized in chapter two of Joan Nelson's very useful monograph, *Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations*, Harvard University Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 22 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 27 ff.

[8] Huntington, 238. See also Kenneth Fox Johnson, *Urbanization and Political Change in Latin America* (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1963), 138, 140; K.F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVII (1964), 439-41; Harr, 542, 544; Stella Lowder, "Lima's Population Growth and the Consequences for Peru," in *Urban Population Growth and Migration in Latin America: Two Case Studies* (Liverpool, 1970), 30.

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organizations are best able to mobilize the indigent population of relatively less developed nations. Each anomic, deprived individual is a potential part of a manipulatable mass, ready to respond to the direction of radical political ideologies or authoritarian, charismatic leadership.[9]

Over the course of the past two decades, behavioral scientists have found that their survey research data often bear scant resemblance to the postulates of traditional urbanization theory. Anthropologists and sociologists have been particularly persistent in attacking the principal assumption of the theory—the inevitability of changes in social relationships—when applied to urban life in relatively less developed nations.[10] Primary groups do not collapse, traditional norms and values persist quite strongly, and, even in those instances where urbanization has altered social relationships, the newly urban man has apparently been able to adapt admirably.[11] Other investi-

[9] Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sánchez* (New York, 1961), xxvii; Alan Angell, "Party Systems in Latin America," *Political Quarterly*, XXXVII (1966), 313, 316; Torcuato di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *Obstacles to Change in Latin America* (London, 1965), 53; Alistair Hennessy, "Latin America," in Ghiţa Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., *Populism, Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London, 1969), 29; David J. Butler, "Charisma, Migration, and Elite Coalescence," *Comparative Politics*, I (1969), 428-29; Philip L. Wagner, "Political Implications of Rapid Urbanization in Caribbean Countries," Paper delivered at the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Miami Beach, April 22-26, 1962; Hobsbawm, 63.

[10] Much of the theoretical confusion can be attributed to generalizations from early urban sociologists' studies of North American cities, which had the ethnocentric quality of ascribing to any urban center the peculiar characteristics of Chicago. See Caplow, 132; Benet, 2.

[11] Bernard J. Siegel, "The Role of Perception in Urban-Rural Change: A Brazilian Case Study," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, V (1957), 255; Robert O. Blood Jr., "The Impact of Urbanization on American Family Structure and Functioning," *Sociology and Social Research*, XLIX (1964), 16; Charles Wagley, "Luso-Brazilian Kinship Patterns: The Persistence of a Cultural Tradition," in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, eds., *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (New York, 1964), 174-89; Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case Study," *Scientific Monthly*, LXXV (1952), 31-41; Lisa Redfield Peattie, *The View from the Barrio* (Ann Arbor, 1968), 40, 49; Douglas S. Butterworth, "A Study of the Urbanization Process among Mixtec Migrants from Tilantango in Mexico City," *América Indígena*, XXII (1962), 257-74; Richard N. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IV (1962), 485; Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janiero," in Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Latin America* (New York,

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gators concentrating upon the economic aspects of urbanization have found that the urban poor do not have unrealizable expectations of immediate advancement and perceive little, if any, relative deprivation.[12] Apparently, even when perceived, the tremendous gap between the urban poor and the small upper and middle classes is not often translated into class antagonism or political radicalism. Moreover, a limited number of studies have shown that poverty is not omnipresent among the lower classes of less developed nations with more dynamic economies.[13] Urbanization, as such, is apparently not a causal factor to be used to explain political radicalism or instability.

Two recent studies have gone beyond an analysis of the relationship between urbanization and radical political activity and have questioned the value of urbanization for explaining any type of political participation. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt have found that "knowing the size of the community in which a citizen lives adds nothing to our understanding of his general level of political participation." Far from encouraging participation, "living in larger cities decreases the probability that the citizen will participate in local affairs" and "has no significant independent effect on rates of national participation."[14] Inkeles, in his six-nation study of participant citizenship and the factory, has found

1961), 191-205; Bert N. Adams, "Kinship Systems and Adaptation to Modernization," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, IV (1968-69), 47-60; José Matos Mar, "The Barriadas of Lima: An Example of Integration into Urban Life," in Hauser, 175; Oscar Lewis, "Further Observations on the Folk-Urban Continuum and Urbanization with Special Reference to Mexico City," in P.M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore, eds., *The Study of Urbanization* (New York, 1965), 500-01; Bertram Hutchinson, "The Migrant Population of Urban Brazil," *América Latina*, VI (1963), 41-72; Ramírez, 219.

[12] Nelson, 51, 66; Andrew Whiteford, *Two Cities in Latin America: A Comparative Description of Social Classes* (New York, 1964), 120; Daniel Goldrich, "Toward a Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America," in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams, *Contemporary Cultures and Societies in Latin America* (New York, 1965), 363-66; William Mangin, "Poverty and Politics in Cities of Latin America," in Warner Bloomberg Jr. and Henry T. Schmandt, eds., *Urban Poverty: Its Social and Political Dimensions* (Beverly Hills, 1968), 186-87.

[13] Wayne A. Cornelius Jr., "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 838. Cornelius's perceptive article is not only an analysis of the political correlates of Mexican urbanization, but an outstanding bibliographical source as well.

[14] Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 368, 819.

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> [it is] difficult to argue that it is the stimulation of urban life rather than his experience at work which makes the factory worker more fully a participant citizen. . . . When matching controlled for the amount of factory work a man had, not much predictive power remained in the measure of years of urban experience.[15]

Latin American Urbanization

Since Latin America currently maintains the highest rate of population growth ever recorded at any time in demographic history, it is not surprising that, even in an era of global urbanization, Latin America is urbanizing more rapidly than any other region in the world. Latin America's population is substantially more urban than that of the rest of the Third World, more so than southern Europe, and only slightly less urbanized than central Europe or the Soviet Union. Today, only the populations of northwestern Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand are significantly more urban than Latin America's. Even in historical comparison, Latin America is now urbanizing at a more rapid rate than the highly urbanized members of the Western community ever reached.[16] Table 1 illustrates this dramatic urban shift.

Colombia's demographic characteristics in many ways are representative of Latin America as a whole. Conservatively calculated as growing at the rate of 3.2 per cent annually, the Colombian population is doubling every 23 years. [17] Approximately one million Co-

[15] Inkeles, 1138. For a dissenting analysis of urbanization and industrialization in Brazil that found both variables to be powerful predictors of modern political participation, see Joseph A. Kahl, "Urbanização e mundanças ocupacionais no Brazil," *América Latina*, V (1962), 21-30.

[16] Durand and Peláez, 170-71, 177; Louis J. Ducoff, "The Role of Migration in the Demographic Development of Latin America," in Kiser, 206; John P. Powelson and Anatole A. Solow, "Urban and Rural Development in Latin America," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLX (1965), 48-62; Jaime Dorselaer and Alfonso Gregory, *La urbanización en América Latina* (Bogotá, 1962); Centro de Investigación y Acción Social, *La revolución demográfica* (Bogotá, 1966); Luis Calderón *et al.*, *Problemas de urbanización en América Latina* (Bogotá, 1963).

[17] In Colombia, a primary and confusing source of data on deaths and, especially, births is the Roman Catholic Church. It is not clear to what extent the births of illegitimate children and Protestants, for example, are excluded, estimated, or actually enumerated in the Church's statistics. In other areas of data collection and analysis, however, Colombia cannot be considered an under-

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lombians witnessed the struggle for independence between 1810 and 1819; there were four million Colombians at the turn of the century and 21.5 million in 1970. The most noticeable manifestation of this growth has been the nation's rapid urbanization during the twentieth century. As late as 1938, 70.9 per cent of the population lived in rural areas (population less than 1,500); today the figure is 45 per cent. In the 13 years between the two censuses of 1951 and 1964, an almost incredible one-third of the entire rural Colombian population under the age of 40 in 1951 had left for an urban area by 1964.[18] While the nation's population increased during these 13 years by 51.4 per cent, urban areas grew by 111.6 per cent. In the decade 1960-70, Colombia's rural population maintained an annual growth rate of 1.4 per cent, while the largest cities' populations increased at the average rate of 7.2 per cent per annum.[19] Table 2 illustrates this urbanization process during the past twenty years.

Unlike most Latin American nations, however, Colombia's urbanization process has not been focused on one principal city. In 16 of the twenty Latin American nations, 50 per cent or more of the urban population lives in one metropolitan area, while less than 25 per cent of Colombia's urban population lives in Bogotá. A four-city index of first-city primacy (population of the largest city divided by the combined populations of the next three largest cities) shows Colombia to have the second (to Brazil) lowest index of one-city domination. The development of a primate city apparently depends in part upon the easy communications that are hampered by the extremely difficult geographical conditions in Colombia.[20]

developed nation. Several data-gathering agencies and institutions are staffed by extremely competent personnel.

[18] T. Paul Schultz, *Internal Migration in Colombia: A Quantitative Analysis* (Santa Monica, 1968), 29; Kingsley Davis and Ana Casis, "Urbanization in Latin America," in Kiser, 151; Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina, *Urbanización y marginalidad* (Bogotá, 1969), 11-25.

[19] Alejandro Angulo, S.I., *Movimiento de la población colombiana* (Bogotá, 1969), 25; Kingsley Davis, *World Population 1950-1970* (Berkeley, 1969), I, 149.

[20] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, XXIX (1939), 226-32; Davis, I, 244; Durand and Peláez, 176, 182; Arnold S. Linsky, "Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, LV (1965), 506-13; Yolanda Ortiz, "Algunas dificultades de adaptación de las poblaciones rurales al pasar al medio urbano en los paises latinoamericanos, especialmente en Colombia," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, XIX (1957), 27-28.

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TABLE 1

Latin American Urban-Rural Population Projections, 1960-1980

	1960		1970		1980	
	Millions	*%*	*Millions*	*%*	*Millions*	*%*
Urban*	94.6	46.2	145.2	53.2	215.2	59.2
Rural	110.3	53.8	127.9	46.8	148.4	40.8
Total	204.9	100.	273.1	100.	363.6	100.

* Localities of 2,000 or more inhabitants

Source: Ducoff, 198.

TABLE 2

Per Cent of Colombian Population in Rural and Urban Areas, 1950-1970

		Urban Population by Size of City			
	*Rural**	*Less than 100,000*	*100,000-500,000*	*500,000-1,000,000*	*More than 1,000,000*
1950	63.0	19.7	12.0	5.4	0
1960	53.7	22.1	12.4	3.8	8.1
1970	45.0	19.8	10.9	7.4	17.0

* All persons not living in towns of 1,500 or more people

Source: Davis, I, 124.

TABLE 3

*Population Growth of Colombia's Major Urban Centers, 1918-1970**

City	*1938*	*1951*	*1964*	*1967*	*1970*
Bogotá	229	450	1179	1435	1666
Medellín	212	452	976	1163	1301
Cali	223	624	1401	1683	1911
Barranquilla	236	433	772	881	960
Cartagena	165	250	471	543	603
Bucaramanga	205	450	921	1085	1203
Manizales	199	292	513	584	648
Pereira	207e	400e	627e	747e	766e
Cúcuta	194	322	584	696	779
Ibague	203	326	540	606	661
Mean	207	399	798	942	1049

* 1918 = 100
e = author's estimate

Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística

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Of great significance to traditional urbanization theory is the relationship between the pace of economic development and the 6 to 10 per cent annual population growth rate of Latin America's largest (100,000+) cities. In an area where economic development cannot hope to match consistently this rapid pace, let alone surpass it, a condition of hyperurbanization—a disequilibrium between the levels of urbanization and economic development—must inevitably occur.[21] Throughout the underdeveloped world, the large city has not been the product of industrialization; rather it is the manifestation of an imbalance in rural-urban economic development, population pressure on agricultural land, and a dramatic drop in mortality rates.[22] To a great extent, urbanization has simply meant the transfer of rural poverty to an urban environment.[23]

Colombia represents the typical Latin American pattern. Since 1918 the nation's ten largest cities have, on the average, doubled in population more than ten times (see Table 3). In recent years, approximately 40 per cent of this increase can be attributed to the excess of urban births over urban deaths and 60 per cent to rural-urban migration. In 1969, 18.6 per cent of Colombia's population had migrated to the city, and of this group, 77.5 per cent were living in departmental capitals. Today, more than 50 per cent of the population of such major cities as Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cali, and Villavicencio is of rural or small-town origin.[24]

The extent to which economic development has failed to keep pace with urbanization in Colombia is evident. Although in mid-1970 it was said that the economy was "in the best shape it has ever been in, with real growth in GNP [6.6 per cent in 1969, 7.5 per cent estimated in 1970] among the highest in the hemisphere,"[25] urban

[21] John Friedmann and Tomás Lackington, "Hyperurbanization and National Development in Chile: Some Hypotheses," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, II (1967), 3; Schultz, 30-31.

[22] Although the assumption has been disproved by Schultz, it is still frequently assumed that Colombia's violence has been a major cause of urban migration; see Schultz, 29-30. For a contrary opinion, see Sam Schulman, "Family Life in a Colombian 'Tugurio,' " *Sociological Analysis*, XXVIII (1967), 186.

[23] Davis and Casis, 161; Philip M. Hauser, "Social Upheaval in the Cities," *Yale Political*, II (1963), 13. A supporting analysis of Santiago, Chile, is Juan Carlos Elizaga, "Internal Migrations in Latin America," in Kiser, 144-65.

[24] Angulo, 21; John P. Powelson, "The Land Grabbers of Cali," *The Reporter*, XXX, Jan. 16, 1964, p. 30; Lloyd H. Rogler, "Slum Neighborhoods in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, IX (1967), 508 ff.

[25] Economist Intelligence Unit, "Colombia-Ecuador," *Quarterly Economic Review*, No. 2 (1970), 1.

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social statistics gave a contrary appraisal. Urban unemployment in Colombia's major cities was four to six times higher than it was fifteen years ago, ranging from 10-16 per cent. If current urbanization and economic growth rates persist, by 1975 urban unemployment will double to 20-32 per cent. During the decade 1960-70, the lowest unemployment rate in Bogotá was 6.7 per cent (March 1964) and the highest 16.1 per cent (April 1967).[26] A recent survey found the *lowest* unemployment rate in Colombia's major cities to be 9.8 per cent in Bucaramanga, and the mean rate of eight cities to be 16.1 per cent. In addition, social mobility is apparently a remarkable exception in the Colombian urban labor force. While intergenerational upward mobility is somewhat in evidence, there appears to be little opportunity for the fulfillment of whatever rising expectations may exist.[27] Finally, the presence, but *not* necessarily the perception of relative deprivation can be well documented by statistical analysis as well as by casual observation. A composite analysis of five different studies shows 5 per cent of the Colombian population receives 38 per cent of the national income; and 97 per cent of the capital, 73 per cent of the land, and 48 per cent of the national income are in the hands of 10 per cent of the population.[28]

The Colombian Perspective

Between the presidential elections of 1946 and 1970, Colombia endured a quasi-fascist civilian dictatorship, more than a decade of the bloodiest rural political warfare in South America's history, a populist military dictatorship characterized by both social concern

[26] Robert L. Slighton, *Urban Unemployment in Colombia: Measurement, Characteristics, and Policy Problems* (Santa Monica, 1968), v, 16; Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Unidad de Recursos Humanos, División de Trabajo, "El empleo en Colombia: diagnóstico y recomendaciones de política," *Revista de Planeación y Desarrollo* (Bogotá), II (1970), 159, 161.

[27] Carlos García N., *Movilidad ocupacional: análisis de una encuestra en cinco cuidades colombianas* (Bogotá, 1968), 91-93. Measurements of the extent of social mobility are always controversial. One author who has found a great deal of upward mobility in a more specialized sample is James L. Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (New Haven, 1968), 42. García's findings are substantiated by Rafael Prieto, "Causas del desempleo y movilidad de la fuerza de trabajo de Bogotá," in *Empleo y desempleo en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1968), 172-73, 186.

[28] "El empleo en Colombia," 256, 259. There is some evidence to suggest that relative deprivation is perceived. See Ramiro Cardona, *Las invasiones de terrenos urbanos, elementos para un diagnóstico* (Bogotá, 1969), 24 ff.

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and overweening vanity, and twelve years of a unique National Front coalition government. An understanding of this context is essential to the understanding of Colombia's electoral patterns.

The Colombian political system is often cited as Latin America's best example of two-party politics. As early as 1848, the progovernment political groups had adopted the Conservative party label and, for lack of a more imaginative nomenclature, the opposition became the Liberal party. As was true elsewhere in Latin America, crucial issues of federalism, protective tariffs, and the role of the Church gradually became less salient, while, through patronage and, at times, brute force, each of the political parties was able to develop strong support at all levels of Colombian society.[29] Party membership became, and to only a slightly lesser extent remains today, an integral part of the socialization process. In Colombia, a highly significant component of individual identity is political party membership. With ego involvement in politics so prevalent, it is to be expected that Colombia's partisan contests have been extremely emotional.[30]

Colombia's progress toward modern populist politics began with the election of 1930, when Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera, taking advantage of an internal feud in the opposition, was able to end fifty years of Conservative domination of national politics. Confused by the world depression and plagued by inexperience, the Olaya administration was not noted for its innovations. That of his successor, Alfonso López Pumarejo, however, was indeed a radical departure from traditional Colombian politics. Although López's *revolución en marcha* was a classic example of moderately paced modernization by an established elite, it also exhibited populist ten-

[29] Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, *Historia de Colombia* (8th ed; Bogotá, 1967), chaps. 9-10; William M. Gibson, *The Constitutions of Colombia* (Durham, 1948), 191-200. For a Conservative approach, see Guillermo Salamanca, *Los partidos en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1961). A Liberal interpretation of the same time period in Milton Puentes, *Historia del partido liberal colombiano* (2nd ed.; Bogotá, 1961). An interesting paper questioning many traditional studies of early Colombian party history is Frank Safford, "Social Aspects of Political Alignments in Colombia, 1820-1860," Paper delivered at the 36th Annual Meeting of the Southern Historical Association, Louisville, Nov. 14, 1970.

[30] Orlando Fals Borda, *El hombre y la tierra en Boyacá* (Bogotá, 1957), 191 ff.; Payne, 194; Charles W. Anderson, "*La violencia* in Colombia," in C.W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, eds., *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), 112.

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dencies. In an attack upon the plutocracy's resource monopoly, López attempted to establish popular support as the dominant political currency.

The effects of Alfonso López's populist policies became evident in the election of 1946, when dissident Liberal Jorge Eliécer Gaitán became one of the few presidential candidates in Colombian history to appeal directly to the people without the mediation of a traditional political party. A thorough democrat, Gaitán, who was engaged in the unpatrician occupation of criminal lawyer, had leaped to national prominence in the late 1920s through his investigation of the bloody repression of a banana workers' strike. Gaitán's inspired oratory attracted a large urban mass following and the undying enmity of traditional party leaders. When he was refused his party's presidential nomination in 1946, Gaitán campaigned as an independent and managed to win 26 per cent of the total vote, running third to the two traditional candidates.

The immediate effect of Gaitán's iconoclasm was to split the Liberal party and permit Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez to be elected with a 41 per cent plurality. As the first Conservative administration in sixteen years quickly redirected the allocation of the nation's spoils, reports of incidents of rural violence grew in frequency. As was true after the Liberals won in 1930, Conservative domination of local political structures and instruments of force apparently gave rise to abuses of power. In 1946, however, either the Conservatives were more abusive or the Liberals more resistant, or both, and, except along the Caribbean coast and in the southernmost departments, rural violence was widespread.

Although by 1948 *la violencia* had already begun, it was the assassination of Jorge Gaitán that started a five-year bloodbath. At lunchtime on April 9, 1948, while the Seventh Inter-American Conference of Foreign Ministers was beginning at the nearby Capitol, Gaitán was shot as he walked out of his office twenty yards from the busiest street corner in Colombia. Crowds gathered and a week-long riot, the *bogotazo*, began, during which the center of Bogotá was demolished and the life of President Ospina saved only by the narrow streets around San Carlos Palace that would admit but a small part of the angry mob. For the first time since protectionist artisans forcedly dictated the selection of the president in 1849, Bogotá witnessed the power of direct popular action.

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La violencia continued with a rising fury through the Conservative administrations of Ospina, Laureano Gómez (1950-51), and Gómez's *designado*, Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez (1951-53). There existed what Colombia's *Semana* magazine and Payne have termed a "defensive feud," during which neither side was able to accept the other's plea for peace. Colombia became a classic example of the praetorian state. Finally, in June 1953, with the blessing of everyone save Laureano Gómez, Army General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed the presidency. Through declarations of amnesty, pacification programs, and an honest attempt to restore a semblance of impartiality to the administration of justice, Rojas's initial attempts to pacify the nation were notably successful. Displaying only contempt for the two traditional political parties, Rojas ruled with the approval of his docile National Constituent Assembly. His Third Force policies were decidedly populistic, probably in imitation of his contemporary, Argentina's Juan D. Perón.

Within three years of his takeover, however, Liberal and Conservative leaders became convinced that Rojas had no intention of returning to them control of Colombian politics. United Liberal and Conservative opposition, increasing violence, Church disapproval, a hemispheric trend toward civilian government, and an almost pathological vanity sealed Rojas's fate. In May 1957, he was sent into exile. In a plebiscite on December 1, 1957, Liberal and Conservative leaders asked for and received popular approval of a National Front coalition government. During the ensuing twelve years (later lengthened to sixteen) all government positions were to be divided equally among members of the two traditional parties. Later negotiations determined that the presidency alternate between the parties every four years. The first president of the National Front, Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo, was elected almost without opposition and assumed office on August 7, 1958. Conservative Guillermo León Valencia (1962-66) and Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), a distant cousin of Alberto Lleras, were also elected with only modest opposition.[31]

[31] Unquestionably the most reliable accounts of Colombia political history from 1930 are John D. Martz, *Colombia, A Contemporary Political Survey* (Chapel Hill, 1962); and Robert H. Dix, *Colombia, The Political Dimensions of Change* (New Haven, 1967).

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The election of 1970 was the first in 24 years in which the Colombian voters were given the opportunity to choose a radical candidate and reject the traditional policies of the National Front. Aging and ill, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla very nearly was elected president. Rojas had voluntarily returned to Colombia in October 1958 and was forced to stand trial before the Colombian Senate in 1959 on charges of misuse of power and public funds. Finding him guilty, the Senate revoked Rojas's political rights, only to be overruled by the Supreme Court in 1966. In the meantime, in 1960, Rojas formed his own political party, the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO—the National People's Alliance), ran for the presidency in 1962, and campaigned vigorously for ANAPO's presidential candidate in 1966, José Jaramillo Giraldo. More importantly, during the decade of the 1960s, ANAPO became the most highly centralized and efficiently organized large political party in Colombia. Under the leadership of Rojas and his daughter, María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno Díaz, ANAPO concentrated its considerable energies upon building an image of the party of the common man.[32]

That ANAPO is a radical political party and not merely the personalist vehicle of an authoritarian, semi-charismatic leader remains to be proven. In tradition-bound Colombia, ANAPO's program of populist social welfare and economic nationalism, combined with a posture of total opposition to the National Front, clearly marks the party with a radical label. Although reformers are found frequently in Colombian politics, the same radical approach of 1970 had been seen before only in Jorge Gaitán's 1946 presidential bid.

Colombian Voting Patterns

Colombia is divided administratively into 22 departments (*intendencias*) and 8 territories (*comisarías*). Within each department or territory the basic administrative unit is the *municipio*, which somewhat resembles a small county in the United States. Depending upon their size and population, the 915 *municipios*, in turn, are divided into three types of smaller units: *corregimientos*, *inspecciones de*

[32] An interesting analysis of the 1970 election campaign is Thomas G. Sanders, "Rojismo: The Resurgence of Colombian Populism," *Fieldstaff Reports*, West Coast South America Series, XVII (1970).

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policía, and *caseríos*. While it is relatively easy to classify these sub-*municipio* units as either relatively urban oriented or relatively rural oriented, a major methodological consideration is the similar classification of the larger *municipios* themselves. Although generally quite small except in cases of vast rural expanses of jungle or plains, any procedure that attempts to distinguish between urban and rural *municipios* is fraught with methodological dangers, not the least of which is the lack of urban or rural voter homogeneity within each *municipio*.[33] Another classification problem arises from the location of several rural *municipios* within a few miles of major urban *municipios*. Constant close contact with a large urban *municipio* has the effect of making these rural areas relatively urban oriented.

To minimize these problems, two methods were devised to identify relatively urban-oriented *municipios*. The first and simpler was used for the 1946 election analysis. Using interpolations of census data,[34] relatively urban-oriented *municipios* were defined as those with cities with populations in excess of 5,000 or with a *cabecera* (county seat) within 20 kilometers of a major city of 20,000 or more people. For the elections of 1962, 1966, and 1970, relatively urban-oriented *municipios* were defined as those with a city of 20,000 or more people, those with *cabeceras* within 33 kilometers of a major city of 50,000 or more people, or those that had a population density per square kilometer greater than 50 and were served by air and surface mail, telegraph, telephone, banks, and electricity.

The data to be analyzed are the votes for president in 1946, 1962, 1966, and 1970.[35] Since the use of the common Left-Right political

[33] At this point it is well to emphasize that these data are designed to illuminate the voting patterns of small administrative units, *not individuals*, and valid generalizations about individuals from aggregate data of this type are probably impossible. The prolonged discussion of the ecological fallacy began with William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, XV (1950), 351-57. See also O. Dudley Duncan and Beverly Davis, "An Alternative to Ecological Correlation," *American Sociological Review*, XVIII (1953), 665-66; W. Phillips Shively, " 'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 1183-96.

[34] Dirección General de los Censos, *Censo general de población, 5 de julio de 1938* (16 vols.; Bogotá, 1938); Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, *Censo de población del 9 de mayo de 1951* (Bogotá, 1954); Dirección Nacional de Estadística, *Anuario general de estadística, 1946* (Bogotá, 1946).

[35] The results of the elections of 1949 and 1958 are excluded because there was no effective competition. In late 1949, Conservative Laureano Gómez was

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classification schema in an analysis of Colombian politics probably obscures more than it illuminates, presidential candidates and their parties are designated as either traditional or radical. Colombian radicalism does not necessarily mean a socialist orientation; it is characterized by the promotion of a fundamental change in the social structure, that is, strong antitraditionalism, which may not be any more socialistic than traditional-party programs. Table 4 identifies the traditional and radical candidates and their total vote from 1946 to 1970.

In the analysis below, the radical candidates and parties of 1946 and 1970 are assumed to be fairly comparable. Although there are striking dissimilarities—Gaitán had more charisma, Rojas a better organization—an analysis of their writings, speeches, and party programs reveals a common blend of populist demagogy and virulent antitraditionalism. The elections of 1962 and 1966 were quite different. In 1962 the vote for Alfonso López Michelson was a mild expression of radicalism, since López had always been identified with the reformist wing of the Liberal party. His Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL—Liberal Revolutionary Movement) was poorly organized, and its principal program, the *Plan de SET*, clearly made the party less antitraditional than Gaitán in 1946 or Rojas in 1970. In addition, in 1962 as well as in 1966, Rojas's ANAPO was so weak organizationally that it could campaign vigorously only in the largest cities.[36] For these various reasons, therefore, data from the 1962 and 1966 elections are used only as indicators of the source,

elected president without opposition. In 1958, Liberal Alberto Lleras was the single presidential candidate of the newly formed National Front. The only opposition candidate was archconservative Jorge Leyva, who had bolted the Conservative party after its majority faction leader, Gómez, either refused or was unable to nominate him as the first National Front candidate. Under the agreements between Gómez and Lleras that established the coalition, the first president was to have been Conservative. Liberal pressure and Conservative indecision forced agreement on a sixteen-year period and presidential alternation. Gómez may have preferred to have a Conservative in the presidential palace when the Front expired rather than when it began. Leyva also ran in 1962. Since his candidacy was primarily based upon nonideological opposition to the National Front and, perhaps, little more than personal anger at Gómez, his political godfather, Leyva's votes have been eliminated from this analysis. A somewhat contradictory interpretation of the Gómez-Leyva conflict is given by Pat Holt in *Colombia Today—and Tomorrow* (New York, 1964), 43.

[36] See Dix, for the most accurate source of electoral information on the early years of the National Front.

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but not the strength, of the radical vote.

For the four elections, the source of the radical vote is shown in Table 5 and its relative strength in 1946 and 1970 is given in Table 6. The data clearly indicate a strong relationship between urban residence and antitraditional voting.[37] To further explore this relationship, two other tests were conducted. First, the 1970 vote in five geographically representative departments was broken down to the smallest available subunits (*corregimientos* and *caseríos*), and the vote in the most rural of these subunits was compared to the total departmental vote. The results are summarized in Table 7. Second, the 1946 and 1970 radical votes in Colombia's 15 largest cities and 21 large secondary urban centers was compared with the national totals. The comparisons are shown in Table 8. These two tests appear to substantiate the assertions that a concomitant of urban residence is a relatively large antitraditional vote and that a similar concomitant of rural residence is a relative acceptance of traditional political parties and programs.

A significant finding is the limited extent to which radical candidates have increased their share of the vote in the largest urban centers. Rojas received nearly 13 per cent more of the total national vote than did Gaitán, yet his gain in the large cities was limited to less than 4 per cent. Even when the more numerous urban *municipios* are considered (see Table 6), Rojas's urban gain of 7.5 per cent was significantly lower than his rural gain of nearly 12 per cent. In other words, while Colombia's urban population and urban poverty were clearly increasing at a rapid pace between 1946 and 1970, the percentage vote for antitraditional presidential candidates increased only slightly in Colombia's urban centers.

Observers have often noted that since the 1920s Colombia's larger cities are differentiated by the changing nature of their occupational structure. Thus certain rapidly growing urban centers that have developed a relatively large secondary sector (Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cali, Medellín, Palmira) are often contrasted with the somewhat less dynamic regional capitals (Ibague, Neiva, Pasto, Popayán, Tunja), with populations that continue to grow but with economies

[37] The reason for the strong rural vote for López's MRL in 1962 is still considered a mystery. The most plausible explanation is that Liberal *campesinos* refused to vote for a Conservative National Front candidate. An alternative, humorous account is given in Payne, 234-35.

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TABLE 4

Colombian Presidential Candidates, 1946-1970

		Vote	*Per cent*
1946	*Traditional:* Mariano Ospina Pérez (C)	565,849	41.43
	Gabriel Turbay (L)	441,199	32.30
	Radical: Jorge Eliécer Gaitán	358,957	26.27
		1,366,005	100.
1962	*Traditional:* Guillermo León Valencia (C)	1,633,873	70.53
	Radical: null votes*	682,664	29.47
		2,316,537	100.
1966	*Traditional:* Carlos Lleras Restrepo (L)	1,881,502	71.73
	Radical: José Jaramillo Giraldo (ANAPO)	741,203	28.27
		2,622,705	100.
1970	*Traditional:* Misael Pastrana Borrero (C)	1,625,025	40.94
	Belisario Betancur Correa (C)	471,350	11.88
	Evaristo Sourdis (C)	336,286	8.47
	Radical: Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (ANAPO)	1,536,608	38.71
		3,969,269	100.

* Because Alfonso López Michelson had failed to declare his candidacy as a Conservative and because Gustavo Rojas's political rights had been revoked by the Senate, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ruled in 1962 that their votes would be counted but considered null.

Sources: Contraloría General de la República, *Revista de la Contraloría General* (Bogotá, 1946), 3-19; Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, *Organización y estadísticas electorales, marzo y mayo de 1962* (Bogotá, 1962), 167-203; Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, *Organización y estadísticas electorales, marzo 20 y mayo 1 de 1966* (Bogotá, 1966), 243-79; Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, unpublished electoral data, 1970.

TABLE 5

The Geographical Source of the Radical Vote, 1946-70
(in per cent)

	1946	*1962*	*1966*	*1970*
Urban *Municipios*	50.11	51.25	64.51	66.39
Rural *Municipios*	49.89	48.75	35.49	33.61
	100.	100.	100.	100.

$X^2 = 9.0584$, $p < .05$

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TABLE 6

The Relative Strength of the Radical Vote, 1946 and 1970 (in per cent)

	1946	*1970*
Urban *Municipios*	35.91	43.66
Rural *Municipios*	20.69	32.21
Total Vote	26.27	38.71

$X^2 = 0.5825$, not significant at the .05 level

TABLE 7

1970 Presidential Vote in Five Departments by Total Vote and by Very Rural Caseríos *and* Corregimientos *(in per cent)*

	Traditional	*Radical*
Cauca: Department Total Vote	74.73	25.27
Very Rural *Caseríos* (N = 60)	97.89	2.11
César: Department Total Vote	52.80	47.20
Very Rural *Caseríos* (N = 9)	76.54	23.46
Cundinamarca: Department Total Vote	43.88	56.12
Very Rural *Caseríos* (N = 15)	75.82	24.17
Santander: Department Total Vote	39.05	60.95
Very Rural *Caseríos* (N = 50)	77.49	22.51
Tolima: Department Total Vote	52.44	47.56
Very Rural *Caseríos* (N = 16)	82.32	17.68

TABLE 8

Radical Vote in Large Urban Areas (in per cent)

	National Total	*Largest Cities (100,000+)*	*Secondary Urban Centers (50,000-100,000)*
1946	26.27	41.29	36.86
1962	29.47	27.77	39.39
1966	28.27	34.68	31.82
1970	38.71	45.27	40.22

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that still rely heavily upon the local agricultural sector. While it is often hypothesized that the former type of city would be more likely than the latter to respond to the appeals of antitraditional candidates, Table 9 reveals the existence of no such systematic relationship in either the 1946 or 1970 presidential elections. In addition, the same table indicates the lack of any systematic relationship between city size and the strength of the antitraditional vote. Rojas was able, however, to make a more respectable showing in a larger number of urban areas than any previous radical candidate, for Gaitán's strength was highly erratic and concentrated primarily along the Atlantic coast and in Bogotá.[38] The fact that Rojas also made significant radical gains in rural areas (Table 6) is probably due to his efficient party organization and the greater ease of communication. As Table 7 indicates, however, even a strong organizational effort cannot yet break the strength of the traditional parties in Colombia's most rural areas.

In sum, the use of Colombian national election data to test current concepts of the political effects of urbanization yields mixed results. As urbanization has accelerated, the development of an increasingly large urban radical voting bloc has, as yet, failed to materialize. Nevertheless, it is clearly evident that radical candidates obtain a disproportionate amount of their electoral strength from urban areas.

Traditional urbanization theory also hypothesizes that within major urban centers rapid urbanization without rapid industrialization should create a lower class whose political identification is with radical parties and candidates.[39] Until 1970 this hypothesis had never been tested in Colombia. The few sample surveys that were conducted delivered inconclusive results, and the use of aggregate data was precluded by Colombia's practice of providing centralized voting booths, with all voters traveling to the center of town to cast their ballots. There they would choose a voting booth according to their randomly distributed *cédula* (identification card) number. In 1970,

[38] Much of Gaitán's rural support, and a significant percentage of his total vote, came from the banana plantation regions along the Atlantic coast. Gaitán's vote in much of the rural highlands was particularly weak.

[39] Richard Senters, *The Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness* (Princeton, 1949), chaps. 5-6; Philip Coulter and Glen Gordon, "Urbanization and Party Competition: Critique and Redirection of Theoretical Research," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXI (1968), 274-88.

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TABLE 9

Radical Presidential Vote in Colombia's Sixteen Largest Cities, 1946 and 1970 (in per cent)

City	*1946*	*1970*
Bogotá	57.66	44.94
Medellín	5.30	43.75
Cali	37.86	47.25
Barranquilla	68.20	38.96
Cartagena	65.77	49.40
Bucaramanga	21.58	59.02
Manizales	17.93	28.03
Pereira	26.90	29.09
Cúcuta	42.95	52.50
Ibague	42.41	46.29
Palmira	49.69	25.19
Armenia	28.83	41.50
Monteria	42.97	51.86
Ciénaga	60.63	33.04
Pasto	23.63	44.37
Santa Marta	57.56	60.50
Mean	41.29	45.27

TABLE 10

Presidential Vote by Stratified Barrios, Bogotá, 1970 (in per cent)

	Slum	*Lower*	*Middle Lower*	*Middle*	*Middle Upper*	*Upper*	*Total*
Betancur	4.05	9.12	13.16	20.28	18.42	9.85	13.15
Pastrana	17.86	30.25	35.50	58.53	67.28	78.30	40.23
Rojas	78.02	60.22	50.67	18.67	11.23	8.00	45.45
Sourdis	0.07	0.41	0.67	2.52	3.07	3.85	1.17
	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100. *

$X^2 = 188.29$, $p < .001$

* 1.13 per cent of the Bogotá votes were declared null or were cast blank.

however, Bogotá and Medellín experimented successfully with decentralized *puestos* (voting places). In addition, during 1969-70 Colombia's very capable Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE—National Statistical Department) conducted a

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housing survey in Bogotá and Cali.[40] Using several indicators but concentrating upon the relationships between number of inhabitants and the size and type of habitation, DANE located each of Bogotá's *barrios* (small neighborhoods) on a six-level stratification table, ranging from *tugurio* (slum housing) to *alta* (upper-class residential area).

Through the use of decentralized voting data and DANE's housing survey, a fairly accurate analysis of the relationship between the vote and social class can be obtained. Several of the *barrios* are too heterogeneous to classify, and they have been omitted from this analysis. While the remaining *barrios* are quite homogeneous in social-class composition, it would be an error to attempt generalizations about the voting patterns of individuals from this aggregate data. The least reliable data are probably from the upper- and middle-class categories, where votes from live-in servants may slightly distort the homogeneity of the *barrio*. The extent of servant political participation is probably not greatly significant, however, since many Colombian domestics are young girls whose ages and/or interest in politics may restrict their voting.[41] The lower-class *barrios* are extremely homogeneous.

The results of the 1970 presidential election in Bogotá by stratified *barrio* are given in Table 10. Because the three traditional candidates offered somewhat distinct programs, each candidate's vote is given separately. Evaristo Sourdis was primarily a moderately reformist regional candidate from the Atlantic coast whose presidential hopes depended upon a deadlock among the other three candidates. He was not expected to win many votes in Bogotá. Belisario Betancur, a young-looking former labor leader, campaigned as the most progressive of the traditional candidates and particularly curried the favor of the middle class. Misael Pastrana was the official National Front candidate, young (46 years old), energetic, and ostensibly quite reform-minded. All three men's programs were in clear opposition to Gustavo Rojas's radical populism, directed exclusively at the lower-class urban voter.

The correlation between lower-class *barrios* and antitraditional voting is clearly significant, as is the relationship between upper-

[40] *Encuesta de hogares, 1970* (unpublished).

[41] Peter Snow, "The Class Basis of Argentine Political Parties," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 166.

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class *barrios* and traditional voting. The middle-class *barrios*, whose middle-class residents are often believed to be ideologically dependent upon the upper class, demonstrated a significant degree of progressiveness and independence in their vote for Betancur and even antitraditionalism in their vote for Rojas. These aggregate results were verified by an unusually competent survey analysis conducted by Miles W. Williams, Rodrigo Losada, and associates of the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá immediately after the April 1970 election.[42] Although the sample of 470 voters probably contained an exaggerated number of *pastranistas*, the strong relationships between low social status and a high radical vote and between high status and a high traditional vote are clearly present. The Betancur vote, however, was evenly distributed among each of the six social classes.

Conclusion

As the work of Nie, Inkeles, and others has clearly demonstrated, it is not possible to assume any type of linkage between urbanization and individual electoral behavior. Nevertheless, urbanization is an important variable that can be used to illuminate if not explain certain aspects of Colombian political behavior. In Colombia, urban political awareness is manifested in part by lower class urban radicalism. Although Colombian politics are extremely volatile, the extent to which this radicalism might develop into action other than voting for a populistic, antitraditional candidate is not clear. Even the prevalence of lower-class radicalism is not easily measurable from voting statistics, for although in 1970 voting participation was lowest in Colombia's lower-class residential areas, aggregate data do not explain the reasons for lower-class abstention. ANAPO spokesmen claim that the relatively low slum turnout was due to a lack of adequate voting facilities in pro-Rojas *barrios*.

Both this relatively low rate of lower-class participation and the low rate of antitraditional voting in many of Colombia's larger cities may be tentatively attributed, at least in part, to the persistence of traditional rural norms among recently urbanized migrants. Although relatively little is known about the migration process in Co-

[42] Miles W. Williams, Rodrigo Losada *et al.*, "El voto presidencial en Bogotá: análisis de comportamiento electoral del 19 de abril de 1970," in *Informe al Congreso 1970* (Bogotá, 1970), xv-xliii.

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lombia, a significant proportion of migrants to the largest cities almost certainly moves directly from rural or semirural environments.[43] Hence, the Colombian tradition of strong identification with the Liberal and Conservative parties and the often mentioned but little investigated Hispanic predilection for paternalistic and authoritarian leadership may combine to stifle radical voting behavior in those *barrios* where the *rojista* and *gaitanista* organizations failed to penetrate the existing social structure and to destroy traditional allegiances. Further research would undoubtedly reveal a strong relationship between the strength of local level antitraditional political organizations and the vote for antitraditional candidates as well as a clear difference in voting patterns between lower-class *barrios* populated by recent migrants and those inhabited by long-time urban residents.

Although Nie, Powell, and Prewitt have found that it is organizational membership and social mobility and not urbanization that governs rates of political participation and Inkeles has found that it is factory experience and not urban life that produces participant citizenship, in most of Latin America, widespread organizations, social mobility, and factories do not exist in rural areas. All three are urban phenomena. Urbanization is clearly neither sufficient nor necessary for political change in Latin America, as the rural sugar workers of coastal Peru and the rural banana workers of Colombia can well attest. Given the physical constraints of Latin America's developing nations, however, urbanization is clearly a variable capable of facilitating *but not automatically causing* the breakdown of rigid traditional political loyalties.

[43] A somewhat contradictory hypothesis positing a "fill-in" migration process that systematically selects the most capable and highly motivated individuals to move to progressively larger cities is William P. McGreevey, "Causas de la migración interna en Colombia," in Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, *Empleo y desempleo en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1968), 216-18. See also William L. Flinn, "The Process of Migration to a Shantytown in Bogotá, Colombia," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XXII (1968), 81.

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Political Virtue in the Age of Jackson

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The neoclassical ideal of the lawmaker formulated by the Founding Fathers was the "virtuous republican" whose hallmark was his active and exclusive concern for the public good and the general welfare. He was expected to display the detached and disinterested judgment of the statesman, to behave with integrity and independence, and publicly to debate issues purely on their merits. This ideal was instrumental in determining the earliest national image of the republic and its leaders. As a strong party system developed in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, however, legislators learned that in order to stay in politics they had to act like party men. They began to see the principled party as an instrument of service to the nation and to make a virtue of the sacrifices party loyalty entailed.[1] Consequently, the idea of the nonpartisan as the bearer of republican virtue had to be changed; armed with new political values, rhetoric, and weaponry, the "virtuous republican" was transformed into a political partisan, the "democratic soldier."[2]

[1] Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era* (Chapel Hill, 1966), 29; Lynn L. Marshall, "The Strange Stillbirth of the Whig Party," *American Historical Review*, LXXII (1967), 445-68.

[2] I am indebted to Professor Eric McKitrick of Columbia University for this phrase. For details of the transformation of political values, rhetoric, and weaponry from 1789-1840, see my "The Republic of Virtue and Other Essays on the Politics of the Early National Period" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia Univer-

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The emergence of this new ideal legislator was a symptom of the growth of a new role in an age of mass politics—the special role of the popular politician.

The organization and continued operation of party machinery absorbed the energies of thousands of participants and enlisted the special skills of leaders who took the initiative in creating parties and superintending their activities. The details varied with the individual state, but the overall structure was essentially the same. The party was coordinated through a network of committees, headed by a state committee usually created at the general state convention. Here officers of the state committee and members of the party's central committee were selected. The central committee was a national body which wrote an address to the people, communicated with the state committees, supervised the activities of the county committees, and chose an electoral ticket with electors pledged to the candidates. The Jackson forces in 1828 also marshalled an 8-member state central committee in Nashville and a 24-member national central committee in Washington, D.C.[3] The success of their efforts revealed the necessity for an active, well coordinated political organization.

The value of organizational efficiency did not go unperceived by the losers.[4] In the campaign of 1832, Henry Clay urged Francis Brooke: "Let our friends organize, throughout the State; let each county be divided into sections, and let one or more members of your Committees of Vigilance be designated in each to bring the voters to the polls, and I incline to think that you would win the day. All this should be put in motion by some central committee."[5] The lesson of the 1828, 1832, and 1836 elections was obvious: "where parties are nearly balanced, that which is disciplined, and in a state of complete organization, is almost sure to prevail over its adversary."[6] Whig bosses like Thurlow Weed of New York became adept

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sity, 1970) and my "Political Rhetoric in the Age of Jackson," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XXIX (1970-71), 360-71.

[3] Robert V. Remini, *Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party* (New York, 1959); Robert V. Remini, *The Election of Andrew Jackson* (Philadelphia, 1963), 88-94, 63, 70; McCormick, 253.

[4] Remini, *Election of Andrew Jackson*, 164.

[5] Clay to Brooke, Aug. 5, 1832, in Calvin Colton, ed., *The Life, Correspondence and Speeches of Henry Clay* (New York, 1857), IV, 341-42.

[6] Clay to Brooke, Apr. 2, 1839, *ibid.*, IV, 440.

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in organizational techniques and were soon able to challenge effectively their Democratic opponents.[7]

By 1840, both the Democratic and Whig parties were national parties, balanced and competitive within the states and poised to contest energetically the presidential election. From Ohio came reports that were typical of the situation in virtually all of the states:

> The two parties are now for the first time perfectly organized, and the candidates are nominated on principles. Never before in this state were the party lines so handsomely drawn. Conventions named the men, and all personal considerations are sunk in devotion to party. New York is not better organized than most of our counties here are; party discipline pervades all classes.[8]

The political delirium of the 1840 election reflected sixteen years of organizational effort culminating in the second American party system.[9]

To be sure, not everyone favored the new developments. A New Yorker confided to his diary:

> Really, I'm beginning to wish this affair ended; the novelty of the thing is over and I'm tired of humbug, swearing, O.K., and the Old Hero. Nothing but politics. The newspapers crowded out their advertisements for mendacious "returns" that nobody believes, the walls are papered three deep with humbug; banners and inscriptions dangle over every street, mass-meetings are held in every groggery from National Hall down. If the North River were actually on fire, or if a live kraken were to sail in the harbor, or if the continent of Europe were to sink in the sea the papers wouldn't be able to find room for the news.[10]

One can sympathize with Strong, for by 1840 politics had become an all-pervasive social phenomenon. Throughout the Jacksonian period there was a tendency to elect more officials at more levels of government. Consequently, elections were more frequent and party

[7] See Glyndon Van Deusen, *Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby* (Boston, 1947). Thurlow Weed, *Life of Thurlow Weed* (New York, 1884).

[8] Francis Granger to Thurlow Weed, Sept. 2, 1840, in the Francis Granger Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. For confirmation of this point, see Adam W. Snyder to General Semple, Apr. 6, 1840, John F. Snyder Manuscript Collection, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Ill.

[9] Robert G. Gunderson, *The Log-Cabin Campaign* (Lexington, Ky., 1957); McCormick, *passim*.

[10] George T. Strong, Nov. 3, 1840, in Allan Nevins and Milton H. Thomas, eds., *The Diary of George Templeton Strong* (New York, 1952), I, 151.

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functions more numerous and complex. For increasing numbers of men, political life became a vocation, and partisans became organization men ready to receive their marching orders.[11]

In 1838, in his classic work on the art of war, Baron Henry Jomini described the characteristics of a perfect army.[12] With a few modifications, these coincide with what American politicians came to see as the prerequisites of an effective political party. The American political party was concerned with organization on a nationwide level, recruitment, drill, discipline, subordination, rewards, campaign operations, and the generation of esprit de corps. The politicians of the age of Jackson perceived—in a reversal of Clausewitz's dictum—that politics was war carried on by other means.

The letters of Postmaster-General John Milton Niles written from Washington during the summer and fall of 1840 help illustrate the point. Niles advised the Democratic party to act like a "skillful general" ready to deal "a sudden blow at the enemy," for nothing less than "a life and death struggle" was in the offing.[13] Niles's letters read like battlefield communiques:

> The parties are contending armies each having several lines. Ohio now is our front line, which will be weakened by breaking the line of the other western states. If we sustain that in October, we shall do well enough and without much doubt carry New York. If our line is broken in Ohio, the enemy fall upon New York but with increased powers and the result will probably turn on that state.

He speaks of an impending meeting "to consider what is to be done, to endeavor to roll back the tide of war," declaring the dawn of "a new era in political warfare": "The old modes of conducting campaigns being abandoned on one side and new weapons and new modes of fighting adopted, we are compelled to meet them with the same weapons or such others as their new tactics may require."[14]

Throughout the campaign, the postmaster-general acted as a faithful sentinel of the party. He frequented the city post office to see "who is sending out the instructions of War," and urged speak-

[11] McCormick, 30, 342, 344.

[12] Baron Henry Jomini, *Summary of the Principles of the Art of War*, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia, 1862), 43-44.

[13] See Niles to Gideon Wells, July 12 and Aug. 9, 1840, in the Wells Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress.

[14] *Ibid.*, Niles to Wells, Aug. 12, 1840.

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ers to "take the field."[15] By mid-September his attention was focused on Maine: "If Maine has not essentially given way we must heave away our cartrich boxes and charge the enemy and continue to charge until the election. It is too late for musketing at a distance; the fight must be by charging the enemy and dislodging him and breaking his lines and driving him from his positions."[16] In October, Niles spent his evenings in party organization meetings and writing articles for the *Globe*. By mid-month, he resigned himself to a "Waterloo defeat" and feared that "democracy is doomed in this country."[17]

Congressman John Bell of Tennessee was one of the first legislators to acknowledge explicitly the analogy between party and war. In his Vauxhall Garden speech of May 1835, Bell announced his rupture with the Democratic party and deplored its excesses. He noted the striking resemblance and close analogy "between the operations and results of actual physical war, and these civil dissensions and violent party conflicts." His address abounds with references to "ammunition," "attacks," "cause," "coalition," "conquest," "destruction," "discipline," "fierce struggle," "firing into a bomb-proof battery," "foe," "guard," "militia," "mercenaries," "obedience," "partisans," "party operations," "political warfare," "posts," "power," "recruit," "rank and file," "spoils," "standard," "stratagem," "summary justice," "tactics," "valor," "victim," and "victory." Bell declared: "We have, in truth, in the last eight or ten years been in a continual state of moral war; a war in which the same passions and peculiar talents have often been conspicuous, which are usually developed in actual physical war."[18]

The new political morality posited the success and preservation of the party above all other considerations; the new ethic called for party loyalty, obedience, and a self-effacing attitude. Concern with the party's welfare often superseded concern for the national welfare, although partisans would not have acknowledged this attitude and vehemently denied such accusations when they emanated from

[15] *Ibid.*, Niles to Wells, July 12 and Sept. 6, Sept. 14, 1840.

[16] *Ibid.*, Niles to Wells, Sept. 14, 1840.

[17] Niles to Wells, Oct. 17, 1840, in the Wells Manuscript Collection, New York City Public Library. See also the letters of Niles to Wells of Oct. 6, 11, 16 and Nov. 2, 3, 7, 15, 1840.

[18] John Bell, *Vauxhall Garden Speech* (May 23, 1835), 11, 6-7, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tenn.

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their opponents. Partisans equated promoting their party with promoting the general welfare of the mass of the people, thus diluting the partisan connotations of party identification.[19]

In remarks delivered in Congress, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania made the identification between party interest and national interest:

> The Senator from Virginia has of late appealed to us often to rise above mere party, and to go for our country. Such appeals are not calculated to produce any deep impression on my mind; because in supporting my party, I honestly believe I am, in the best manner, promoting the interest of my country. I am, but I trust not servilely, a party man. I support the present President not because I think him the wisest or best man alive, but because he is the faithful and able representative of my principles. As long as he shall continue to maintain those principles, he shall receive my cordial support; but not one moment longer. I do not oppose my friends on this side of the House, because I entertain unkind feelings towards them personally. It is against the political principles, of which they are exponents that I make war.[20]

The positive functions which parties performed were strongly asserted. These included:

(1) An educational function—"Where there is no party, and a general apathy prevails among the people, they will not inform themselves on political subjects."

(2) A programmatic function—"Parties must exist to carry out any great measure, or otherwise it will not succeed. Acting on great principles without concert is like an army moving to battle without a general."

(3) A censoring function—"Parties also have great influence on one another, and on the members, to make them responsible, and

[19] Michael Wallace, "Politicians and Statesmen: Conflicting Views on Party Loyalty and Party Legitimacy in the United States, 1815-1828" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1966), 20-22 and *passim*, and Michael Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: New York, 1815-1828," *American Historical Review*, LXXIV (1968), 453-91. See also Dixon Ryan Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York, 1801-1840* (New York, 1919), 283; Paul Ingersoll Miller, "Thomas Ewing, Last of the Whigs," (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1933): "The Whigs continually, in private letters and in public papers, referred to the Jacksonians as "collar men" with the implication that they went where they were led" (83, n. 69).

[20] Statement of Senator Buchanan of Feb. 14, 1839, *Congressional Globe*, 25th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1838-39, Appendix, 210.

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thereby cause them to act right."[21]

In addition, parties served as an informal network of influence for making nominations and filling offices; as a mediating force between government and the governed; as a unifying force providing continuity of personnel and policy; as an instrument of organizing, directing, and controlling power, careers, loyalties, and sentiments; as a vehicle for organizing the public imagination on a nationwide basis; and as an institutionalized channel to deal with opposition.[22]

By the end of the Jacksonian period, the party system was considered natural and even beneficial. John Bell voiced what appears to have been the majority sentiment: "In every free community, there will be a diversity of sentiment in relation to the policy and interests of the country, which will give rise to parties. When founded upon principle, and an honest difference of opinion, parties seem to be healthful in their operation in a free state."[23] It was evident that both the Democratic and Whig parties were "great, bland, enveloping coalitions" rather than the "limited homogeneous, fiercely aggressive special interests" that James Madison had envisioned. The fact of political parties was not evidence of a decay of libertarianism; they were the condition of its existence. "The insight that underlies our acceptance of the two-party system, that the conflict of parties can be made to reinforce rather than undermine liberty,"[24] had become a recognized fact.

This dramatic change between the generations of Jefferson and Jackson in the sentiments regarding party and republican virtue is revealed in an 1838 exchange between two congressmen of the Old Dominion. James M. Garnett, representative from 1805-09, wrote in answer to his nephew, Robert M. T. Hunter, representative from 1837-43 and 1845-47 and later senator from 1847-61, who had argued in favor of public men becoming party men:

[21] The quotations are from John Reynolds, *My Own Times: Embracing Also The History of My Life* (Chicago, 1879), 284, 294.

[22] Frank J. Sorauf, "Political Parties and Political Analysis," in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., *The American Party Systems* (New York, 1967), 53. See also Eric McKitrick, "Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts," in Chambers and Burnham, 117-51; and Remini, *Martin Van Buren*, 193.

[23] Bell, *Vauxhall Garden Speech*, 7.

[24] Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840* (Berkeley, 1969), 72, 73.

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I think you utterly wrong in the notion which you seem to entertain, that to be useful in public life, a man *must* join some political party or other. *This* I most confidently believe to be one of the greatest, the most fatal errors that any honest public man ever committed; and therefore I am painfully excited to prevent (if I can) a most beloved sister's son, whom I highly value, for his own merits, from adopting a creed which would paralise his own usefulness, and so far strengthen the damnable doctrine of political *Partyism*. Don't understand me as fearing that you will ever knowingly fall into party-ranks; but I much fear the effect of your apparent belief, that all men must be either drones, or non-entities in political life, unless they will fall into these ranks, and be led or driven, as party politics require. My own belief *is* and always *has been*, ever since I had a capacity and moral right to believe anything, that the entire stock of knowledge and power which any man possessed to contribute to the welfare and happiness of his species, might always be beneficially exercised, under our Institutions, without his attaching and binding himself to any party whatever, either in politics, morals, or religion. Such attachment and binding might appear, for a time, to increase his *power*, because it increased his popularity; but it would always prove a 'penny wise and pound foolish' business. *This* is the all important, the vital fact of which it is indispensably necessary that all honest public men should assure themselves. As *party-men*, they *may* gain and exercise great personal influence; but it is an 'ignis fatuus' which cannot possibly delude those who understand its real nature; and the mischief is, that all who have been once led astray by the *false light*, will always hesitate to that which is certainly *true*, certainly of *heavenly* origin.[25]

Not only had the politicians accepted the legitimacy of party in Jacksonian America, they also accepted the more sophisticated idea of the legitimacy of an opposition party. No less a spokesman than Henry Clay expressed this idea in a speech delivered in 1844:

I am a Whig: I am so because I believe the principles of the Whig party are best adopted to promote the prosperity of the country. I seek to change no man's allegiance to his party, be it what it may. A life of great length and experience has satisfied me that all parties aim at the common good of the country. The great body of the democrats, as well as the whigs, are so from a conviction that their policy is patriotic. I take the hand of one as cordially as that of another, for all are Ameri-

[25] Garnett to Hunter, Jan. 14, 1838, in "Correspondence of Robert M.T. Hunter, 1826-1876," ed. Charles Henry Ambler, Annual Report of the American Historical Association (1916), 28-29.

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cans. 'I place COUNTRY far above all parties.' Look aside from that, and parties are no longer worthy of being cherished.[26]

The event which polarized opinions and galvanized partisan loyalties in that period was the war against the "Monster." "Here," Marvin Meyers declares, "the party formed, or found, its character . . . . the war against the Bank became a general struggle to preserve the values of the Old Republic."[27] The attempt of Bank president Nicholas Biddle to obtain a renewal of his Bank's charter in early 1832 was clearly an attempt to embarrass the president during his reelection campaign. Jackson's veto of the rechartering bill, on the other hand, was a political bombshell.

The political aspects of this struggle are most revealing. Jean Wilburn observes that "about one half of the senators who voted against the Bank were actually men who were known to be, or had expressed themselves to have been, in favor of the Bank. Indeed, some had actively fought for the Bank." She explains this apparent inconsistency: "Very simply, these men felt it more important to support Jackson *at this time*, just prior to the election, than to hurt his chances of reelection by placing him in the position of having to veto or sign a bill on the Bank. If the bill for re-charter failed in Congress, no comment from Jackson would be required."[28] The nine senators who voted against the Bank before the veto, but who are known to have favored the institution, included William R. King of Alabama, John Forsyth of Georgia, Elias K. Kane of Illinois, Powhatan Ellis of Mississippi, Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, Bedford Brown and Willie P. Mangum of North Carolina, Stephen D. Miller of South Carolina, and Felix Grundy of Tennessee.[29] Wilburn explains that "those who voted against the Bank but were pro-Bank in sentiment cast their votes the way they did because they gave Jackson's reelection priority over the Bank issue. Had they cast their votes in favor of the Bank, the renewal of the charter would have been assured. But party unity came first."[30]

[26] Epes Sargent, *The Life and Public Services of Henry Clay* (New York, 1860), 218.

[27] Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief* (New York, 1960), 10, 17.

[28] Jean A. Wilburn, *Biddle's Bank: The Crucial Years* (New York, 1967), 11-12.

[29] *Ibid.*, 15-16.

[30] *Ibid.*, 122.

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To a certain extent, party unity on this issue had already crystallized in reaction to the Senate's earlier rejection of Martin Van Buren as minister to England. Since Clay, Calhoun, and Webster had opposed Van Buren and supported the Bank as part of Clay's American System, the Democrats would naturally oppose the Bank. The rejection of Van Buren had drawn party lines tight, for eight of the nine Senators who voted against the Bank but were believed to have been pro-Bank in sentiment had also voted for Van Buren's confirmation.[31]

The president himself, of course, belongs in the very center of the Bank War. His fighting instincts were aroused by the challenge of the "Monster," which he perceived as an "irresponsible" institution spending its funds "as a means of operating upon public opinion" with "power to control the Government" and alter its character. Jackson referred to the Bank as a "vast electioneering engine."[32] "The Bank, Mr. Van Buren, is trying to kill me, but," he vowed, "I will kill it."[33] Forewarned, Van Buren and the Albany Regency, though believing the Bank War a risky venture, fell into line!

> Many Jacksonian party leaders in New York City had no trouble living with Biddle's monster during the 1820's, and some of them served that monster effectively and enthusiastically. Their subsequent political hostility to the Bank of the United States resulted from the call for party discipline following the declaration of the Bank war. Jackson had cracked the whip and most Jacksonians responded.[34]

The Bank War was a catalyst in the formation of party loyalty and discipline.

The nullification crisis furnished another test of party loyalty. When South Carolina's Nullification Convention declared the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void and warned that any attempt to collect duties within the state would lead to immediate secession, Jackson responded characteristically. The president's proc-

[31] *Ibid.*, 125.

[32] Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Bank War* (New York, 1967), 44.

[33] John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, Annual Report of the American Historical Association (Washington, D.C., 1920), II, 625.

[34] Frank Otto Gatell, "Sober Second Thoughts on Van Buren, the Albany Regency, and the Wall Street Conspiracy," *Journal of American History*, LIII (1966), 19-40. See also Wilburn, 93-117, who cites Biddle's refusal to establish a branch bank in Albany in 1826 and 1831-32.

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lamation of December 10, 1832, was a ringing denunciation of South Carolina's defiance of the law and the Union. While Congress worked feverishly to resolve the crisis, Jackson urged a "Force Bill" upon Congress which would empower the president to take speedy action against the Carolina hotspurs. In the following weeks, the Force Bill debates in the Senate proceeded in an atmosphere of national crisis and intense drama. Some Southern Democrats bolted their party and forged a Clay-Calhoun alliance, which formed the nucleus of a potent opposition. The vote on the Force Bill served as another test of party loyalty.[35]

Felix Grundy became the president's chief lieutenant during the nullification crisis and was instructed to mobilize the party vote in the Senate. Jackson wrote to his fellow Tennesseean:

> Surely you and all my friends will push that bill through the Senate—this is due to the country—it is due to me, and to the safety of the union and surely you and others of the committee who reported it will never let it slumber one day until it passes the Senate—lay *all* delicacy on this subject aside and compell every man's name to appear upon the journals that the nullifiers may all be distinguished from those who are in support of the laws, and the union. . . . I have confidence you will push the bill, the whole bill and nothing but the bill.[36]

The final vote was testimony of Grundy's endeavors. The Force Bill passed in the Senate by a vote of 32 to 1 with Clay, Calhoun, and others abstaining. It passed in the House by a vote of 149 to 47. Both the Force Bill and the Compromise Tariff, which terminated the crisis, were approved by the president on March 2, 1833. The Jacksonians received their political baptism in the Bank War and the nullification crisis. Party loyalty became the new criterion of legislative behavior. It was a development which proceeded gradually but inexorably, though not without resistance.

John Quincy Adams, for example, remained an implacable critic of party politics and the new political morality it entailed. He complained that "the call for the yeas and nays is the bugle-horn of

[35] See William W. Freehling, *Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836* (New York, 1966); William W. Freehling, ed., *The Nulllification Era* (New York, 1967).

[36] Jackson to Grundy, Feb. 13, 1833, in Joseph H. Parks, *Felix Grundy: Champion of Democracy* (Baton Rouge, 1940), 197. See also Major L. Wilson, "Andrew Jackson: The Great Compromiser," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XXVI (1967), 64-78.

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party, and never fails to rally the pack." The ex-president lamented that bills were driven through the legislatures by well drilled parties and he denounced "rank" party men and their "prostration of principle before party."[37] The style of the statesman was passing from the national scene, and Adams was regarded as a relic of the past. Whig Representative Joshua Giddings of Ohio remarked that Adams "keeps house by himself. While in the House he consults with no one, acts in concert with no one and holds himself accountable to no one but the nation. He belongs as much to the former age as to this,—perhaps he may be said to be the connecting link between the former generation and the one now in active life."[38]

Nor was Adams alone in his denunciation of parties. No congressman disliked the role of partisan legislator more heartily than did Horace Binney, a Whig representative from Pennsylvania. Binney considered "the spirit of party" to be "a more deadly foe to free institutions than the spirit of despotism":[39]

> There is . . . a spirit of devotion to party that seems willing to surrender to it the Constitution, the laws, and the happiness of the country; and this is not suprising since the object of party devotion is party itself. The selfish principle rules and overrules everything, and men care not what they sacrificed to it, as they believe or hope that they are to be gainers by all they sacrifice. It is said by gentlemen in daily debate that the disease is idolatry, and that Jackson is the idol. This is a mistake: the idol is party, party ascendancy and power, and he is at present only the priest, and I entertain no such expectation as that his death or retirement will bring men to their senses.[40]

The Pennsylvania legislator longed to be "his own man" and concluded that Washington was "not the place for me." He wrote to his son: "Public life! Public death is a better name for it."[41] Binney retired from national politics after a single term of service. His attitude was shared by many of his colleagues.

[37] Charles Francis Adams, ed., *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* (Philadelphia, 1876), IX, 78, 131, 332, 370, 458; Allan Nevins, ed., *The Diary of John Quincy Adams* (New York, 1928), 384, 443; Adams, *Memoirs*, IX, 458, 488.

[38] Letter of Giddings, Jan. 1, 1839, in George W. Julian, *The Life of Joshua R. Giddings* (Chicago, 1892), 57-58.

[39] Speech of Binney on the removal of the deposits, in Charles Chauncey Binney, *The Life of Horace Binney* (Philadelphia, 1903), 440.

[40] Binney to Daniel A. White, Feb. 15, 1834, *ibid.*, 114.

[41] Binney to his son, Jan. 11, 1834, Mar. 4, 1835, *ibid.*, 112, 131; see, pp. 448-49 for a statement of Binney's written about 1840.

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The most common complaint of the legislators was the sacrifice of individuality and the subordination of self which party allegiance required.[42] Gulian C. Verplanck, who had been a Democratic congressman from New York, deeply regretted the new politics:

> The public man is taught in his official character to look not to the welfare or the judgment of the people as a whole, but . . . to the success and approbation of his party. Thus means usurp the place of ends. . . . He has sold his manhood for a little pelf; he must revile, and he must glorify; he must shout huzzas, or whisper calumnies, just as he is bidden. His time is not his own. His thoughts are not his own. His soul is not his own.[43]

Summing up the experience of the Jacksonian generation, Andrew Stevenson of Virginia, speaker of the House for seven years, asserted that "Party is a Bloody Idol, and spares not; and yet without Parties there can be no political principles."[44]

Throughout the period 1828-40, it became increasingly difficult for a lawmaker to remain aloof and unaffiliated. "A member of Congress," observed Illinois Representative John Reynolds, "has very little standing in that body who vacillates from one side of party politics to the other in excited party times."[45] Most of those who were unwilling to adjust to the new requirements and who doggedly pursued an independent course found public life increasingly distasteful, and many retired from the national scene.[46] Legislators who were nominally party members but who refused to demonstrate consistent regularity were increasingly condemned to politi-

[42] See the comment of Mississippi congressman Henry Cage in Edwin A. Miles, *Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi* (Chapel Hill, 1960), 79; the complaint of Kentucky senator John J. Crittenden to Orlando Brown, Dec. 27, 1835, in Mary Coleman, *The Life of John J. Crittenden* (Philadelphia, 1873), 88. See also Crittenden to Brown, Mar. 13, 1836, *ibid.*, 93, and the resentment expressed by Virginia representative William F. Gordon to his wife, Dec. 8, 1834, in Armistead C. Gordon, *William Fitzhugh Gordon, A Virginian of the Old School: His Life, Times and Contemporaries (1787-1858)* (New York, 1909), 295; Robert W. July, *The Essential New Yorker: Gulian Crommelin Verplanck* (Durham, 1951), 181.

[43] Gulian C. Verplanck, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of the American Scholar," in July, 181-82.

[44] Stevenson to William Pope, Mar. 4, 1840, in Francis Fay Wayland, *Andrew Stevenson: Democrat and Diplomat, 1785-1857* (Philadelphia, 1949), 247.

[45] Reynolds, 316.

[46] See for example, Edwin A. Miles, "Franklin E. Plummer: Piney Woods Spokesman of the Jacksonian Era," *Journal of Mississippi History*, XIV (1952), 1-34.

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cal death. "God help the victim that dare express an opinion in opposition to the orthodoxy of party. Excommunication and proscription is his inevitable destiny," wrote one congressman.[47] Those who chose not to worship the "idol" were confronted with two choices, retirement or desertion.

The deserter was ostracized by his colleagues and heaped with scorn and contempt. Congressman John Bell of Tennessee was a case in point.[48] A staunch administration supporter during Jackson's first term, Bell found his ardor for the Democratic party diminishing after 1832. His middle-of-the-road course and his absence on important roll-call votes drew unfavorable comment. Although Bell served as an able speaker and moderate partisan during the second session of the Twenty-third Congress (1834-35), he did not concur with Jackson's banking policies nor with the selection of Van Buren as heir apparent. Bell, William Rives, Nathaniel Tallmadge, and others were moving in the direction of a third party. They preferred Hugh Lawson White to succeed Jackson. In May 1835, at Vauxhall Garden in Nashville, Bell issued a personal declaration of independence from his party. Roundly condemning the "excesses" of the Democrats, he drew an analogy between his party and the Society of Jesus:

> The vows of poverty and chastity are wisely omitted; but that of absolute obedience and a renunciation of individual sentiment and opinion, are the capital and indispensable engagements of every member, who hopes to rise to distinction. As a necessary consequence of these engagements, the infallibility of the general, or chief of the order, is the principal article in the faith of all its members. An efficient and fit substitute for the dagger of the assassin, is provided in the slanders of a designated, vile and prostituted press.[49]

The Old Hero pronounced sentence. Bell's "political sun has set in Congress," Jackson wrote to Polk; "he will not get one republican vote for speaker,—this you may rely on."[50]

[47] Letter of Adam W. Snyder, Jan. 17, 1839, Snyder Ms.

[48] Norman Lexington Parks, "The Career of John Bell of Tennessee in the United States House of Representatives" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1942).

[49] Bell, *Vauxhall Garden Speech*, 18. See also Bell's statement that "a good party man, we know sir, fears neither God nor his own conscience, provided his party approve his conduct," *Register of Debates in Congress*, 24th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1836-37, XIII, 1464.

[50] Jackson to Polk, Aug. 3, 1835, in Norman Parks, 273.

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A telling example of political behavior is furnished by the career of Adam W. Snyder, a Democrat from Illinois elected to the Twenty-fifth Congress (1837-39). Shortly after arriving in Washington, Snyder started to hemorrhage from the lungs. He continually suffered from severe attacks and was "painfully convinced" that he was beyond recovery. His attendance in the House was infrequent, but he recalled, "I left a sick bed twice . . . to vote with my party in the . . . contested election."[51] Snyder's deteriorating health forced him to decline reelection, but his Illinois supporters implored him to reconsider because of mounting Whig opposition at home. His party was divided but would unify behind his candidacy. Snyder responded:

> I repeat that I am very willing to run and use all my exertion to be elected but I should cheerfully yield and aid the election of any other whom the party would run; let there be no discussion about it, I fear with all we can do we will be beat, the Whigs already are anticipating victory everywhere. They affect to believe we cannot unite or if united on any candidate he will be beaten, should Carlin be thought stronger than myself run him, 'all for the cause,' should be the war cry of the party.[52]

Snyder confessed, "I should like to run, but I prefer seeing the party triumph to any other considerations at this time."[53] Although his health had sufficiently improved, he decided to step down in the interest of his party's success. He was subsequently elected to the state senate and served as a presidential elector in 1840. Shortly before that election, he proclaimed: "I am a better Democrat than I ever was. The more desperate the affairs of the party the closer I cling to my principles. It is . . . little credit to be zealous in a victorious majority, but some to stick firmly to a cause that is going down."[54] Party loyalty of this nature was required of the democratic soldier.

Congressman John Forsyth is another excellent example of the

[51] Letter of Adam W. Snyder, Feb. 9, 1838 in Snyder Ms. See also John Francis Snyder, *Adam Wilson Snyder and his Period in Illinois History, 1817-1842* (2nd ed. rev.; Virginia, Ill., 1906).

[52] Letter of Adam W. Snyder, May 18, 1838, Snyder Ms.

[53] Letter of Adam W. Snyder, May 22, 1838, *ibid.*

[54] Snyder to General James Semple, Apr. 6, 1840, *ibid.* See also James P. Shenton, *Robert John Walker: A Politician from Jackson to Lincoln* (New York, 1961). Senator Walker of Mississippi was absent from the Senate for long periods due to a lung affliction. When he announced his decision not to run for reelection on May 1, 1839, he received a flood of Democratic protests to reconsider, and he changed his mind: "For such a party there is no honorable sacrifice which I am unwilling to make" (p. 28).

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Jacksonian style of democratic soldier. Forsyth is described by his biographer as a "political tactician" whose defense of the administration during the Bank War was a "crusade." The Georgia congressman undoubtedly believed that he was preserving and asserting his integrity when he wrote to Jackson: "I will support you to the best of my power when I think you right and oppose you without asperity when I shall be unfortunate enough to think that you have mistaken the true path."[55] Yet his biographer concludes:

> Party regularity was characteristic of Forsyth. He was a loyal and indefatigable party member. On occasion, he exhibited independence; furthermore, he did not compromise his integrity. Nevertheless, he understood the value of conformity within party ranks. He realized that divided counsel diminished the chances of success in politics and endangered the very life of the party. Therefore, Forsyth generally followed the dictates of the political organization.[56]

The John Forsyths and Adam Snyders formed the model for the democratic soldier during the Jacksonian period.

The sacrifices which political life entailed were a frequent source of reflection for partisans in their more sober moments. Amasa J. Parker wrote to his wife from the chamber of the House:

> Political reputation is hardly worth the toil and anxiety it costs and then it is ephemeral, blown about by every changing breeze, and often blighted by the frosts of adversity. Yet it is pursued under an excitement almost amounting to infatuation; it is almost deified, a goddess in whose temple thousands of the finest spirits in the land worship, before whose shrine health, genius and mental labor are offered, a voluntary tribute; and upon whose altar competence and domestic tranquility are too often sacrificed. To court a stray smile from the fickle maiden, the young man of genius passes from his academic studies to a more abstract and boundless science of national laws and municipal policy. Aided by the midnight lamp, he toils on till his pale face and emaciated form mark him as the victim of an idol that rewards her votaries perhaps with a smile at first, and then a grave. Another enters upon the wider and more useful department of politics by studying from the great book of human nature, by tracing from the effects of action the thousand motives that govern the million cords that vibrate differently when variously combined and touched; by learning to move the multitude by a moral and secret influence, as if by a magic wand; by con-

[55] Forsyth to Jackson, June 20, 1831, in Alvin L. Duckett, *John Forsyth: Political Tactician* (Athens, Ga., 1962), 149.

[56] *Ibid.*, 219-20. Duckett also observed that Forsyth lacked the popular touch: "He was a political aristocrat . . . he did not mingle with the masses" (p. 222).

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> trolling the world by mental instead of physical force. I admit this branch of a politician's study is in some respects useful, and may be applied with great advantage in professional life. But this is rarely done. The substantial advantages that would result, amassing a competence of this world's goods, are lost sight of in pursuing the unsubstantial rewards of public life. Ought I not to break loose from this infatuation, to look to home and its comforts and pleasures only as the sure and unfailing source of happiness, to decline hereafter all office, and abandon all desire of promotion?[57]

How, then, did men like Parker explain the lure of political life? As he himself put it: "Political life is a source of continual care, vexations and anxieties, but not withstanding all this the bauble is so glittering that it lures thousands in its pursuit. It is constantly receding as we advance. We are never satisfied with what political distinction we attain, but grasp after something more and so pursue the ignis fatuus through life."[58] Politics, moreover, as J. G. Baldwin discerned "are the safety-valves that let off the discontent, and the surplus energies of our people."[59]

By the time Van Buren left the presidency, politics had become an all-pervasive social phenomenon, and "party" had become the most significant form of organizational activity in an age of voluntary organizations. "Party" had also become a vital democratizing agent and an instrument of change. A victorious national political party could now effectively unite the political community in the national capital with the thousands of local party organizations across the country. It was ironic that Martin Van Buren, though he left behind the legacy of political democracy and mass politics, should have been brought low by the very forces which he himself had labored so diligently to create.

The age that witnessed the expansion of the power of the presidency and the emergence of the second American party system, mass politics, and the citizen as a political person also gave rise to the democratic soldier, whose characteristics were active party loyalty, obedience, self-effacement, and the equation of party with the mass of the people and the will of the majority, and who thus identified party service with popular service to the republic.

[57] Parker to his wife, June 28, 1838, in the Amasa J. Parker Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress.

[58] *Ibid.*, Parker to his wife, Oct. 8, 1837.

[59] J.G. Baldwin, *Party Leaders* (New York, 1855), 279.

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One Theory in Search of Reality: The Development of United States Studies in the Soviet Union*

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Americanistics, a Russian neologism denoting Soviet studies on the United States, came of age with the establishment in 1968 of the Institute of U.S. Studies by the USSR Academy of Science. The institute began to publish a journal in January 1970 entitled *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiia* [USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology]. Both events marked an important new stage in the development of research on a country that had long preoccupied Soviet scholars and political leaders. To assess the efforts of the institute and its journal, and to hazard a few predictions about the likely directions of future research, it is necessary to look at the previous research and writing, which are virtually unknown in the United States.

This essay will consider Soviet academic monographs on the history, economics, politics, and social life of the United States. For reasons to be noted later, not all of these fields can be given equal treatment; our aim will be to trace the vagaries of the development of studies on the U.S., to identify the several analytical approaches of Soviet students of the United States (known as Americanists in the Soviet academic community) along with their concomitant the-

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matic concerns, to treat the major methodological problems facing the Americanists, and to indicate the Soviet sources providing the most fruitful leads for further research by Western scholars in specific areas of Americanistics.

Genres of Writing on the United States

The most widely available writings on the United States (and therefore those least likely to contain materials deemed ideologically objectionable) are the daily reports of current events by TASS correspondents in the U.S. for the major Soviet newspapers. Over the years the quality of this coverage has varied, depending sometimes upon the temperature of the cold war, sometimes upon the level of sophistication of the writer and editor, sometimes upon the subject of the report. Notable throughout, nevertheless, has been an unremitting emphasis upon problems and difficulties of the kind that a Marxist-Leninist would most likely describe as the natural disasters of capitalism. Occasionally translations of articles from the U.S. press are printed in Soviet periodicals, most regularly in the weekly *Za rubezhom* [Abroad], published since 1960.

Widely available, somewhat surprisingly, are numerous translations of literary works, especially novels with significant social themes written by what the Soviets like to call the proletarian authors of the 1920s and 1930s. The many interpretive travelogues, published in both book and article form, by Soviet tourists and by members of Soviet delegations sent to the U.S. are also widely available.[1]

Highly pertinent are the translations of memoirs, monographs, studies, and collections of essays originally published in the United States. Among the authors are Omar Bradley, Thomas K. Finletter, Henry Ford (his autobiography was published in eight editions in

[1] Such works had been produced by literary figures like Pil'niak, the humorists Il'f and Petrov, and, following World War II, by Piotr Pavlenko and Boris Polevoi. Of the books published in the 1950s and later, two have been translated into English: Nikolai N. Mikhailov, *Those Americans: A Travelogue* (Chicago, 1962) and Viktor P. Nekrasov, *Both Sides of the Ocean: A Russian Writer's Travels in Italy and the United States* (New York, 1964). The two most interesting books in this category have been republished in large second editions: Lev N. Mitrokhin, *Amerikanskie mirazhy* [American Mirages] (Moscow, 1962, 1965) and Nikolai N. Smel'iakov, *Delovaia Amerika* [Efficient America] (Moscow, 1967, 1969).

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the 1920s), J.W. Fulbright, John K. Galbraith, Colonel Edward M. House, Ralph Ingersoll, Henry Kissinger, C. Wright Mills, Samuel Eliot Morison, Matthew Ridgeway, John D. Rockefeller Sr., and Robert E. Sherwood. These books are printed in very limited quantity and are not generally available, but they are often cited in Soviet scholarly studies.

The monographs of the Soviet scholars dealing with the United States will be discussed in detail below. But it should be pointed out that they are becoming a more important source of information on the U.S. even though they are not readily available because they are each printed in limited editions of 5,000 to 10,000 copies. Also notable is the huge quantity of books and periodicals systematically imported from the United States which serve as primary source material for the Americanists. Access to these materials is so restricted that they can be considered almost archival.

Finally, mention should be made of three important publications containing information on the U.S.: the lengthy article on the United States in the *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* [Large Soviet Encyclopedia] and the two academic journals regularly containing articles on the U.S., *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika* [World Economics and World Politics], published from 1925 to 1947, and *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* [World Economics and International Relations], published from 1957 to the present.

Origins of United States Studies and First Publications

In tsarist Russia little scholarly attention was paid the United States, and the few monographs produced were outnumbered by translations of U.S., British, French, and German works on America.[2] Soviet scholars in the mid-1920s were breaking new ground, therefore, when, after the chaotic events of 1917 and the civil war years, they began publication on a small scale of short monographic studies on the United States; not so new were the translations of U.S. and German books that also appeared at that time.[3] In these

[2] A bibliography of those works on U.S. history (the best covered topic) is in Pavel G. Mizhuev, *Istoriia velikoi amerikanskoi demokratii (Severo-Amerikanskikh Soedinennykh Shtatov)* [The History of the Great American Democracy (The North American United States)] (St. Petersburg, 1906), 277.

[3] See Leonid G. Raiskii, *Noveishaia istoriia Severo-Amerikanskikh Soedinennykh Shtatov posle Grazhdanskoi voiny i do mirovoi imperialisticheskoi voiny*

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writings there was a clear concentration on economic matters, the focus being upon the practical operation of various U.S. industries, particularly the organization of work.

Considering the circumstances, it was not unduly long before research on the U.S. was provided an institutional locus. The Americanists, by and large, were concentrated in the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, founded in 1925, and they began publishing in the institute's monthly journal, *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*. A significant step was taken in 1928 when the institute decided to sponsor a thirteen-volume work on the geography, history, economy, social system, political parties, and other aspects of the U.S., only one volume of which was ever completed; the institute's attention was preempted by the need to produce analyses of the world depression.[4]

The switch in the institute's focus of study provides the opportunity for an interesting comparison. Both V. Lan's *Classes and Parties in the USA* and Esfir I. Gurvich's *Postwar America* were sponsored by the institute, the former written as part of the original thirteen-volume study, the latter under the conditions prompting the institute to change its research plan. Because of her typical Soviet economic determinism, Gurvich expected the imminent demise of the existing order in the United States. Lan, however, was not nearly so sanguine, partially because his study was a much more historically oriented consideration of the continuities and changes in development of the political, social, and economic life in America. Al-

[The Recent History of the North American United States after the Civil War and up to the Imperialist World War] (Leningrad, 1930), 240-44, and *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, nos. 10-11 (1927), 177-81, for bibliography.

[4] The institute's director, Evgenii S. Varga, the famed economist, was involved in planning the thirteen-volume study tentatively entitled *The United States in the Period of the Decline of Capitalism*; on the considerable methodological difficulties involved in that undertaking, see Varga's article in *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, no. 7 (1929), 122-25. The one book of this study that was published was V. Lan (pseudonym of Veniamin I. Kaplan), *Klassy i partii v SShA. Ocherki po ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii SShA* [Classes and Parties in the USA: Essays on the Economic and Political History of the USA] (Moscow, 1937). Two works of note were produced as a result of the institute's study of the Depression in America: Sergei A. Dalin's *Ekonomicheskaia politika Ruzvel'ta* [Roosevelt's Economic Policy] (Moscow, 1936); and, as the Depression became more severe, Esfir I. Gurvich's *Poslevoennaia Amerika. Zagnivanie amerikanskogo kapitalizma* [Postwar America: The Decay of American Capitalism] (Moscow, 1937).

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though he did not stress them and did not expect them to save the system, Lan was aware of the system's adaptive capacities.[5] It is also revealing that even during this chaotic and politically delicate period in Soviet history both writers cited a wealth of contemporary American scholarly and official sources; there was no interruption in receiving and analyzing materials.

In concluding this consideration of the late 1920s and the 1930s, we should note another interesting example of differing views among specialists on the United States. The institute's studies on the U.S. economy had a rival in those produced by Gosplan's (the State Planning Commission) subordinate agencies, the Economic Research Institute and the World Economic Section. A dispute arose between the latter and the Institute of World Economics and World Politics over the seriousness of the American economic malaise in 1927-28. The World Economics Section, obviously more cautious in its judgments, was unwilling to label the situation a depression until the spring of 1928, and even then predicted an economic upturn in the near future. The institute's economists took a far more negative view.[6] Once the Depression struck with full force, the Economic Research Institute quickly published a study of the crisis and later put out a book stressing the unworkability of the attempts being made to overcome it.[7]

The original intention of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics had been to undertake a comprehensive study of the United States, not one of narrow political or economic scope. That admirable aim first was the casualty of the Depression. Then, due to the halt in the publication of books on the U.S. occasioned by the purges in the late 1930s and by the ravages of the war, and still later (after a short postwar period when there were some publications) by the imposition of Stalinist orthodoxy upon scholars, it was many years before U.S. studies even began to recover that breadth. Because of the unexpected congruence of events in the 1930s, Soviet schol-

[5] Compare Gurvich, 407 ff. and Lan, *Klassy i partii*, chaps. 16, 17.

[6] See N. Osinskii's (pseudonym of Valerian V. Obolenskii) report to the Communist Academy on April 7, 1928, "The Economic Depression in the United States," in *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, no. 3 (1928), 3-22.

[7] Lev Ia. Eventov and L. A. Mendel'son, eds., *Krizis v Severo-Amerikanskikh Soedinennykh Shtatakh* [The Crisis in the North American United States] (Moscow, 1930); Lev Ia. Eventov, ed., *"Planovye" manevry v kapitalisticheskikh stranakh* ["Planning" Maneuvers in the Capitalist Countries] (Moscow, 1936).

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arly attention was overwhelmingly, though not entirely, devoted to the study of economic problems.

World War II and its Aftermath

The outbreak of the war made it impossible to test the economic prognostications of the Soviet analysts. More than that, the newly forged alliance with the United States created the need for widely available, comparatively dispassionate information on the new partner. What was once to have appeared as a series of monographs was published, therefore, as a kind of expanded encyclopedia article in book form, complete with extensive bibliography,[8] containing relatively factual descriptions of the geography, natural resources, economy, history, armed forces, and political system of the U.S. Never before had there been, and for a long time afterward there was not to be, such a comprehensive treatment of the United States.

During the war the publication of book-length monographs was suspended, but the scholars at the institute continued to analyze the performance of the wartime economy and follow the caprices of U.S. elections in the pages of *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*. Research was also proceeding on a number of books on the history of the period between the world wars, pre-World War II Far Eastern diplomacy, and the postwar economic prospects of the United States.[9]

The war's end was followed by a dramatic change in the direction of U.S. studies. At the end of 1947, in connection with the well known attack upon Evgenii Varga, who had remained director of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics throughout the turmoil of the 1930s, both the institute and its journal were abolished.[10] As a result, almost no significant books on the United States appeared between 1948 and 1950. Moreover, a reorientation was taking place in the Soviet perception of the U.S. that was to be re-

[8] *Soedinennye Shtaty Ameriki. Spravochnik* [The United States of America: A Handbook] (Moscow, 1942); a greatly enlarged edition was published in 1946 under the same title.

[9] See *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, no. 12 (1945), 82-86. The books were published in 1946 and 1947.

[10] Frederick Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion* (New York, 1950), 198-207, has analyzed these events. Robert Conquest contributes some additional insights in *Power and Policy in the USSR: A Study in Soviet Dynastics* (London, 1961), 88-91.

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flected in future publications. Time was needed to make the change and to do the requisite research and writing.

If it is recalled that the original Soviet scholarly concern with the U.S. had more or less coincided with both the strengthening of American isolationism and the initial phases of the Depression, it is understandable why for almost two decades Soviet analysts had focused on domestic factors and looked toward the self-destruction of the economy as a consequence of the contradictions in capitalist development. Since, however, the U.S. economy had maliciously failed to collapse after World War II and, even worse, Washington had decided to abandon isolationism in favor of an almost worldwide involvement, a new tack obviously had to be taken.

While in the early 1950s the study of U.S. internal affairs was reduced to an almost exclusive concern with "reaction" in its various current manifestations, many books on foreign policy appeared with themes such as the United States as the "most vicious enemy of the peoples," as participant in the intervention following the October Revolution, and as instigator of World War II.[11] So great was the attention thereafter bestowed on foreign policy that the history of U.S. diplomacy has until now remained the best developed branch of Americanistics.

The last stage of the period under discussion coincided with the climax of the cold war and therefore marked the nadir in Soviet studies on the United States. At this time, even Soviet academic writing assumed and retained for a few years the unrelievedly polemical stance, to use the kindest expression, that had been characteristic of the more journalistically oriented parts of the Soviet press.

New Directions

Although convenient in some respects, the approach of the early 1950s did not come to grips with the internal sources of strength possessed by the U.S. that sustained the foreign policy threat perceived by the Soviets. Thus, the appearance of the first books in almost ten years dealing with American domestic history heralded

[11] For a list of books on foreign policy illustrating these tendencies see Vasilii A. Val'kov, *SSSR i SShA. Ikh politicheskie i ekonomicheskie otnosheniia* [The USSR and the USA: Their Political and Economic Relations] (Moscow, 1965), 371-75, *passim*. This is also the best general bibliography of Soviet works on Soviet-U.S. relations.

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the arrival of a new era.[12] Relatively comprehensive in scope, with their focus on the distant past, these volumes brought to an end the preoccupation with current events and "reaction" in American domestic developments. In effect, the shift was the beginning of a return to the older Soviet approach toward studying the United States that had disappeared with the demise of Professor Varga's institute.[13] Indeed, the institute itself was resurrected with a slightly different name, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and it began publishing *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, a monthly, in July 1957.

The new era had clearly grown out of the destalinization process initiated before the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 but was given final approval only at that gathering. The results were the renewed publication of serious works on history in general (including, of course, United States history), the revival of sociology after a 25-year hiatus, and the establishment of international relations as a discipline.[14] Much later, in 1965, there was some talk about similarly establishing political science, but nothing concrete has yet come of that initiative which is so fraught with problems, especially for the ideological conservatives, to say nothing of party bureaucrats who worry about outsiders tampering with areas in which they consider themselves to have exclusive competence.[15] Similar caution surrounded the equally sensitive field of economics,

[12] Aleksei V. Efimov, *Ocherki istorii SShA. Ot otkritiia Ameriki do okonchaniia Grazhdanskoi voiny* [Outlines of the History of the USA: From the Discovery of America to the End of the Civil War] (Moscow, 1955), initiated that trend.

[13] The most recent example of that genre had been V. Lan's *SShA ot pervoi do vtoroi mirovoi voiny* [The USA From the First to the Second World War] (Moscow, 1947). The process culminated in the Academy of Science's two-volume history of the U.S., Grigorii N. Sevost'ianov, ed., *Ocherki novoi i noveishei istorii SShA* [Outlines of the Modern and Current History of the USA] (Moscow, 1960).

[14] This fascinating situation is discussed in George Fischer, *Science and Politics: The New Sociology in the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, 1964), and in Alex Simirenko, ed., *Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals* (Chicago, 1966). See also the chapter "The Emergence of International Relations as a Discipline" in William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967* (Princeton, 1969), 25-74.

[15] The best treatment of that reluctance is in Laszlo Revesz, "Political Science in Eastern Europe: Discussion and Initial Steps," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, VII, 3 (1967), 185-210, esp. 188-99. One recent Soviet monograph, the first of its kind, is devoted exclusively to a critical analysis of U.S. political science:

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although here the main problem lay in getting the already existing discipline to move in new directions, a task posing particular difficulties in the sphere of macroeconomic theory.

These general developments in Soviet academic life affected the future of Americanistics in many ways. The unwillingness to allow either economic or political studies to stray very far from the severe limitations of orthodoxy has produced a serious gap in the scholarly literature. Very little creative, systematic study has been attempted on the macroeconomic or macropolitical levels since the capitalist economy and its derivative politics have already been authoritatively analyzed in the classic works of Marxism-Leninism. The hesitancy in doing as little as updating those works has made it impossible even now to produce a satisfactory general description of either the economic or political system of the U.S.

On the other hand, increased attention has been given to the study of history, foreign policy, and to narrowly specialized areas in economics and politics. The latter two undertakings are of special interest because in the 1960s the Americanists for the first time managed to write detailed monographs on these sensitive subjects.[16] All of these studies have created methodological problems which ultimately have raised the question of the usefulness of orthodox ideology in macroeconomic and macropolitical analyses.

It was, therefore, not too many years following the dramatic increase in the output of scholarly books and a marked differentiation in their subject matter and approach that the Institute of U.S. Studies was founded. Clearly, the time had come for establishing a center

Valerii G. Kalenskii, *Politicheskaia nauka v SShA: Kritika burzhuaznykh kontseptsii vlasti* [Political Science in the USA: A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of Power] (Moscow, 1969).

[16] In view of the plethora of books on those topics it is possible to cite only several recent and particularly interesting studies: Stanislav Men'shikov, ed., *Noveishie tendentsii v organizatsii upravleniia krupnymi firmamy v SShA* [Recent Trends in the Organization of the Management of Large Firms in the USA] (Moscow, 1966); V. Lan, ed., *Politicheskaia zhizn' v SShA (Problemy vnutrennei politiki)* [Political Life in the USA (Problems of Internal Politics)] (Moscow, 1966); Dzhermen M. Gvishiani, *Sotsiologiia bisnesa. Kriticheskii ocherk amerikanskoi teorii menedzhmenta* [The Sociology of Business: A Critical Essay on the American Theory of Management] (Moscow, 1962); Vladimir P. Zolotukhin, *Fermery i Vashington* [The Farmers and Washington] (Moscow, 1968); Nikolai D. Gauzner, *Nauchno-teknicheskii progress i rabochii klass SShA* [Scientific-Technical Progress and the Working Class of the USA] (Moscow, 1968).

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of coordination.

Old Foci

Because up to this point our primary concern has been to identify and briefly characterize the main development of Americanistics, our focus has been on the differences among the periods. But there have also been some imposing continuities. Although some Soviet books are methodologically or conceptually more sophisticated than others, nevertheless the clear tendency has been to focus on what might be termed traditional Soviet themes such as monopoly rule, concentration of wealth, class struggle, unrepresentativeness of political institutions, the disadvantaged life of various segments of the population, and the like. Whatever one's opinion of these themes, it is easy to recognize that they are far from being the private property of the Soviets. At one time or another similar, if not identical, criticisms have been leveled by such disparate commentators on American life as, among others, the Muckrakers, the Progressives, Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, presidents, members of Congress, social scientists, and the current crop of radicals.

Nevertheless, despite the similarities, these criticisms have two qualities that are uniquely Soviet. First is the doggedness with which the Americanists have concentrated on these themes, although not quite to the exclusion of others. The second is the persistent, almost ritualistic assertion that the U.S. politico-economic system will be incapable of resolving the problems besetting it and will therefore collapse—as Marx and Engels predicted. Both can be seen in Evgenii Varga's final collection of essays, a work notable for its lack of dogmatism. After criticizing what he feels to be an inadequate theoretical formulation of Marx's concept of surplus value, Varga continues: "And here, just as in J.V. Stalin, there is missing the very sum total of the economic laws of Marxism, namely, that the operation of the economic laws of capitalism inevitably leads capitalism toward its destruction and creates the prerequisites for the revolutionary overthrow of the domination of the bourgeoisie."[17]

With preconceptions like those expressed by Varga lurking in the

[17] Evgenii S. Varga, *Ocherki po problemam politekonomii kapitalizma* [Essays on the Problems of the Political Economy of Capitalism] (Moscow, 1964), 29. An English translation exists: Varga, *Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism* (Moscow, 1968).

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minds of Soviet scholars, it would appear that a kind of self-censorship determines the selection, research, and treatment of subjects. It is, therefore, all the more fascinating to follow the attempts in many monographs of the 1960s to steer a course between affirming the Marxian prognosis and accounting for the relatively high general standard of living in the U.S., ameliorative governmental programs, and rapid technological advance. At the moment, the Soviet consensus on this point remains the same: whatever the temporary significance of these factors, they will not make any difference in the long run, for they can only momentarily arrest the operation of capitalism's economic laws.[18]

Yet the fact is that the number of recent publications stressing those considerations has been diminishing. As long as the Soviet Marxian orientation encouraged Americanists to rivet their attention almost exclusively upon the problems, difficulties, and failures readily discernable in U.S. society, there were always concrete signs which, given the requisite preconceptions, could be interpreted as clear indications that the nation was heading toward a severe economic and political crisis. A great many Soviet writers devoted their energies to documenting those processes. But the recent past has witnessed the beginning (and no more than that) of a shift in focus from social problems to the techniques of problem-solving in the realm of industrial organization and management. It is safe to predict that much greater attention will be given to the study of American experience in wrestling with such problems as the optimal mix of centralization and decentralization, the application of new technology, and the utilization of information in decision-making.[19]

[18] A number of American authors have made the point that the typical Marxian analysis and predictions of what is in store for America are no longer relevant. Gennadii B. Khromushin assaults that proposition at great length in his *Razveiannye mify (Kritika doktriny amerikanskoi iskliuchitel'nosti)* [Dispelled Myths (A Criticism of the Doctrine of American Exceptionality)] (Moscow, 1969). Adolph Berle and John K. Galbraith bear the brunt of the criticism.

[19] Substantiation for this prediction has already materialized. At the first national conference of Americanists held in Moscow on May 27-28, 1971, were read fourteen major and forty short papers on aspects of the general theme, "The USA in the 1970's." The majority of those devoted to U.S. domestic affairs were concerned with scientific and technical progress and its consequences; see *SShA*, No. 7 (1971), 52-53, for a report on the conference. Academician Nikolai N. Inozemtsev, head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, had suggested that more attention be given to these factors by Soviet Americanists in the future; see Inozemtsev, "The Contemporary USA and So-

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In so doing the Soviets will have come full circle, recovering the concern with American technology characteristic of the mid-1920s. To be sure, that concern had never been entirely absent in the Soviet Union, but it disappeared as a theme in at least the published scholarly literature after World War II, made a shaky reappearance in the early 1960s, and has only recently shown signs of burgeoning.

Future Development: A Prognosis

The Americanists are likely to follow a number of paths in coming years. The most respectable approach, sired by Marx and Engels, suprapolitical and supraeconomic analysis, is contained in general studies of capitalist development, with the United States considered as only a variation on a theme. Only by applying the higher laws governing all capitalist societies to America is it possible to understand the political and economic processes at work there.[20]

In some respects this approach is the Soviet substitute for the macropolitical and macroeconomic analyses characteristic of contemporary social science; but in another connection it has already been noted how this approach has contributed to the failure to produce comprehensive descriptions of the structure and operation of the U.S. political and economic systems. Partial analyses of those systems are scattered throughout a number of studies, and one of the major undertakings of the Americanists should be to begin to fit those elements into a larger theoretical framework.[21]

Supra-analysis will not soon disappear. For one thing, partisans of that approach will never lack grist for their mills since the United States can be expected always to have its share of problems, and the more ideologically oriented among the Soviet scholars will always

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viet United States Studies," *SShA*, no. 1 (1970), 9-10. The authors cited above who have pioneered in this area are Smel'iakov, Men'shikov, and Gvishiani.

[20] Following the lead of retired or deceased scholars (e.g. Anushavan A. Arzumanian) who regularly wrote or edited works in the tradition of supra-analysis is Solomon L. Vygodskii's *Sovremennyi kapitalizm (Opyt teoreticheskogo analiza)* [Contemporary Capitalism (An Essay in Theoretical Analysis)] (Moscow, 1969). Unlike his predecessors, Vygodskii is more concrete and utilizes mostly U.S. materials in his books.

[21] A start has been made in the realm of politics: Galina G. Boichenko, *Politicheskaia organizatsiia SShA. Obshchestvennye instituty i ikh vzaimodeistvie s gosudarstvom* [The Political Organization of the USA: Social Institutions and Their Interaction With the State] (Minsk, 1970).

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see in those difficulties intimations of the system's impending demise. In addition, so long as the Soviet Union retains its official ideology there will exist a propensity to produce supra-analyses.

Closely connected with supra-analysis is the approach that seeks to verify the former's generalizations by unrelenting criticism and unmasking of U.S. society. This school concentrates its attention upon the gamut of problems besetting twentieth-century America, such as juvenile delinquency, crime, unemployment, discrimination, and poverty. Valentin S. Zorin, for instance, specializes in the study of monopoly rule in the United States and consistently concludes that the monopolists dictate Washington's policies.[22]

The major weakness of the books written in this vein is that they tend either to degenerate into polemics or to focus so exclusively upon dysfunctional phenomena that they are more reminiscent of sensational journalism than serious analysis. Nevertheless, this tendency will inevitably persist for the same reasons that supra-analysis persists. Moreover, most of this school's criticisms do not have a uniquely Marxian ideological grounding and are similar to the complaints lodged by many European and American critics of the United States.

On the other hand, since it is wasteful and even dangerous to refuse to take into account the accomplishments of the United States in areas such as managerial efficiency, consumer services, and applied research, there is a practical-technical aspect from which some Soviet researchers look at the U.S. with the intention of developing ways of assimilating those achievements the Soviets admire.

But to talk about such achievements puts the Soviet analysts in the awkward position of having to explain how they can exist in a country that has for so long been described as heading toward perdition. In almost traditional Soviet Marxian fashion one can maintain, as does Smel'iakov, that the positive and negative always coexist and can speak of the great contrasts to be found in American life. Or, like Gauzner, one can claim that the much vaunted technological progress in the U.S. has only heightened the exploitation of the working class because the rise in labor productivity has out-

[22] A sterling example is Valentin S. Zorin, *Monopolii i politika SShA (Monopolii i vnutrennaia politika respublikanskoi partii SShA v 1953-1960 gg.)* [The Monopolies and the Politics of the USA (The Monopolies and Internal Policies of the Republican Party of the USA, 1953-1960)] (Moscow, 1960).

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stripped the increase in real wages. And Men'shikov can go so far as to allow that some updating of Lenin's general remarks on the role and functioning of the trusts is necessary in order to come to terms with the latest developments in the management of large U.S. firms.[23]

It can be confidently predicted that the practical-technical approach will become one of the most important subfields in Americanistics. Because of the undeniable importance of maintaining technological momentum, one can expect an abundance of such studies. Since this approach depends on making discriminating judgments about the United States, it has special significance. It precludes viewing the U.S. in a totally negative way as is not the case with supra- or dysfunctional analysis. In the long run, therefore, these practical-technical treatises may help produce a more balanced picture of America than has so far been evident in Soviet writing.

Finally, there is the approach exemplified by the works of V. Lan that comes closest to being dispassionate, lacking the obvious imbalance of the first two approaches even though the subject matter treated by Lan is much the same. Underlying this approach seem to be a quiet conviction about the ultimate veracity of the Marxist world outlook coupled with a commitment to view life in its full complexity (and not exclusively in terms of ideological presuppositions) and to come to grips with the distinctive features of the United States as a society.

The future of this approach is hard to predict, because it depends upon the degree to which the Soviet political leadership retains its sense of responsibility and balance. In view of the degradation of scholarship that followed the disappearance of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, which involved the eclipse of the more dispassionate academic writers, a repetition cannot automatically be ruled out. It would seem unlikely, however, since the United States has remained the chief concern of the Soviet leadership for almost 25 years, and a sober look has to be taken at the strengths and weaknesses of the rival lest any miscalculation have catastrophic results. Undoubtedly, such considerations were high among the reasons for founding the Institute of U.S. Studies.

[23] See Smel'iakov, 12-34; Gauzner, 223-43; Men'shikov, 14-18. A more detailed statement of Men'shikov's views is available in English; Men'shikov, *Millionaires and Managers* (Moscow, 1969).

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For a mixture of both ideological and practical reasons, therefore, Americanistics probably will develop along four lines: suprastudies, studies of dysfunctional elements, practical-technical analyses, and attempts to achieve as balanced a view as adherence to orthodoxy will allow.

Conclusion

Students of the social sciences know only too well the formidable research effort required to produce analytical descriptions of any society. Due recognition was given that necessity by the Soviet academics who planned the thirteen-volume study in the late 1920s, but the ensuing four decades have produced no attempt at a comprehensive study of the U.S. Americanistics has tended to become a reactive study, the latest set of significant events preempting the attention of the researchers as they did during the Depression and after World War II.

Those endeavors have resulted in a series of volumes analyzing the conflicts and centrifugal tendencies in the United States. What still remains undone, and produces an enormous gap and a destructive imbalance in the Soviet scholarly literature on the U.S., is a serious consideration of the centripetal tendencies and of the means by which conflict can be and has been resolved. It has not been done because it entails taking a hard look at the political system and the economy and, what is even more important, the complex interaction between the two. In doing so, the Soviets would have to subject to critical scrutiny many of their theoretical assumptions and pose some agonizing questions about the adequacy of Soviet conventional wisdom respecting the U.S.

The fundamental problems facing the Americanists are, therefore, the old ones identified by Varga in the late 1920s, when he commented that some means would have to be devised to ensure that studies of the U.S. would not be merely calculated attempts to document the accuracy of Marxian hypotheses, that they should fill the middle ground between an excessively theoretical approach not much bothering with the facts and highly factual accounts that avoid theoretical conclusions and implications.[24] These tasks are difficult enough in constructing theories, but given the existence of an official ideology, their pursuit becomes dangerous. Filling the gaps at

[24] *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, no. 7 (1929), 122-25.

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the middle theoretical levels involves a kind of testing of hypotheses that could easily leave a Soviet analyst open to the ominous charge of bourgeois objectivity. The Institute of U.S. Studies can hardly be expected to indulge in such risky undertakings. Ultimately, to be sure, those problems must be grappled with, but now it is too early.

In the immediate future the institute can be expected to do basic work reminiscent of the early work done during the establishment of area studies programs in the United States. The Americanists do not have one of the disadvantages that faced early Sovietologists, for the former have at their disposal a considerable body of scholarly literature on the United States in both Russian and English. On the other hand, they have the paradoxical disadvantage of knowing almost too much before they even begin, not because of the availability of sources but because of their commitment to view those materials in preordained ways.

Not many years after Soviet area studies had got their start in the United States, Daniel Bell wrote an arresting article criticizing Western approaches toward the Soviet Union.[25] The analogous problem facing the Americanists today within their own intellectual heritage concerns one theory in search of a reality which has proved far too complex to be exhausted by that theory.

This consideration suggests the probable nature of the institute's contribution in the more distant future. The detailed studies sponsored by the institute will tend to demonstrate more precisely than ever before the limitations of trying to explain everything in terms of that one theory. It will be possible to pose larger theoretical questions only after many such studies have appeared and have created a climate in which the need for a critical reappraisal can be shown to have grown out of an indigenous Soviet academic tradition.

If these comparatively dispassionate studies on the micro level are allowed to continue, the concomitant reevaluation of theoretical considerations will necessarily result in an adjustment of the Soviet interpretation of the United States: a lengthy procedure, no doubt, but one that has been in abeyance for altogether too long.

Often in the past, the guardians of official orthodoxy have been

[25] Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior," in *The End of Ideology: The Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Rev. ed.; New York, 1965), 315-53.

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reluctant to make changes in their theory even when confronted with overwhelming evidence of the need to do so. Anyone hoping for the Institute of U.S. Studies to have an early impact would do well to recall that it took almost a decade for a group of Soviet scientists to induce the authorities to forsake the longstanding official denial of Einstein's theory of relativity and Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle.[26] If it required an effort of that duration to win acceptance of scientifically verified propositions, it is not hard to anticipate how much more difficult it will be to effect changes in theory on the basis of the often contradictory facts of American economic, political, and social life.

This article has concentrated upon the themes and approaches found in a large body of officially sanctioned literature, but it is important to note that those writings also convey an enormous amount of substantive information on the United States which permits the discerning reader to piece together his own estimate of various aspects of American life. And that is precisely what some Soviets do, both from those sources and others, as many Americans have found in private conversations with a broad spectrum of Soviet specialists and academicians. Such views, however, are never published within the Soviet Union. The views of the official Institute of U.S. Studies, which will be published, are very much worth watching, nevertheless, if only because the institute is sure quickly to become the largest center of U.S. studies on the European continent.

[26] This instructive process has been analyzed by Siegfried Mueller-Marcus, "Soviet Philosophy in Crisis: The Unity of Science and Ideology," *Cross Currents*, XIV (1964), 35-61.

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Heinrich Brüning: A Review and a Memoir*

ALFRED VAGTS
Sherman, Connecticut

The civilian militarist is a strange, yet definite figure in political life—rare at certain times and in certain societies and numerous in others. He is the man who never finds his way back from the war or the army because he felt at home there. In post-1918 Germany, his type soon found a welcome and, indeed, came to dominate political life.[1] In this rise of the *Frontgeneration* to political prominence, Heinrich Brüning participated as a Catholic, civilian militarist, according to his own deathbed declaration in his *Memoiren*. The ready acceptance which greeted the attitude Brüning represented surprised even the professional soldiers. They found they could use Brüning, then cast him aside; but they discovered later that although they could use the Nazis to some extent, they could not cast them aside.

Over and over again, Brüning's memoirs assure posterity of his soldierly resoluteness, disinterest, and loyalty at all times and particularly as chancellor. How did he come to hold this consistent stance? He allows us to glimpse all too little of his personal life and

* Heinrich Brüning, *Memoiren 1918-1934*. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970.—721 pp. $9.20.

[1] How things have changed in this respect: in the Federal Republic in 1952, in a poll ranking civic virtues, only 7 per cent ranked "soldierly virtue: courageous, able as a soldier," highest; by 1962, this percentage had shrunk to 3 per cent; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York, 1967), 367.

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of his family—almost monastically dedicated: the brother a priest, the unmarried sister given to charity work—or of his student years. All his life had been studious and *erlebnisarm*, save for a few male friendships and the war years. Those years were the truly formative ones, of *Bekräftigung* in every sense of the term. During this time he survived as leader of an elite outfit of company size on the western front, living close to his men, loving them because they were willing to obey and to obey intelligently—that one true satisfaction the leader of such units, and of no bigger ones, can experience—ever ready to fight the foreign foe and, at war's end, the domestic one, the revolutionary soldiery. They must have seemed to him the *Wiedergänger* of the *Wiedertäufer* of Münster, his native town; he was to find the Nazis still truer revenants of political anabaptism. In his eyes, the Reds of 1918 were mere rabble, whom he was preparing to fight with his machine guns immediately after November 1918, to fight almost alone with his company and almost as soon as the Oberste Heeresleitung had directed that soldiers' councils be set up.[2]

The war years were clearly Brüning's most satisfactory time, spent in the company of males by the man who never married, the man who knew women only as nun-nurses, the active rather than contemplative ascetic, driven into the politics of the *Männerbund*. He was Spartan but without Spartan homoerotism, a man of whom one remembers not one laugh. Analysis in depth can hardly go further. The memoirs offer no windows or even peepholes on the man and the psyche that were Brüning. But they do show whence his "ethos of unselfishness" came, on the strength of which he demanded that the German people—if not the Reichswehr—share his

[2] In reminiscing about the war, even Hindenburg would remind Brüning that he himself had signed the order to set up soldiers' councils in the field army units. So did I, who had been in 1918 a member of the soldiers' council of the Third Infantry Division. At a meeting in 1939 with Brüning in Cambridge, Mass., I pointed out that this very order guaranteed the orderly march back from the western front as worked out by the Oberste Heeresleitung and agreed to, formally and silently, by the councils. Brüning makes light of the resistance he might have encountered from the councils, rabble to him, but some at least were radical and determined enough to defend themselves and their *Errungenschaften*, if need be, such as the councils of the Marine Corps and the Third Infantry Division on the right wing of the front. Brüning would never acknowledge that the action he had planned, at the narrowest bottleneck at the southern tip of the Maastrich-Zipfel, would have endangered the whole logistically complicated *Rückmarsch*.

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own asceticism, in order to overcome the post-1929 socio-economic crisis: he expected the people to suffer through all four years that he believed the depression would last. It was as an ascetic that he opposed all Keynesian monetary ideas; the one meeting with the Englishman, who offered a gayer outlook on life and monetary theory, is unfortunately disposed of in less than half a page (p. 506). To Brüning it was and remained forever "a serious problem whether any democratic form of state can last forever once the people have become accustomed to ever rising wages and prices" (p. 117, the problem before Nixon even now!), a view which to Brüning's chagrin was not shared by Catholic union labor, never too fond of him, standing as he did from the beginning on the Center party's far right wing (p. 162).

Brüning's severity and belt-tightening was not that "universal asceticism" which radicals of various sorts—like Robespierre, Saint-Just, Lenin—have demanded from the masses at times as the price for social experiments which promise as a reward a general social leveling. What Brüning's ascetism intended was the restoration of a pre-Weimar stage, for which he asked from the major beneficiaries not much more than modest sacrifices and a decent business ethos. As far as this ethos was derived from the Church, it had come from an earlier period, and not that of 1930s, which had become highly acquisitive.[3]

Returned from the field, with mind and ethos never fully demobilized, Brüning did not join any veterans' organization—the Center party had all kinds of special bodies, *Gesellen-* and *Bauernvereine*, but no *Kriegervereine*. Instead he worked his way up in the party into which he had been born and baptized, beginning as a social worker and as such a strong opponent of the Social Democrats, to him the party of the Godless, the anticapitalists and antimilitarists,[4] and soon he became a Reichstag member. By the time

[3] According to his friend Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, *Das Ende von Weimar: Heinrich Brüning und seine Zeit* (Düsseldorf, 1968), 380 f. Brüning saw in the College of Cardinals, so largely Italian, nothing but "exact practical realism, and a very reduced spirituality. There was no talk of moralistic or religious consideration. . . . The basic motive was immediate material practicality." Treviranus's book is in part a parallel to Brüning's memoirs.

[4] When in 1945 I sent Brüning a copy of the funeral orations in memory of my dead friend Mierendorff, the Reichstag's youngest member before 1933, Brüning was ready to exempt him, also a war veteran, from condemnation with the rest of the Social Democrats (SPD); he wrote me then: Mierendorff "had

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of the crisis of 1929, though apparently not before, he sought the company of the authoritarians in the Weimar Republic, not fully aware or ever frankly admitting that from early on he had been used by them. Among them, he fondly believed, he would once again encounter honest men, standing, even in politics, by their "word of honor" (see p. 403 for his disappointments on the *point d'honneur*). With them he would be able to act "wie im Feld"—"like old soldiers"—in tight situations fighting as he once had in his gunners' company (pp. 211, 113, 132). In order to reestablish this noble company, he wanted to do as much as possible without the Reichstag and also to bring back the Hohenzollern, hand in hand with Hindenburg who was forever and tearfully doing penitence for having sent his Kaiser into exile. Before his approaching death, Hindenburg wanted to bring back his Emperor, not to wait like Heine's grenadier for Napoleon to ride back over his grave—"Dann reitet mein Kaiser wohl über das Grab. . . ." When Brüning proved too slow for this job he was dismissed, but he never fully comprehended that this was one of the reasons for his dismissal.

In foreign affairs, the chancellor's outlook was no less soldierly. His hope for better international relations rested not only on a capitalist community of fate, during the world economic crisis that unfortunately hit France last and hence made her less receptive to proposals for new reparations and other settlements, but also on the ex-combatant's dream of reconciliation, somewhat in the style of the medieval *Waltharilied*, with the reconciled heroes feasting and their wounds being tended by a heroic nurse. For all this he found little sympathy among his counterparts abroad, all of them nonveterans, except of the class war, who like Henderson could not see why Germany's reparation bill should be reduced if she were at the same time allowed to rearm. There was, however, more understanding on the part of Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who came to Europe at the time. Happily the two found out that they had met before, on a battlefield at that; Stimson in 1917, observing his first

strong convictions which I always respected because of his sincerity" (letter of May 7, 1945). Still later, his judgment on the SPD became more favorable, more so, the malicious said, than Adenauer's.

Brüning gives no indication whether he expected any armed resistance against his measures from the SPD and its paramilitary organization. The older generation would not hear of this, in any case, since it might have provided the Reichswehr with an 18th Brumaire, which it and the chancellor might have used.

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battle action, saw what happened to Brüning's unit while routing a British one. According to Brüning, the joint memory helped him get from the Americans yet another credit (p. 341).

His "successes"—not as numerous as his admitted failures and disappointments, such as the "standstill" agreements on credits and reparations payments—were, according to Brüning, in the international field rather than the domestic one. His domestic enemies were constantly endangering his negotiations abroad, unable to see that he was furthering their own true interests. It was they who prepared the coming of Hitler, not he. Nearly everyone for whom he was working disappointed, cheated, and betrayed him, denying him support, which he found mainly where he could not expect it—from the Social Democrats. If he did not give them credit while in office, he does so rather handsomely in his memoirs.

The top deceivers were the Hindenburgs, the field marshal and his family. The old man's daughter-in-law, née von Mahrenholtz, expressed the relief of the noble officer's wife over Brüning's dismissal by saying, "Now we are glad that we are rid of the plebs" (p. 613), which was to say, rid of the "temporary gentleman" who found the worst of intriguing done by the military. Details on such plotting, including wiretapping, are ample. The very worst of all intriguers was von Schleicher, still unforgivingly remembered in the Vermont hills, where Brüning spent his last years, and described as Iago, the man "mit dem lauernden Blick" (pp. 402, 539, 516).

There is fulsome enough expression in the memoirs, one might think, of Brüning's bitter disappointment over the Reichswehr's rather pretorian greed for money and political power. But he had given vent to it in still more embittered form on at least one earlier occasion, that of a visit to the house of Charles Beard in New Milford, Connecticut, on October 18, 1936. It was the anniversary of the 1813 *Völkerschlacht*, which we two veterans noted as we, so to speak, exchanged credentials,[5] discovering that we both had served *le roi de Prusse*, both in arms categories for which the noble officer is unsuited—Brüning had been a machine gunner and I a trench mortarman. In the presence of Beard, an historian suspected of the economic interpretation of all history, Brüning stressed the

[5] In searching for common ground, for common acquaintances, we found only Clemens Baeumker, Brüning's uncle, a very conservative Catholic historian at the University of Munich. I had occasionally visited his lectures, though at the time I was a pronounced Liberal in politics.

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"wage demands" of the Reichswehr officers, this subject coming up because I was then collecting material for a study of military wages, "soldier's pay." As Brüning explained to us, the Reichswehr had participated in only one of the three salary cuts that all state servants had to accept as part of Brüning's stringency measures, the first and that the least of the others. Afterward not only were the military spared the two other cuts, but they wanted besides to have the first restored. He was still visibly indignant at the officers' greed, having expected it so much less from them than from the industrialists and the agrarians.[6]

Brüning, who revered Hindenburg as a father figure, *pater patriae*, at times seemed to have progressed only slightly beyond adolescence, and there could have been no greater disappointment in Brüning's view than seeing the father-substitute turn betrayer of the constitution. Brüning hardly had enough self-awareness to be capable of understanding his attitude, and in his memoirs he cannot spare the "wooden titan," as Wheeler-Bennett in 1936 entitled his portrait of Hindenburg, for which Brüning, unacknowledged at the time, provided so much of the material.[7] (It would be a nice little proseminar exercise to compare the earlier work and the present memoirs, and these with Treviranus's *Ende von Weimar*).

Time has provided but little varnish for Brüning's own portrait of Hindenburg. The many warts are there and very little sense is left of the charisma which managers had provided for the presidential image. What emerges is an old man, open to many influences from family, other soldiers, and agrarians, above all others, an arteriosclerotic who came to understand ever less of what was being explained to him and could no longer remember what he had been told, even on the following day, and what he had himself promised the day before. This senile Cid was just as prone to treachery as the

[6] By 1936, Brüning was so far cured of his thirst for military glory that when I observed that much of that glory was measured, not by the economical use of troops, but by casualties suffered, he told about General von Conta, who had commanded a Silesian division. Before they were committed to the Verdun front, von Conta told his assembled officers that the division they were to relieve had suffered 40 per cent casualties. He would not let his division leave before it had suffered no fewer losses. He proved no underachiever and was decorated with the very high order of the *Pour le mérite*.

As it happened, the butler in the Beard household was a veteran of Verdun.

[7] John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Wooden Titan: Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History, 1914–1934* (New York, 1936).

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historical Cid, though he sat out his reelection campaign in an armchair and not on a horse. At 85 years, Hindenburg was "der Alte" for the Germans of 1932, reminding one as well of Franklin D. Roosevelt, another half-dead Cid, riding through the Brooklyn rain in the 1944 reelection campaign. Thanks to his party and the Social Democrats, Brüning was victor, using campaign funds drawn from the treasury of Prussia, then still run by the Socialists.

The men and groups spared by Brüning's acid are few, among them the Socialist Hilferding, almost above Brüning's own party's leaders; he notes favorably a few high-ranking civil servants, General Groener, Treviranus, and Carl Melchior, the Jewish banker. The capitalists mentioned either as a group or by name could hardly have fared worse at the hands of a Socialist, though they were the very men whom Brüning tried to save from their own follies, whose affairs he tried to salvage with Hugenberg, the leader of the German Nationalists, the worst of Germany's *hommes fatales*. While he tried to do his best for them, they conspired against him, giving sums ten times greater than they provided for Hindenburg's reelection to the president's opponent of 1932, Hitler. High officials were "cheating" the Reich government or even using officially acquired information to profit at the stock exchange (p. 112). Numbers of old enemies are preserved in an acerbic amber, including Adenauer (pp. 214, 445), even though in the preface to his memoirs, Brüning states that "his sharp judgments of the years between 1933 and '35 have since become milder" (p. 12). Does such mildness make for greater historicity or does it merely amount to what is usually called "more considered judgment" or greater discretion? On at least one point a more precise reexamination would seem possible.

Not only is Brüning astoundingly frank and outspokenly critical about his own party and its leaders, including the nominal head, Prelate Professor Dr. Ludwig Kaas, in his double role as Vatican dignitary and party head, who became increasingly weak-kneed in his opposition to Nazism after each return from Rome. This critical view extends to the Vatican, its policies, and its bureaucracy, which, well before 1933, supported an authoritarian form of state as the most stable and reliable (pp. 135 ff.). Brüning's interim judgment of 1936 was even more outspoken. Since the 1920s, the Vatican had wanted a concordat, following similar pacts with the *Länder*. It had been written but remained unsigned, even after Brüning had

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become chancellor. Brüning told Pacelli, who had been for many years nuncio in Munich and Berlin,[8] was cardinal secretary of state at the time of the conversation, and was later to become Pope Pius XII, that as a Catholic chancellor, he could not think of signing the instrument. He was having enough trouble as it was with the political Protestants (pp. 358 ff.). Still Pacelli insisted, seeking a government of the Right even more eagerly than Brüning himself, since that might bring at last the signature on the concordat. Pacelli argued that the Church had not fared too badly with the Right in Italy, under fascism, and he would not entertain Brüning's insistence that peace with fascism would not last and that Pacelli was, moreover, altogether mistaken as to who and what would constitute the Right in Germany. Brüning thought that the Cardinal "misunderstood the nature of National Socialism." That was in 1931.

To simplify the sequence of events: on March 23, 1933, the Center party voted for the *Ermächtigungsgesetz*, and soon after, on July 8, the Reich Concordat was signed by Pacelli and von Papen. Was there a *quid pro quo* in this? While Brüning refrains from saying so outright in his memoirs, his earlier oral accounts indicate otherwise. As I remember, helped by diary notes, his version of 1936 went as follows: the Party had not wanted to vote for the law and had so informed the Vatican. It was bidden to go along with the Vatican, which was still hoping that it would be possible to do business with the Nazis. Hence, do vote this law. And who, it was asked, from among the German episcopate are the men most friendly to Nazism? The answer: Berning, the bishop of Osnabrück, and Gröber, archbishop of Freiburg.[9] Well, they were to be the liaison men forthwith. All this amounts to something close to a Hochhuth version of history, or to what Brüning on the way to his American exile told other emigrants: "It is not the Pope who stands behind the understanding with Hitler but the Vatican bureaucracy with their augur, Pacelli. What they have in mind is an authoritarian state in

[8] For Pacelli's impressions of the Nazi movement, see the most friendly witness, Constantine, Prince of Bavaria, *The Pope: A Portrait from Life* (New York, [1956]). He had gone into Nazi meetings on occasion, had heard Goebbels speak, and "had instantly recognized the Catholic influence in his style" (p. 77), but had obviously not diagnosed the rest of Goebbels's oratory.

[9] See for this, for example, *Der Spiegel*, 1965, No. 10. Their record under the Nazis, at first and later, is well enough known. I have been told by a Bonn historian that the Nazis, who made Berning a member of the Prussian Staatsrat, blackmailed him for some sexual failings of which they knew.

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eternal alliance with the Church, a regime that finds Catholic parties a discomfort, hence drops them."[10] There are variations of this explanation (among which is the one given by Treviranus[11]) which precede the version Brüning writes in his memoirs:

> Without any contact with the Center Party, at the suggestion of the nuncio, the bishops during March [1933] gave out a joint edict which signified a total change of front as regards the NSDAP and was contrary to the attitude of the Center Party in the election (that of March 5) who from better instinct and from greater political insight as well as from a deep feeling of loyalty had stood firmly with us, that is to say, the Party leadership (p. 664).

Using the hateful German lingo of those years: it was a Vatican *Dolchstoss* in the back for the ever-faithful, if at times independent-minded, Center party. Brüning, who often invokes the name of Windthorst, the party leader during the *Kulturkampf*, must have known the historical precedent. In 1887, the Vatican—by a direct understanding with Bismarck—had terminated the *Kulturkampf*, going against the wishes of the party and over the head of that leader, in particular, who openly declared his opposition to Rome on a purely political question that was beyond the authority of the Vatican.[12]

Brüning's memoirs close with the summer of 1933 and his mandatory departure from the Third Reich. If it is not too presumptuous we might add to the record a few of his statements in exile. At a meeting in August 1939, three weeks before the outbreak of the war, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he was feeling his way into New England conservatism, he thought the Nazis would last only three or four more years, partly because, he believed, the resistance of the Catholic workers, so much more impervious to National Socialist indoctrination than the one-time Marxist-tinged workers, would undermine Nazism. Subsequent studies have not demon-

[10] Harry Graf Kessler, *Tagebucher 1918-1937* (Frankfurt a.M., 1961), 742.

[11] Treviranus, 369 f., 375 ff.

[12] When I mentioned that I had seen Wilhelmstrasse documents showing payments from the Guelph Fund to Catholic dignitaries for bringing the *Kulturkampf* nearer to an end—and I remembered among the recipients Cardinal Ledechowski of Posen—Brüning was not too shocked: *"Ist alles möglich."* For some of these payments, see Stewart A. Stehlin, "Bismarck and the Secret Use of the Guelph Fund," *The Historian*, XXXIII (1970), 29 f.

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strated that the great resistance actually came from Catholic workingmen. Certainly the Nazis themselves did not think so, for in their continued persecution of labor leaders and rank-and-file resisters, their weight, while not sparing those of the Center, fell heaviest on the Marxists.[13]

[13] Like the posthumous memoirs of at least three other chancellors—Bismarck, Hohenlohe, and Bülow—those of Brüning have become a matter of strong contention in Germany. An obviously disappointed ex-protégé of Brüning's has declared them "unauthentic" in a court of law and accuses one of Brüning's heirs, an American, of having tampered with the manuscript and of being, on the whole, "not sufficiently friendly to Germany to qualify for the editing of the memoirs of a German Reichskanzler"; *Der Spiegel*, 1971, no. 26. At this time, the case is still in the courts.

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Book Reviews

The Future of Law in a Multicultural World *by Adda B. Bozeman. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971.—xvii, 229 pp. $6.50.*

This thoughtful and provocative book is a necessary prelude to any effort to come to grips with the creation of regimes of law that envisage legal solutions of either simple or knotty world problems. The words which one nation uses to express a creed or faith, for example, Buddhism in India, may be meaningless when translated into another culture, for example, the Chinese. "All of India and all of China" had first to be understood "before the separate aspects of Buddhism could be made meaningful to the Chinese." The Indian-Chinese experience as told by the author is a classic manipulation of one set of values, not to promote understanding, but to subvert and manipulate institutions. An allied example is the resistance of Muslim thought to Greek philosophy and to the belief that the source of truth is divine revelation, not reason, that reliance on reason leads to "unbelief." The impact of this isolation on the Arab nations that embraced Islam is well told by the author.

There have always been borrowings of labels, concepts, phrases by one culture from numerous cultures. But the old concept often acquires a new and different meaning when put to a new use. Sihanouk's versatility in Cambodia and Sukarno's in Indonesia are recent examples. Current also is the "retooling" by Africans of *sovereignty* and *self-determination* to serve special African needs. Arabic is preeminently suited for diplomacy because it conceals intention and reveals meaning only obliquely and takes Western words like *state, nationalism, sovereignty, revolution, imperialism* and uses them in ways not comprehensible to Western thought.

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The fault, according to the author, is largely "in our politically crucial academic disciplines—notably political science, psychology, and sociology," which have used the experience of the West as "the projected norm" when, in fact, the recent emergence of new nations has obliterated or "diluted beyond recognition" most of "the colonially implanted European institutions." One recurring example is "the idealized shape" of China in occidental consciousness, acquired by wishful thinking rather than by identifying and understanding the essential configuration of Chinese culture. We know much about the classical Confucian maxims on peace and harmony, but we do not know of their classics on military and psychological warfare and the use made of them since at least 400 B.C.

The purpose of getting these cultural maps of the world clear and articulate is first to understand various peoples' choices of preferred values and then to formulate a vocabulary capable of assuring clarity in discourse. Scholarship will concern not merely the study of another culture, historically and otherwise. Its aim will be to produce men and women who think, for example, as the Chinese think, or the Arabs, or Indians, and so on.

The heart of the book is in "Political Systems and the Rule of Law." Five main systems are explored—the West, Islamic Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, India and Indianized Asia, and China. The "law" and the "political systems" in each of the five areas have widely different roots and manifestations. The West is strong in constitutionalism, the separation of powers, and the rights of the individual. The West introduced these concepts into the other four areas, but once the colonial holds were loosened, the Western ideas of laws and institutions were replaced by the older normative concepts of these diverse civilizations. The one exception is India, where a highly efficient bureaucracy plus the judges' constitutional training and outlook caused an abrupt break with older Hindu customs. The permanency of that break is doubted by the author. But, in any event, India today at least is a bridge by which constitutionalism has reached Asia.

The other areas produce such a great diversity of traditions and outlook as to make even *war* and *peace* terms of dubious meanings. The analysis of China and of the Islamic Middle East are particularly provocative and suggestive. If Soviet Russia were added to the list, the diversities would be further compounded and one might wonder how a cooperative world regime could possibly be realized. We know that it was Western philosophy that conceived and molded the United Nations. It was Western juristic minds that fashioned the Declaration of Human Rights. We now know that in many areas these "rights" have little or

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no meaning. How "universal" a given set of "rights" can become is one of the unknowns.

One who centers on the diversities of law in a multicultural world can easily end up a pessimist as respects the probabilities of creating a cooperative world regime. The differences are so enormous that theoretically no system except the ancient one of balance of power and of "war," "peace," diplomacy, and espionage would seem to have any chance of universal acceptance. Such an outlook in this nuclear age is alarming. The perils of going it alone are not restricted to the presence of nuclear bombs and the expanding use of nuclear power in industry. Mankind around the world is turning the oceans into a huge cesspool. Cooperative ventures are necessary to avoid destruction of the race through radiation or by the slow starvation and paralysis of people through pollution of the indispensable, life-giving oceans.

The book is not designed to lower the curtain on any of these problems. It is concerned with making articulate the vast cultural differences among nations and the resultant differences in laws and political systems. It admirably states the barriers and impediments that make cooperative world regimes difficult. Human necessities and fears make world controls essential. The message of the book concerns the magnitude of the task if international dialogue is to be meaningful. That is not a unilateral challenge to the West alone. But the West can make its scholarship responsive to the needs of this multicultural dialogue; and the West can make articulate the voices of concern of all humanity that rise above race, religion, and ideology.

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS
United States Supreme Court

The Democratic Citizen: Social Science and Democratic Theory in the Twentieth Century *by Dennis F. Thompson. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.—xi, 271 pp. $8.95.*

The purpose of this book is to design and apply a "schema" for studying the relations between a theory of democratic citizenship and the findings of the behavioral social sciences. The conclusion reached by Professor Thompson is that the latter are very useful in formulating such a theory, but that there is an important area of theory which is inaccessible to them. He is offering a middle road between the extremes of "prescriptivism" and "descriptivism" or, roughly speaking, between idealists and positivists. He selects thirteen writers as the basis for his

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exposition and critique of citizenship theory: Dewey, Kelsen, Alf Ross, Merriam, T. V. Smith, Graham Wallas, Lindsay, Yves Simon, Carl Friedrich, MacIver, Hobhouse, G. D. H. Cole, and Laski. He draws his factual data from recent empirical research carried out in the U.S. and the U.K., mostly with the use of quantitative methods. He is not discussing the status of citizenship as most sociologists understand it, but only its political aspect, that is, the capacity of the citizen to influence politics.

He starts with two basic "presuppositions" of citizenship theory—first, that of "autonomy," that is, citizens are to be treated as the best judges of their own interests; and, second, that of "improvability," that is, they are to be treated as capable of showing better judgment than they do at present. The inclusion of "treated as" gives these statements the character of precepts, not propositions, and allows for wide variety in the reasons for which political theorists may accept them. Next come four "standards" by which to judge how far the conditions postulated by theory are realized or realizable in any given situation. They are "participation," "discussion," "rational voting," and "equality," the last of these being relevant through its effect on the capacity to engage in the other three. These standards are deducible in the main from the presuppositions, but are also shaped by the findings of social science. The bulk of the book is devoted to the confrontation of the theories with these findings, and the schema requires this to be done at three levels. The first is the level of "conditions," that is, what now exists. The question whether conditions meet the minimal requirements of the theory is primarily one for social science to answer. The second level, of "constructive ideals," is concerned with ways of enhancing citizenship, on all four standards, without radically changing the social structure. Here social science is very useful, especially by identifying trends, but is not sufficent. There remain issues concerning the value of changes which belong to the realm of theory. At the third level, of "reconstructive ideals" whose fulfillment involves radical social change, Professor Thompson holds that social science is of little use. He admits that it can offer opinions based on direct comparison or analogy, but does not seem to allow that the theoretical apparatus of the social sciences today has any worthwhile capacity for prediction.

The forty-odd pages of notes and thirty or more of bibliography bear witness to the thoroughness with which the author has surveyed the material on both sides of the confrontation but, in so short a space, he can do no more than illustrate his points. His general tone is one of qualified optimism about the present situation and current trends, and he has some ideas to offer about the future. He suggests ways of developing

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"rational propaganda" and sees scope for increasing "participation" by radically decentralizing the political process, even to the point of rotating offices among citizens at local level. What one misses most is a serious attempt to show how a theory of citizenship based on individual interests can provide the foundation for democratic government in the common interest or for the protection of minority rights. It is not enough to maintain that it is an adequate basis when the issue is one of the general character and principles of government. The more fully the citizen participates in politics, the more necessary it is for the theory of citizenship to be accompanied by a theory of political responsibility.

T. H. MARSHALL
Cambridge, England

Social Science and Social Purpose *by T.S. Simey. New York, Schocken Books, 1969.—xii, 241 pp. $5.50.*

At the time that Lord Simey conceived and completed this book, he was like the lone prophet in the desert. Meanwhile, his preaching place has become so crowded with likeminded zealots that their voices seem to drown out each other. This rapid change of the scenery will tend to lessen our appreciation of the courage and deliberation which undoubtedly were necessary to present what at the time appeared to be an unorthodox position. Simultaneously, the appearance of so many statements to the same effect has heightened our expectations and tightened the standards by which we judge the merits of any such presentation.

Lord Simey argues against the idea that "social science has no alternative but to observe . . ." (p. ix), and he pleads in favor of moral commitment: "What we want is both science to give us techniques, and morals to give us a grasp of values" (p. 20). Social science to him appears to be overly concerned with providing information, the supply of facts, and woefully disinterested in the use of its data, in the capacity of society to understand the implications of social science materials, and in the values which would help put such findings into perspective. *Values* is the key word of this essay. Sociologists and kindred scientists are to concern themselves with values; they are to make their own values known and to act as guardians of public values properly understood.

In developing his case, Lord Simey scrutinizes sociological empiricism in Great Britain, American empiricism, and the work of Max Weber; he

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shows special interest in Weberian ideas on the logic of the social sciences as they took hold in Germany and, for some time, were widely accepted in the United States. He shows special sympathies for Hobhouse because he makes "allowances for both facts and values" (p. 41), while he criticizes Weber for his tenet that, if sociology were to be a science, it would have to resign itself to value-free analyses. On the other hand, Lord Simey finds much in Weber which he believes may be retained and reinforced in sociology to good purpose.

As one might expect, the author also turns to social scientists who have shown themselves especially responsive to the social purpose of their discipline. In this context, Lord Simey accords a separate chapter to the efforts of Mannheim and Myrdal. It is fair testimony to his own objectivity that he would dwell not only on the aspects of their work which will support his argument, but that he demonstrates awareness of their ambivalence and, in fact, their misgivings about a value-oriented, value-committed social science.

There are substantive and formal aspects to the conclusions reached by the author. He succeeds in forcefully making the point that social science ought to take into account the explanatory powers of the value concept: "values may stimulate and influence conduct and promote change and the activities that go with it" (p. 153). But then, this theme proves to be rather conservative; for sociologists, social historians, and other brothers-in-arms have long observed this very precept. Lord Simey, however, also ventures into uncharted waters. In his judgment, social scientists should take the more "progressive" course of making value judgments; if need be, theirs also is to introduce new values into a social situation. Little do we learn, though, on the contents of these values. Where the substantive argument turns away from convention, it tends to become hazy and, in consequence, unconvincing.

To this the author might object that the identification of these values (perhaps by definition) is not his task. Such strategy would shift attention to the formal side of his recommendations, i.e., to the methods for for forming value judgments. As it turns out, his suggestions are not novel and subject to standing doubts and sweeping criticisms. Lord Simey's proposition is that—in order to make events "comprehensible as a matter of human concern"—we should fall back on a subjective, intuitive, empathic, emotional insight into the subject of research; he endorses comprehension, sensitive appreciation along the lines of Weberian "Verstehen" and quotes Sorokin and Dilthey for support.

The author is aware of the price to be paid for his recommendation. He professes his willingness to incur losses in certainty to the benefit

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of human significance. Just how this balance is to be determined remains unclear. In the words of T. S. Simey: "It all depends" (p. 129). But the proponents of objectivity in science may find this position relatively palatable—when compared with occasional tendencies in this book to upset the proposed countervalence at the cost of subjective comprehension: with approval, he quotes Louch to the effect that "methodological soundness is inversely proportional to factual significance . . ." (p. 184), and he is quick to assert that there is need of "knowledge of the underlying truth, rather than still more information . . ." (p. 123). All told, the reader might feel tempted to side with the general views expounded in the essay and yet find it risky business to become an accomplice to the enterprise. There is little by way of formal method or substantive prescription, and a sympathizer is forced to rely on his own means of sustenance. The best to be said about this book is that it states and restates an important problem; the worst would be that it does a critical disservice to the solution of this very problem by not taking it beyond the stage of identification.

HEINZ HARTMANN
University of Marburg

The Foundations of Human Society *by Donald McIntosh. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969.—ix, 341 pp. $10.50.*

The Reach of Politics: A New Look at Government *by James K. Feibleman. New York, Horizon Press, 1969.—xi, 335 pp. $10.00.*

Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization *by Fred I. Greenstein. Chicago, Markham Publishing Company, 1969.—xii, 200 pp. $5.95.*

Of the three volumes under review, the first two make pretensions to a general theory of politics, while the third is of much more limited scope. Donald McIntosh has developed an imaginative and important general theory of politics from a combination of game theory and Freudian psychology. From game theory, to which he has made significant additions for the purpose at hand, he develops the formal structure, while he has drawn upon psychoanalytic theory to provide the substance. "Private will," "particular will," "real general will," and other terms from traditional theory are given precise meanings and woven into a carefully in-

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tegrated empirical theory. Frequently the ancients are found to have been more percipient than their modern successors, as in the case of Plato's recognition that power depends upon a combination of internal mastery and external control.

Modern utility theory, via prisoners' dilemma situations and the ever-present potentiality of the double-cross, demonstrates the impossibility of explaining much cooperation action and political organization in terms of simple individual rationality. Enter Freud. The dynamics of ego identification with other members of a group and superego identification with the image of a parental surrogate supply the missing links for a theory of society. For some, identification with others provides the essential social glue. For others, that function is performed through the superego, by means of resentment of disorder and support of sanctioning authority. Because of this resentment and the sanctioning processes it supports, individual acts of deviance do not disrupt the social order; but the development of conflicting subgroups may constitute a real threat to society. Shades of Hobbes, Rousseau, and contemporary critics of pluralism!

Some of the most interesting parts of this fascinating book are to be found in the discussions of the psychological relations between those who comprise the formalized structure of government and those whom they supposedly represent, a relation that finds itself repeated within the governing structure itself in ways that produce both stress and constitutional controls. Typical of the many insights to which the author's approach gives rise is the explanation of the movement "from status to contract" as one of formalization of the general will—a process that both enables social sub-units with differing normative standards to cooperate and at the same time alters the balance of power among various social groups. For all who seek a theoretical framework for political studies, this book is a "must."

The same cannot be said for Professor Feibleman's comprehensive study of *The Reach of Politics*. It is difficult to determine to just what audience this book is directed. Trained students of political science will hardly find it rewarding, while one would be hard pressed to recommend it to the untrained. Bits of freshness that would commend an essay or even a series of essays are indeed to be found. Yet as a comprehensive theory, it is sadly lacking both in coherence, not to mention rigor, and in substantial underpinnings. The author seeks to build a general theory of politics upon a specific theory of human needs. The latter, however, is developed without reference to the works, or even the ideas expressed in the works, of Maslow, Fromm, Durkheim, Homans, Freud, Rogers, or other modern students of the subject whose ideas would be relevant.

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His theory of the state as a compromise arising out of man's desire for "the absolute dominion of the entire environment" is essentially Hobbesian. It lacks both McIntosh's understanding of the severe limitations of what can be explained in terms of rational utilitarian calculus and his explication of how processes of love, hate, and identification make good the gap. Although the earlier chapters of the book abound with references to man's "native and natural tendency" toward violence, Feibleman's concluding plea for a "global superstate" seems to take no account of this formidable obstacle.

Fred Greenstein's small and modest review of the study of "personality and politics" belongs to a very different *genre*. This survey of the subject brings the literature into orderly and helpful array, sensibly appraises the criticisms that have been leveled against this approach to political science, and makes constructive suggestions for further research. Studies in this field are divided among those of individual actors (the Georges' *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*), typological studies (*The Authoritarian Personality*, the weaknesses of which are said to have obscured its valuable contributions), and studies of the aggregate effects of personality and politics (Sidney Hook's *The Hero in History*). The difficulties inherent in this area of research are set forth by the author himself in these words: "Deeper levels of personality are imperfectly associated with political belief; personality and belief have varying behavior consequences, depending upon situational stimuli; and the behavior of individuals and types aggregates in ways that are often not in any simple arithmetic fashion" (p. 140). Yet he finds complementary strategies by which these problems can be mitigated. Both for the beginning student of the subject and for the researcher-explorer in need of a map and a compass, this volume (including the bibliographical note supplied by Michael Lerner) will serve a useful purpose.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK
Swarthmore College

Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy *by David Easton and Jack Dennis. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969.—xvi, 440 pp. $9.95.*

This important book appears to complete the presentation by the principal investigating teams of a major interdisciplinary study of the political orientations of American elementary school children—a study launched at the University of Chicago in 1957 by David Easton, a po-

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litical scientist, and Robert D. Hess, a developmental psychologist. More will be heard of "the Chicago study" in the form of secondary analyses by other investigators, but Easton and Hess and the collaborators each of them enlisted in preparing the two books that emerged from the study, have now moved on to other matters. Apart from the reviewer's 1958 study of New Haven school children and the fugitive child development and civic education studies summarized in Herbert Hyman's *Political Socialization* (1959), the Chicago study was the only source of data on the political orientations and perceptions of pre-adult Americans available in print until the mid-1960s. Even now this study provides the nearest approximation to national political socialization norms for the United States.

Since space prohibits a detailed analysis of *Children in the Political System*, I shall attempt to provide convenient benchmarks in the rather complex publishing and research history of which it is a part, noting only briefly my own reactions. This annotation should help readers to establish whether they are interested in pursuing the work of the Chicago investigators and how they may economically locate that work and other germane literature. An invaluable complement to these remarks is the recent "Chronology of Major Data Collection and Publications in Political Socialization (1957-1968)" by Judith Torney published as an appendix to the useful anthology of journal articles edited by Norman Adler and Charles Harrington, *The Learning of Political Behavior* (1970).

Between 1957 and 1961, the Chicago team conducted a series of five pretest studies of pre-adult political orientations, two of them of American elementary school children, two of American high school children, and one of children in a number of countries. Two of the more influential research reports of this group, co-authored by Easton and Hess, emerged from the pretest studies. Then, in 1962, with the support of the United States Office of Education, a major national sampling was undertaken; in all, paper and pencil questionnaires were administered in classrooms in eight cities to 12,052 American children in the second through the eighth grades. After the phase of data collection, the interests of the two original investigators appear to have forked off sufficiently so that each found it desirable to find a collaborator from his own discipline and to conduct what appear to have been largely independent analyses of the same data set, each analysis with its own disciplinary focus. Hess collaborated with Judith Torney and they reported their conclusions—largely, if not systematically, illuminated by developmental psychology—in *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (1967). Easton, who in the intervening years had produced

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two major theoretical and conceptual works advancing an approach to the study of politics in which socialization is seen as a critical ingredient accounting for the persistence of political systems, enlisted Jack Dennis as his collaborator.

The Easton-Dennis work is composed of an initial five theoretical chapters, which are largely a gloss on Easton's previously published systems-theory formulations, organized under two headings: "A Political Theory of Political Socialization" and "Primary Socialization of Support for the Structure of Authority." The following twelve chapters consist of data from the 1962 national survey, discussed in broad juxtaposition with the initial theoretical formulation. Perhaps because much of the theoretical apparatus was perfected by Easton after the study was designed and fielded, the connections between theoretical and empirical sections of the book (which winds up with a pair of concluding speculative chapters on "cross-system implications") are not rigorous and deductive. Nevertheless, the authors do consistently discuss their findings in terms of political system functioning and in this respect their presentation differs from (and complements) the Hess-Torney presentation, with its focus on the intrinsic significance of psychological development.

Since the Easton-Dennis work draws wholly on the national study and the Hess-Torney volume draws largely on it, two aspects of the research strategy that governed that data-gathering effort—and that have subsequently been criticized—ought to be noted. First, as David O. Sears noted in an important review essay on Hess-Torney, "Development of Political Attitudes in Children," *(Harvard Educational Review,* XXXVIII [1968], 571-77), although a large sample was collected, the choice at that pre-"relevant" time in the early 1960s was deliberately to reduce the representation of minority populations in the survey:

> No Negro children were included, and school districts were sampled to minimize the presence of other 'ethnic groups.' Rural and small-town America were not represented; the smallest city used has a population of over 100,000. Hence the sample turns out to be disproportionately white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, urban and suburban, and upper status.

Subsequent research on such minority populations as the Appalachian children studied by Dean Jaros and his associates ("The Malevolent Leader," *American Political Science Review,* LXII [1968], 564-75) have made it clear that the positive childhood orientations toward political authority reported by the Chicago investigators and in my 1965 *Children and Politics* are clearly not shared by children in all population groupings—quite apart from whatever general shifts in such orienta-

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tions may have occurred nationally during the unsettled late 1960s and early 1970s.

A second choice of research strategy in the final national survey fielded by the Chicago group was to rely exclusively on fixed choice questionnaire items. Sears commented in his review of Hess-Torney:

> The basic method [used in the Chicago study] for measuring a child's 'concepts' is to offer a series of alternatives and see which he picks. Thus he may choose the flag and the Statue of Liberty as 'the two best pictures to represent America' from a group of other pictures. It seems indeed likely that the young child has a dim idea of what America is and, if pressed, will at least associate the flag and the Statue of Liberty with it. But to conclude from this that these symbols are 'crucial points of focus' is stretching it.
>
> That children think of political parties simply in terms of their candidates is concluded from the fact that children know which party the President belongs to but are relatively unfamiliar with 'political parties.' . . . The argument proceeds thus, by deduction from indirect data, when it would have been more straightforward (though more expensive) simply to ask children what they thought of first when they heard the word 'Democrats.' . . . The fixed-response-alternative approach used throughout the study is fine for determining the child's affects toward political stimuli, but it is inappropriate for obtaining the contents of his thought (Sears, 572-73).

The reader of *Children in the Political System*, especially if he has spent time in open-ended discussion with children about their political orientations, will find a number of points at which to question whether a particular distribution of responses presented by the authors reflects moderately well formed subjective structures in the child's mind or whether it merely results from responses to incomprehensible stimuli provided by the questionnaire. An extreme example of the latter is the finding in Table 6-6 (p. 125) that 89 per cent of the fourth graders (age 9) purport to think that labor unions "help decide which laws are made for our country": it is unlikely that the notion "labor unions" occupies *any* cognitive space in the minds of more than a handful of children of that age.

A more important example is the authors' treatment of their data on evaluations and perceptions of the Supreme Court. Acknowledging that "our data do not penetrate very deeply into the child's attitudes toward this body," they nevertheless conclude from the finding of favorable responses to their items on the Court that "a high level of regard for this impersonal unit in the structure of authority has been built up in children by the time they are ready to leave elementary school" (pp. 278-79). If, however, one follows Sears's advice and simply asks children as old as the highest age group in the Chicago sample to say what they think of when they hear of "the Supreme Court" (as Sidney Tarrow and

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I have, in a recent study), one finds virtually *no* awareness of the real world institution, but rather an immediate tendency to construct *de novo* the attributes that an institution described by such awesome terms as "supreme" and "court" *must* have: "I haven't heard anything about that, but I suppose that it's where they try people if they've done really bad things" is a common response.

A concluding bibliographical benchmark. Recent research has underlined the extraordinary instability (when remeasured at a later point in time) of the responses to political survey items by both children (P.M. Vaillancourt, "The Stability of Children's Political Orientations," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1970) *and* adults (P. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-attitudes," in E. R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, 1970). There promises to be a considerable period of methodological ferment—paralleling the experimentation of the early years of survey research—as future workers follow up on such studies as the one reported in *Children in the Political System*. The inquiry that still needs to be done will not negate the importance of the work of Easton, Hess, and the other Chicago investigators. Rather, it will help sort out which aspects of the findings reported in this work and other products of the seminal Chicago study are of enduring significance.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Wesleyan University

The Seniority System in Congress *by Barbara Hinckley. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1971.—x, 146 pp. $5.95.*

One of the more encouraging steps toward badly needed reform in the United States Congress, particularly the need to modify the seniority rule in the House of Representatives where I work, is the recent and growing number of advocates who are helping to win public support through the educational process.

Barbara Hinckley is *not* one of these advocates. At this date in time, it comes as a shock to read Mrs. Hinckley arguing for reconsideration of "the traditional criticism of the seniority rule" (whereby committee chairmen are designated) and her contention that "basically there is no evidence that application of this rule results in regional bias." The history of such major legislation as federal aid to education, housing programs, and civil rights legislation, blocked or delayed for years by sitting Southern committee chairmen, clearly faults this claim.

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Again in defense of the seniority system the author misleads, at best, when she states that the seniority rule reinforces the main areas of strength, the established interests in the majority party in the Congress. What majority party? Numerically, the Democrats have had majorities in the House and Senate in 38 out of the past 42 years, losing out to Republicans in the Eightieth Congress (1947-49) and again in the Eighty-third (1953-55). But the core of parliamentary government is the vote. And the voting records in the House of Representatives have consistently revealed that the voting majority on major domestic issues consists of a coalition of Democratic and Republican conservatives. The voting minority is made up of National Democrats and a very few like-minded Republicans. So what the seniority rule reinforces is the majority coalition.

The author's arguments beg the larger question—and the more important issue—of the function and purpose of an effective national legislature. This, it seems to me, puts the biggest hole in the theory of a conservative seniority system reinforcing a conservative institution.

Mrs. Hinckley finds another plus in seniority, which she terms "predictability" and which, she argues, offers something valuable. This is also open to question. Seniority has been misused to obstruct and damage the Democratic party's national programs, including vital remedial legislation for urban areas, until the problems reached crisis proportions. That kind of predictability as a valuable byproduct of seniority is of little value to the party or to the country.

RICHARD BOLLING
U.S. House of Representatives

The Year of the People *by Eugene McCarthy. New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969.—vii, 323 pp. $6.95.*

Eugene McCarthy's book is a personal narrative and analysis of his campaign against American policy in Vietnam and his attempt to "open" the political process to the power of popular expression. This unexciting book of an exciting and vital period in American politics is, nevertheless, an interesting document for the political scientist who presses beyond McCarthy's seeming detachment from his subject. Although short on new analytic insight, the book does stake out a clear position on McCarthy's political and philosophical views and enables one to see his political concepts in clear contrast to the pluralist view, where political power is formed by aggregations of fragmented forces.

The most striking aspect of this book is the clarity (in both prose and

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poetry) with which Senator McCarthy reveals his deeply Catholic view of man and organized political life. To him conscience and moral order are not just inputs into the political system; for McCarthy, politics is but a direct extension of deep moral and religious commitment. This personal philosophical quest to find the common, unfragmented qualities in man finds expression in his hostility to Robert Kennedy's attempts to organize around different ethnic and interest groups (p. 318), not only because he feels it is a shopworn, ineffective strategy but because of its appeal to different interests rather than to those common to all. This resistance to the legitimacy of political claims which have no broad moral acceptance is indicated below:

> We had to deal with straight problems which are the concern of *every* citizen in this country—simply because he is a citizen and not because he is a member of any organization or group or minority. In this speech I emphasize that I was quite prepared to speak about the injustices in our country—against Negroes and against others—and was going to do so, but only in order to get all the people to respond, to accept their responsibilities and not to distract people from the common problems which faced us (p. 162).

Many issues are important, even urgent, but still not common to all Americans. They must be recognized and dealt with through the political processes. Even the Vietnam war was not and still is not perceived by some as being as important as others of their interests. Who is to determine the "commonness" and then priority of interest when there is not agreement? Does political order come from moral order? Further, what if an issue of both principle and importance is perceived differently; one need only remember that most white people did not perceive racial segregation in the same way and with the same intensity as did black people.

Senator McCarthy responded to the pressures of presidential politics as if self or group interest did not have (and never had) its claimed legitimacy in the American political process, and he posed a view of man and America that is closer to moral prescription than to accurate historical description. He concludes his book with acclaim for John Adams's euphoric view of the spirit that moved this country at its founding, when citizens participated in assemblies "not because they had any special interest which they wished to advance, but because they were concerned with the public good" (p. 260). The mutual exclusiveness of private interest and public good is hard to square with the grasp of human nature by the founding fathers, who hoped to structure and utilize these competing interests to balance and further develop political organization.

McCarthy's perception of his role as a teacher of properly ordered

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values is also closely involved with this conception (misconception) of the earlier more "moral" period of American history, a view which partially explains his frequent flights to models of less complicated, uncluttered government of the past. His conception of a president as a nonpartisan generalist (George Washington model), rather than a political partisan and chief executive, was articulated in his plans to decentralize and depoliticize much of the executive administrative function. His belief that social programs could be administered in a decentralized, nonpolitical manner without the deep and constant involvement of the chief executive is an anachronistic political fantasy. Public administration *is* politics and the involvement of the president in ministering to the mundane problems of social life is firmly ingrained in today's America.

Senator McCarthy's own terms for the presidency were unacceptable to the American public, and in this sense it is possible to conclude that he did not really aspire to the office. He seemed aware of this fact and it is a tribute to his personal integrity and courage that he persevered in the role he carved for himself. He saw himself as a teacher of higher principles to the American electorate, one who, reluctantly, was forced to become a presidential candidate to deliver his message. Everything in this book reveals him to be true to his own self-image as a man, a religious, almost mystical man, who must rank as one of the least likely presidential candidates in our history.

RICHARD L. RUBIN
Columbia University

Alliance Politics *by Richard E. Neustadt. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.—xvi, 167 pp. $5.95.*

Delivered as the Radner Lectures at Columbia in 1966, Richard Neustadt's observations on the politics of Anglo-American relations are here published, as revised and expanded in 1969. The result is an important contribution to an understanding both of the two particular crises that Neustadt examines, Suez in 1956 and Skybolt in 1962, and of how the different internal political considerations of Britain and the United States produce crises of this kind. As might be expected of the author, who drew on his experience in the Truman administration for the innovative *Presidential Power*, his analysis combines the intellectual insights of a political scientist with the knowledge and sophisticated sensitivity resulting from an unusually intimate access to many of the gov-

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ernmental participants. Neustadt is almost uniquely the inside outsider, the academically detached observer who yet observes from within.

The author's inside role is especially striking in the Skybolt affair, with which his study of Anglo-American relations began. Occupying no governmental position at the time, Neustadt was asked by President Kennedy, soon after the event, to study what had happened to produce a crisis over Skybolt. The research involved interviews on both sides of the Atlantic and a confidential report to President Kennedy only a week before his death. It led also to Neustadt's examination, partly by similar means, of the more significant earlier crisis over Suez. The research method is plainly advantageous for an age in which, as the author notes, government officials conduct much of their most important business by word of mouth and leave incomplete (and possibly misleading) written records. The rest of us who seek to understand the behavior of government officials, notably at the highest levels, might well appreciate as well as envy Neustadt's access. Yet the method raises problems for conventional scholarship. Sources of information cannot always be cited, and certain information obtained in confidence is actually withheld. As Neustadt says about Skybolt, "I am not at liberty to do more than elaborate what already is in the public record" (p. 7). Whatever else he knows, we may assume, contributes to his insight, although we cannot evaluate it in the usual way. We have to trust Neustadt's judgment, as I admit that I am willing enough to do.

Suez and Skybolt receive succinct accounts in separate chapters before Neustadt raises his general question of how the closely linked British and American governments came to suffer from such grievous misunderstandings as to produce the spiraling crises in mutual confidence of 1956 and 1962. The answer, skillfully elaborated, is that the leaders of each nation incorrectly perceived the internal politics of their ally. They projected their own considerations, used false analogies, and mistook their partial knowledge of the other nation's politics for the reality. For example, Americans overestimated the deterrent effect of Labour's parliamentary opposition to Eden's Suez plans because they neglected the twentieth-century fact that a British government can sustain a policy as long as its own party following is almost entirely loyal. And British leaders overestimated the influence of a New York Jewish vote on President Eisenhower's reelection campaign and on his response to the British-French-Israeli military action. At still another level and in the other crisis, British officials failed to understand the American budgetary process that dictated the timing of the Skybolt cancellation, while American officials did not appreciate Skybolt's political importance to Prime

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Minister Macmillan's Conservative party following.

Neither the brevity nor the pleasant personal style of the book should cause one to treat it lightly. On the contrary, its subtlety demands close and attentive reading. There is much wisdom here. Even the footnotes contain revealing comments.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin

The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century *by Gene M. Lyons. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1969.—xvi, 394 pp. $8.50.*

In recent years a number of commissions have written reports on the state of the social sciences. Two of these were concerned mainly with questions of the proper scope of the social sciences and how they should be supported and organized. One, the first in this sequence (reprinted in the book under review), was published in 1962 under the title "Strengthening the Behavioral Sciences," sponsored by the President's Science Advisory Committee. The other, known as the BASS Report, was sponsored jointly by the Social Science Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences.

Two other commissions were more concerned with the utilization of the social sciences. In 1968 a report on "The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government" appeared, also sponsored by the National Academy. In 1969 the Brim Committee, appointed by the National Science Foundation, published its report under the title "Knowledge in Action: Improving the Nation's Use of the Social Sciences." Gene Lyons was the executive secretary of the "federal government" study. In this capacity he had to collect information on similar efforts made prior to 1968. After two years of service to his committee, Lyons was given a grant by the Russell Sage Foundation to summarize his documentation. The result is the present book.

The general reader as well as the specialist will gain much from Lyons's analysis. I can testify that when the author describes events in which I personally participated, the content is correct; on matters less familiar to me, for example, the history of social research in the Department of Agriculture and the development of the new planning, program, and budgeting system, the narrative is both interesting and useful. The book can be used for many purposes. He has made available and brought

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order to the confusing record of foundation commissions and governmental agencies. We can study the sociometry of participating colleagues. We can trace the ways in which the defenders of the social sciences describe their tasks and merits at various periods. And his inclusion of failures should help to improve in the future the kind of effort in which he so productively participated.

The book falls into three parts. In the first chapter, Lyons describes the problem with which his commission had to cope. In the final chapter, he gives his own reformulation and analysis of the general issue, a national policy for the social sciences. Here he also explains the background for the recommendations of his committee (they are reprinted as an appendix and make insightful comparisons with other efforts.)

Chapters III and IV discuss social research during the New Deal and the Second World War, with chapter III containing pre-1900 to 1930 material which will probably be new to most readers. The narrative is interspersed with analytical observations. Today we are clamoring for more support and influence; forty years ago we were mainly worried about too much involvement in policy (pp. 72 ff.). Since World War II we have been riding on the coattails of the natural sciences. During the New Deal it was the other way around; social scientists like Merriam and Mitchell entreated the federal government to make a place for natural science research (p. 285).

Chapters V, VI, and VII discuss the social sciences on the contemporary scene. Adhering closely to the plan of his commission (presided over by Donald Young), Lyons stresses three areas: foreign affairs, social research by the military, and "social programs"; the latter refer to mission-oriented research in the fields of health, poverty, and education. Again the author is highly informative and again he raises analytical questions. Much of this program research is uncoordinated. Might this be due to lack of an accepted theory of social change which could serve the same function as the theory of economic growth and help to make us as successful as our sister discipline? Will the rapidly growing emphasis on evaluation make for a better integration of social science work in the federal government? Lyons refers to the BASS Report which was still in progress when he wrote; unfortunately, therefore, he could not comment on a striking shift. The Young Report recommends a "National Institute for Advanced Research and Public Policy" in the social sciences. In the BASS Report this has become a recommendation for a "graduate school of applied behavioral sciences."

The shift might be due to increasing clarity about a crucial issue. Lyons repeatedly stresses the need for a smoother welding of research and policy, but he thinks mainly in operational terms. Actually, the real

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problem results from an intellectual gap: what are the ways by which knowledge and social action are and can be linked? Only detailed case studies will bring clarification and improvement; obviously such work can best be done in an institute for advanced training and this would justify giving it priority. Lyons is now on leave from Dartmouth College to be director of the UNESCO social science department in Paris. He should have an opportunity to sponsor continuation of his work in this direction.

PAUL F. LAZARSFELD
Columbia University

The Image Empire: A History of Broadcasting in the United States *by Erik Barnouw. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970.—396 pp. $9.75.*

> A television-radio system is like a nervous system. It sorts and distributes information, igniting memories. It can speed or slow the pulse of society. The impulses it transmits can stir the juices of emotion, and can trigger action. As in the case of a central nervous system, aberrations can deeply disturb the body politic.

In these perceptive words, Professor Erik Barnouw has caught the central importance of broadcasting. And *The Image Empire* is, itself, a work of central importance. It is the third and final volume of Barnouw's monumental history of broadcasting in the United States. The earlier two volumes, *A Tower in Babel* and *The Golden Web*, cover the period of American broadcasting until 1953. *The Image Empire* carries us through the time of broadcasting's coverage of the moon landing.

As one deeply interested in radio and television, I have been baffled by the lack of serious academic interest and writing about the history of broadcasting. The most powerful medium of information and entertainment in world history has, for the most part, been neglected by historians and scholars. The familiar excuse that broadcasting is too new no longer will wash. Broadcasting is now fifty years old, and its power and influence demand some reordering of scholarly priorities. James Reston has accurately observed that "mass communications in this country probably have more effect on the American mind than all the schools and universities combined. . . ." In a world where children spend more time with television than with their teachers—and in some cases, parents—the need for thoughtful scholarship has not been even touched, much less fulfilled.

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The Image Empire is a significant contribution toward meeting the need and is clearly the major work in the field. It is required reading in the class of graduate students I teach at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism, and has given them a depth of perception available from no other source. Barnouw brings a broad view to his subject, based on his experience as a successful writer for television as well as a scholar and teacher. His mind and perspective stretch the reader to grasp a sweeping panorama of the medium's social significance.

This is because Barnouw has studied and thought deeply about broadcasting as a social and political force, as well as a business. He is critical, and traces the constant conflict between commercial necessities and the need for public service programming. Although I agree with much of his analysis, I think he tends to underestimate the contributions broadcasting has consistently made to a better informed electorate. He traces how presidents and public officials try to use the medium to affect public opinion, but does not give enough credit to the courageous broadcasters who stand up to attempts to censor and intimidate them. Of course, the book was completed pre-Agnew, and if there were to be a fourth volume (which I hope Barnouw will undertake), there should be additional discussion of the dilemma of reconciling the First Amendment with a federally-licensed medium. This vitally important issue will have to be solved in this decade and should be on the very top of the agenda for political scientists concerned about applying the Constitution to a highly technological society.

One of Barnouw's major insights is into American efforts to use broadcasting abroad. The USIA, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty are all examined, and Barnouw makes one significant suggestion which I hope will receive wide debate. The United States is the only country which cannot see or hear the Voice of America—the result of an informal understanding with Congress. The theory behind the understanding is to avoid the possibility that our own government may propagandize its citizens. Barnouw suggests that Americans have a right to know what our government is telling citizens of other countries and proposes that noncommercial, public television stations be free to use USIA broadcasts if they desire. I have long shared Barnouw's view and hope his proposal will reopen the issue.

Students and scholars of broadcasting's future will use Barnouw's trilogy as the basis for their work for years to come. And they will be much in his debt.

NEWTON N. MINOW
Chicago, Illinois

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Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World War II *by Davis R. B. Ross. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.—vi, 315 pp. $10.00.*

The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II *by Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1969.—x, 562 pp. $12.50.*

These two monographs, the one on returning veterans and the other on the Japanese-American internees, are substantial contributions to the domestic history of the United States in World War II. They are an indication of the significant work that can be done and remains to be done in appraising the great impact of the war upon American life. They are especially useful as illustrations, since the one is a study of the policy making and political maneuvering at the Washington level which led to the voting of substantial privileges to ex-GI's, while the other, at the level of individuals, delineates the denial of rights to Americans of Japanese ancestry. Both are unusually well researched and written.

In *Preparing for Ulysses,* Ross sketches the sorry background of World War I veterans and politics, out of which somehow came the far more effective programs for World War II veterans. First, in 1919 had come crash demobilization with no retraining or aid of any substance except for disabled veterans; second came the long, painful struggle for a bonus. President Roosevelt, having lost the bonus fight in 1935, was wary of a new stiff battle with the veterans' organizations. They, for their part, were also ready to compromise. The president in 1943 proposed legislation to aid veterans in their transition to civil life. "They must not be demobilized into an environment of inflation and unemployment," he declared; "we must, this time, have plans ready—instead of waiting to do a hasty, insufficient, and ill-considered job at the last moment." Roosevelt did not obtain as broad a program as he would have liked, to include groups other than veterans. Neither did a Congress sensitive to veterans' organizations dare kill the administration proposals as they had so many New Dealish wartime measures. The result was the GI Bill of Rights, providing mustering-out pay, provisions for training or education, and loans to start businesses or purchase homes.

Not much attention has been paid to the impact of the GI Bill. Ross focuses, rightly, on the complicated political maneuvering which led to its passage and implementation, but his conclusions suggest that the $20 billion invested by 1955 in the veterans have brought an important social and economic harvest.

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The story of the Japanese-Americans in World War II is, in contrast, one in which there is little to take pride—except for the fortitude and resilience of the victims. *The Great Betrayal* redelineates the indictment against hysterical officialdom, including President Roosevelt, to be found in Morton Grodzins's *Americans Betrayed* and other earlier studies, and goes much further. Through numerous interviews and much original research, the authors have evoked the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese-American community and followed its members through their years of dispersion and travail and their ultimate return. A painful story at any level, it is the more poignant when told unsensationally in terms of individual suffering. Fuji Takaichi, who had arrived as a bride at Heart Mountain relocation center, says: "I can remember being indignant only once. They wanted to move in another family in our unit. It was only one room. There was no way of barricading it. There was nothing to hide behind to get dressed or undressed" (p. 313).

Mrs. Girdner and Mrs. Loftis record much that was pleasant and beneficial together with what was hateful and destructive. They chronicle the adventures of the Japanese-Americans in the armed forces—in the deep South; these men driven out of California for not being white were allowed to use the "white" facilities, but sometimes startled Southerners by using the "colored."

In the years since the end of the war, the Japanese-Americans have moved back to the Pacific coast in large numbers and have come to be accepted as never before. Indeed, many Caucasians feeling the guilt of Hiroshima have gone to extremes in lauding those of Japanese ancestry. And, one Japanese-American leader suspects, some Caucasians have praised the Japanese community as a means of slapping at other minorities. As for the children and grandchildren of the evacuees, often they are not even aware of what their families endured.

FRANK FREIDEL
Harvard University

Profit in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940-1965 *by Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1970.—xv, 268 pp. $8.95.*

This is the second volume in the authors' study of Henry Wallace. The first volume, which I have not read, covered the period from 1910 to 1940; this volume carries the story on from 1940 until Wallace's death. It is a sympathetic, but balanced, carefully documented, thoughtful ac-

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count of Wallace's activities during this span of years.

Several points struck me as being of particular interest. Wallace was an excellent administrator and, as secretary of agriculture, he had made a good record. To Roosevelt, at the peak of his power and popularity, Wallace seemed like a fine vice-presidential nominee and possible successor. But the Southern wing of the party never liked or trusted Wallace and there were early signs of trouble, as when Representative Martin Dies tried, unsuccessfully, to damage Wallace by a typical red-baiting attack. Later, in the celebrated row between Wallace, then head of the BEW, and Jesse Jones, head of the RFC, the battle lines were drawn. The authors' treatment of this clash (chap. 5) is most illuminating. The fight was embarrassing to Roosevelt because it endangered—or might have—his leadership of the party at a critical moment in the war. Wallace was right about the issues and Jones was wrong, as usual. In characteristic style, Roosevelt settled the row, which had broken out into the open, by setting up a new agency, the Office of Economic Warfare, and naming Leo T. Crowley to head it. On the surface it appeared that Roosevelt had not decided in favor of either Wallace or Jones, but when the din of battle abated, Crowley adopted most of the positions which Wallace had taken on the points in dispute. In retrospect it is clear that from this furious bureaucratic battle the president acquired a strong feeling that Wallace was a most inept politician or, to put it another way, that he had little skill in political management. And Roosevelt was right. The authors point out that Wallace later conceded that his side of the engagement had not been skillfully conducted.

From this point on, Roosevelt began to feel that Wallace, for all his merits, was not the kind of candidate who could hold —or help hold— the Democratic party together. This became very clear—to everyone but Wallace—when Roosevelt sent the vice-president on a long, exhausting mission to Russia and China which kept him out of the country until shortly before the Chicago convention. Frances Perkins read the signs correctly and urged Wallace to find some excuse for not accepting the assignment. Roosevelt, who stayed away from the convention, made a last minute attempt to get the Democratic bosses to accept William O. Douglas, but every boss at the convention was for Truman. The president could have forced the nomination of Wallace but he was worried—needlessly I think—about the fourth-term issue. For whatever reason, his handling of the vice-presidential issue lacked his usual political skill. Wallace had offered to step aside if that was what the president wanted, but the president could not bring himself to act forthrightly.

It is refreshing to read what the authors have to say about Wallace's

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good will tour of the Latin American nations in 1943, certainly one of the most successful missions of its kind ever undertaken by an American representative. If a proper program had been submitted based on the foundations of good will and understanding that Wallace had established, North-South relations would not be in the wretched state they are today. Wallace was an amazingly effective ambassador of good will to these countries. He spoke the language, he had studied the problems, and he demonstrated his eagerness to communicate directly with the people. Neither before nor since has there been anything quite like this tour.

Although it was clear that he had been dropped by Roosevelt, Wallace loyally supported the Roosevelt-Truman ticket and campaigned hard for it. In my view he would have been well advised not to have accepted a post in Truman's cabinet. The relationship was fraught with trouble from the start. No portions of the book distressed me more than the authors' account of the shameful way Truman dealt with Wallace or of what Truman, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., and James Forrestal had to say about him. The references are spiteful, dishonest, and cruel. After 1948, when he was viciously red-baited, Wallace did not, of course, know how to defend himself, since he had no instinct for politics or skill in public relations. The poor man thought that his pursuers were honorable men who would readily retract their lies and falsehoods once the true facts were brought to their attention.

About the 1948 campaign and its aftermath, the authors are, for the most part, perceptive and accurate. But on some points they are naive. For example, when Wallace finally broke with his hard-core backers over the Korean War, the authors do not question any more than Wallace did the official version of how that war began. In the same way, they seem not to question the Byrnes-Acheson version of how the cold war began. As to 1948, the prime mistake that Wallace made was not his acceptance of left-wing support, but his failure to fight the issues out within the Democratic party.

A sad story, this one. Despite the fact that he was self-righteous and a bit too pious for my taste, Wallace was a good man, a man of honor and compassion. He was a scientist and prophet, not a politician. But he was essentially right on the foreign policy issues that divided him from Truman, Byrnes, Forrestal, and the others. He may have been wrong about details and tactics, but he was right about the kind of approach that should have been made to the Soviet Union in the postwar period. I found the pages dealing with the last years in the life of this great and good man almost too painful to read. Once he had stepped aside, once his movement had been destroyed, he was treated with the

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worst form of contempt; he was simply ignored, as though he had never existed. At only one point is this record redeemed by an act of kindness and understanding. President John F. Kennedy had the characteristic grace to invite Wallace to his inaugural.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS
New York City

British-American Relations, 1917-1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman *by W. B. Fowler. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969.—ix, 334 pp. $9.50.*

America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 *by James A. Field Jr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969.—xv, 485 pp. $13.50.*

William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy *by Robert James Maddox. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1969.—xx, 272 pp. $7.50.*

These interesting volumes illustrate three divergent approaches to the history of American foreign relations. W. B. Fowler's book, a supplementary volume to *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, is somewhat traditional, dealing largely with the comings and goings of diplomats. But Fowler usefully pursues the paths recently marked by Lawrence Gelfand and David Trask by focusing on a second-level figure in the wartime period. Diplomatic historians have long needed to know more about Sir William Wiseman. Fowler lays bare the many activities of this insinuating young English liaison agent.

Fowler carefully avoids the common trap of exaggerating the importance of a secondary figure. But Wiseman sometimes appears less influential than Fowler implies, while the lengthy appendix from the Wiseman papers raises further doubts about his influence, even in the Magnolia meeting. The appended documents reinforce Fowler's interpretation elsewhere, however, and reveal interesting details about Woodrow Wilson's attitudes.

Fowler successfully explains how the shrewd Wiseman worked through Colonel Edward M. House to promote British-American collaboration. He provides significant information about the president's suspicions of Great Britain, the fumblings of British policy, and British-American differences over troop replacements, the Supreme War

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Council, and freedom of the seas. The excellent section on Russia includes a fascinating description of Wiseman's use of Somerset Maugham as special agent. Fowler also sheds light upon the major interpretations of Wilson's policies on intervention. He concludes that the president was influenced by the Czechs' presence, agreed only to limited cooperation with the allies, and did not act to forestall the Japanese. Fowler's Wilson fits neither the New Left nor an extreme realist mold. Wilson was more flexible than often thought, contends Fowler, who further emphasizes the practical aspects and immediate determinants of American policy.

James A. Field's book is impressive in scope, development, and interpretation. It is a significant, broad-gauged volume as well as a useful monograph for specialists in diplomatic history. The author treats events abroad and in the United States and their connections, but he stresses underlying American values. He ably relates diplomacy to ideas and to cultural history, placing the subject of foreign relations in an intellectual context that he describes as the American Enlightenment. Thus he discusses sermons, poetry, plays, and even sculpture, while he also treats at length the role of commerce, the navy, and missions. Field refers to other areas of the world in addition to the Mediterranean; in this way he enhances his subject and raises particularly significant questions about accepted interpretations of our relations with the Far East.

The book has some minor faults. Field does not appear to have analyzed the intellectual climate of the Gilded Age with the care he gave the 1770s, or to have established adequately the continuity of American thought. He might have sharpened his important distinction between the American policy of permitting individual commerce and conscious national commercial development. His discussion of events in the Pacific in the 1890s is cursory, and he is less effective in explaining the decline than the original rise of Mediterranean interests. The lengthy book is occasionally anecdotal and discursive, and somewhat heavy with quotations, but it is literate, perceptive, and thoughtful. He analyzes several matters particularly well: the "enlightenment" origins of the navy, commerce, and missions; the extent, diversity, and fluctuations of enthusiasm, and regional shifts of American interest within the Mediterranean; the relative independence of trade and missions; and the eventual displacement of American by European influence. But Americans remain active in the Mediterranean, Field concludes, and they continue to believe in humanity, rational solutions, and the milennium.

Senator William E. Borah did not share that faith, according to Robert James Maddox. The Lion of Idaho was a fatalist who believed that nothing good would come of foreign entanglements, particularly with England

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and France. Throughout his career Borah believed that the "logic of events" would inevitably justify his worst fears.

Maddox adds little to knowledge of Borah's activities before 1917 or to the story of the fight over the League of Nations. And his treatment of Wilson's policies is less convincing than Fowler's. But he contributes substantially to our understanding of issues of the 1920s, particularly the outlawry of war. He also effectively portrays Borah's consistency, ambition, and negativism; on outlawry, Maddox argues, the Senator's machinations smacked of fraud.

That Borah remains a cardboard figure is not altogether Maddox's fault, for the Senator did not often reveal his motives. Yet, while Maddox brings out Borah's hostility to the "interests," there is no clear picture of the structure of his thought. This is regrettable since other "progressive" senators thought much as Borah did on the war, the League, and Russian recognition. Maddox also may overstress Borah's consistency, as between the 1930s and 1917, and underestimate his populistic, occasionally leftist sympathies. But he has explored a wide range of sources, provided a convincing evaluation of Borah's stands on policy, and demonstrated the importance of studying the opposition as well as the diplomats and the general context of foreign policy.

PAUL S. HOLBO
University of Oregon

A Hero in Spite of Himself: Brand Whitlock in Art, Politics, and War *by Robert M. Crunden. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. —479 pp. $10.00.*

Professor Crunden's first book on Albert Jay Nock was well written and this biography of Brand Whitlock is no disappointment. The author's writing skill, however, is unable to do much for the subject. Perhaps unintentionally, this study of a minor, yet representative, Progressive politician, literary man, and diplomat suggests the frailty of many in the Progressive movement. Whitlock, whose name is invariably coupled with Golden Rule Jones and Tom Johnson, served as the independent reform mayor of Toledo from 1905 to 1911. He fought the good fight against the traction company, pious prohibitionists, and rigid advocates of law and order, who, as Whitlock put it, felt that poverty was the one crime that should not go unpunished. A staunch supporter of free trade, the social gospel, and the fight against capital punishment, Whitlock was an engaging if somewhat diffident man who took delight in expos-

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ing the sham of middle-class morality. If by example he brought a sense of decency, justice, and mercy to a city suffering the growing pains of urbanization, Crunden concedes that Whitlock left no reformist legacy. It was not progressive ideology, class divisions, or a status revolt that brought reform to Toledo, but rather an attractive personality on the side of a popular issue. When Whitlock left, the townspeople returned to the party hacks. Whitlock charged that Americans were incapable of realizing a corporate wrong, only a personal one, but he was chiefly concerned with the character of the individual and displayed that streak of anarchistic individualism found in so many of the early Progressives. Whitlock was far more influenced by the religiosity of a Golden Rule Jones than by the radical social commitment of a Eugene Debs.

Crunden has not neglected Whitlock's literary career, which he often pursued at the expense of his political obligations. It is doubtful that Whitlock's fiction will appeal to any but the most avid social historian. Crunden makes a case for Whitlock's conception of life lived as an art, but one suspects that frequently his notion of both life and art was confined to a feeling for melodrama. One cannot dismiss the notion that among politicians he was thought to be a good litterateur and among litterateurs a good politician.

Suffering from minor ailments and always a hypochrondriac, Whitlock accepted what he thought would be a placid post as minister to the legation in Brussels. Because of his enormous popularity in Belgium during the war, Wilson awarded him a full ambassadorship in 1919. During his wartime service he was absorbed by the local politics of the Commission for Relief in Belgium and the intricacies of diplomatic protocol in Brussels. Crunden, in endless detail, records the petty jealousies and social backbiting within the diplomatic corps that taxed Whitlock's feeble energies. Enthralled by his friendships with King Albert and Cardinal Mercier, the early progressive veneer of the reformer disappeared. Whitlock, the diplomat, became increasingly impatient with trivial complaints. He was embarrassed by the rural crudities of visiting congressmen and their wives who did not know when to curtsy when auditioning the king and queen. It irked him that American ministers were not permitted to wear uniforms and medals at official functions. Increasingly disdainful toward the vulgar masses and skeptical of their potential for "spiritual growth," Whitlock developed a fashionable elitism that assured him that the "democratic genius had of necessity to become an elitist or succumb to the tide of stupidity."

Dismissed from the diplomatic service with the advent of the Republican ascendency, Whitlock spent the remainder of his life wandering about the watering spots of France and Belgium, writing a few more

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novels and a biography of Lafayette but mostly complaining that democracy was antithetical to art and that he belonged to an old and dying world. It is such a standard portrait of jaded disillusionment that one suspects there had not been much substance to his earlier progressive stance except a sentimental attachment to progressive paternalism. To describe Whitlock as a "hero in spite of himself" is an extremely generous interpretation. He was indeed a pleasant fellow, but there is little evidence in this appreciative and definitive biography to make one believe that he lived up to his opportunities or potential.

MICHAEL WRESZIN
Queens College, City University of New York

New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics and Urban Progress, 1880-1896 *by Joy J. Jackson. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1969.—xi, 355 pp. $8.50.*

Customarily, readers of urban history are confronted with dull catalogs of necessary information or entertained by trivia of negligible significance. Professor Joy Jackson has probably negotiated this Scylla and Charybdis of urban historiography as well as can be expected. She does, of course, have the advantage of writing about New Orleans. No city which can boast of the Vieux Carré, the Mardi Gras, the Sullivan-Corbett fight, jazz, and Storyville can be all dull, and this book is not. Professor Jackson makes good use of anecdotal material, in particular, brief accounts of the numerous characters who have peopled New Orleans's history—Big John Fitzpatrick, New Orleans's paragon of big city bosses; John H. Morris, the mysterious financier of the Louisiana Lottery; or the fascinating E. A. Burke, whose political career ended in exile in Honduras.

Professor Jackson covers the history of New Orleans from 1880 to 1896, from the end of the carpetbagger era through the period of Redeemer domination. The sequence of events is set forth clearly, so that the reader understands the nature of the power groups and their achievements and failures during these years. The combination of Redeemer heritage and big city machine politics provides an excellent example of the curious mixture of "New South" dreams and the reality of urban politics.

This work also adds to the general reappraisal of the years prior to the Progressive era, years which have been neglected or treated with patronage and contempt. The author shows that it was an era of signifi-

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cant developments, important ideas, and fundamental changes. Her account of New Orleans demonstrates that the so called Gilded Age years were not a wasteland of greedy capitalists and corrupt politicians. Obviously, the leaders of the 1880s and 1890s did fail to take account of the rapid changes in American life, in particular, in planning for life in the city. But Professor Jackson aptly reveals the extent to which the public was responsible for the attitudes that fostered the political irresponsibility of the officials of the time.

The most obvious gap for readers not native to New Orleans is an adequate map of the city and its environs. Another problem is that Professor Jackson does use the term "Gilded Age" carelessly, to explain such a variety of phenomena that it diminishes the usefulness of the concept. In the same vein, Professor Jackson describes the style of sob-sister prose as being a phenomenon of the Gilded Age when it was obviously at least as old as the "damned mob of scribbling women" that bothered Nathanial Hawthorne. But these are minor criticisms, and the book as a whole is to be commended for its careful research, first-rate organization, and readability.

ROBERT R. ROBERTS
California State College, San Bernardino

Radicalism, Racism, and Party Realignment: The Border States During Reconstruction *edited by Richard O. Curry. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969.—xxvi, 331 pp. $10.00.*

The Civil War's bicentennial celebrations are ended—thank God!—and no one has proposed initiating analogous commemorations of the post-Appomattox Reconstruction. That is, no one except a pride of scholars who have been carrying forward an exciting, fruitful, and tenacious reconsideration of Reconstruction men and measures. Their painstaking reevaluations have riddled numerous footnoted myths that have endured far too long. "Radical" Republicans appear now less vindictive, states' rights Democrats and Andrew Johnson less Jeffersonianly noble, and the United States Supreme Court less supine and irrelevant. Ongoing inquiries into the nature of Reconstruction constitutionalism, federalism, public finance, race relationships, and urban-state interactions promise a continuing flow of useful data and syntheses.

Radicalism, Racism, and Party Realignment deserves a prominent place in this constructive current. It attends to one of the dimmest parts of Reconstruction's murky terrain, the border states. Stretching in a

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great strategic arc from Delaware to Missouri, they were dark and bloody wartime battlegrounds and intense postwar crucibles in which the war's results were shaped and/or frustrated.

It is reviewing style to say that multi-author books are stylistically uneven, so I proceed from this cliché to commend Professor Curry on his decision to structure the enterprise in discrete essays. The border-state theme is still too underresearched and vast for any single scholar I know to tackle. I commend him less for asserting (pp. xvi, 15) that *ex parte Garland* (1867) resulted in the United States Supreme Court's declaring unconstitutional "federal test oaths for lawyers." Instead the Court declared void a specific oath required by its own rule only for lawyers practicing before it; several national court jurisdictions retained the oath requirement after this decision. Indeed, the question is unresolved as to what effects high court decisions of unconstitutionality had a century ago. And I disagree also with the description (p. 26) of the victimization in politics of one of the senators who voted not to convict President Johnson in the impeachment.

Although these are not minor slips, they do not diminish substantially the large overall value of the volume for researchers, classroom teachers, and serious undergraduate and graduate students. Of the essays, I was most informed by the joint contribution of Balk and Hoogenboom, on the growth in the border states of deceptively-styled "Liberal Republicanism," and of W. A. Low on the Freedmen's Bureau's role in the border states. To single these out is not to denigrate the other seven contributions. In their essays, Parish (on Missouri), Alexander (Tennessee), Curry (West Virginia), Webb (Kentucky), Wagandt (Maryland), Hancock (Delaware), and Gillette (Fifteenth Amendment voting rights enforcement) neatly compress recent major works by each on the themes noted. Taken together with the rich bibliographical essay with which this volume concludes, *Radicalism, Race, and Party Realignment* offers a commendably convenient place for recent scholarship on the numerous subjects that made, and make, Reconstruction's border state history so rewarding and frustrating.

HAROLD M. HYMAN
Rice University

Forging a Majority: The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860 *by Michael Fitzgibbon Holt. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969.—ix, 408 pp. $10.00.*

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This book is an important one, for several reasons. It is one of a growing number of studies aimed not simply at documenting the coming of the Civil War, but rather at viewing the 1850s in their own right. In addition, it is one of the few city-based analyses we have of the rise of the Republican party. Most antebellum historians have sketched on a much broader canvas. Finally, Professor Holt's book represents the work of a second generation of American political historians who are trained in the use of modern statistical methods and who appear more cautious and critical in their approach than some of their predecessors.

Holt views the emerging Republican party from three angles: the characteristics of its leaders, the partisan appeals those leaders made, and the types of voters who supported the organization. Voting behavior was obviously the hardest thing to assay. Although Holt gathered and tabulated extensive data on the ethnic backgrounds, occupations, and wealth of all adult white males in Pittsburgh's nine wards, the old question of quantitatively-minded political historians—"Who voted for whom?"—is as elusive for Holt as it was for Lee Benson in his study of New York state politics during the Jackson era. Many of Holt's conclusions on popular voting behavior in Pittsburgh are based in part on a series of bivariate ecological correlations, and, as Holt himself admits, are open to some question as a result.

In any event, the picture that emerges from this analysis is not the familiar one of increasing outrage over the threat of the extension of slavery, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the attack on Charles Sumner, "Bleeding Kansas," and the rest. Although he admits that such national issues were important, Holt argues persuasively that political lines in Pittsburgh were drawn not over these questions, but over more pressing local matters. The predominantly native-born, Protestant coalition of rich and poor, of employers and workers that was the Whig party of the late 1840s began to dissolve in the early 1850s over the questions of industrial depression, labor unrest, and large numbers of immigrant foreigners who seemed to threaten established ways of life. These issues, all close to home, evidently evoked more political response than a threat of slavery in distant Kansas. Certainly the revival of a nativist party capable of combining opposition to slavery and opposition to immigrant Catholics was more responsible for polarizing Pittsburgh's voters in 1854 than was the Kansas-Nebraska bill. In fact, a nascent Republican party capitalizing solely on opposition to slavery extension did not do well at first, but by 1856 it succeeded by broadening its appeals as a Union party to attract both antislavery and anti-Catholic voters. And in the years between 1856 and 1860, the city's voters seemed most interested in problems of railroad growth and in the taxes levied to sus-

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tain the new lines. The Republicans were able to reinforce the strength of their new coalition by following the Democrats in bitterly opposing such taxes.

Holt's findings point to a real need for similar studies of other northern cities, especially of those with weaker Whig and Republican parties than Pittsburgh had. But there is just as much need for integrating studies like this one with findings from other studies, not all of them recent, of the 1850s. Readers will find a good deal of support for some elements of Holt's thesis—especially those stressing the importance of the Know-Nothing movement—even in the published literature.

JON FACKLER
University of Vermont

Peaceable Kingdoms: New England Towns in the Eighteenth Century *by Michael Zuckerman. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1970.—ix, 329 pp. $7.95.*

This book is brilliant in its argument, probably flawed in its research, and certainly questionable in several of its major conclusions. Briefly put, the argument is that in eighteenth-century Massachusetts, the dispersion of settlement, the growth of population, the loss of the original charter and the gain of a new one which established important changes in government, all contributed to a devolution of authority to the towns. There in isolated communities, a compound of traditional religious values and sanctions, ecclesiastical discipline, education, and child-rearing practices, combined to create a "consensual communalism," a set of ideals and practices which enforced social and psychological conformity to reigning Protestant standards of peace, order, and unity. In this confined, and confining atmosphere, dissent was not possible (dissenters were only free to separate themselves from the polity) and majoritarianism, if it ever existed, gave way to unanimity. To secure unity, almost all techniques of control resorted ultimately to public opinion, which in its own subtle way proved more efficacious than outright coercion. The arrangements of consensus politics were especially well worked out in the town meeting where a functional democracy developed—though not a democracy of "principle." By the time of the American Revolution, which saw an extension of pressures for consensus, the meaning of legitimate government was in America very different from in England. In England legitimacy rested on the assent of the sovereign; in Massachusetts, on the consent of the governed.

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This is the heart of the argument of the book, an argument developed with great skill and with constant reference to data and evidence. But despite the book's apparent basis in the sources—for the most part, town meeting records and the Massachusetts archives—its research does not adequately support its argument and its conclusions. Compared to the number of extant town records, the book's sample is small, and there is no assurance that the selection is representative. Mr. Zuckerman may also have written off the county courts much too easily; a close reading of their proceedings might alter some of his conclusions about the successful achievement of consensus.

Mr. Zuckerman concludes with a number of observations about the implications of his findings for cherished ideas about American individualism. The pressures for conformity in the peaceable kingdoms he studies were certainly very great. At the same time, one should not confuse Massachusetts with all of America. But if Mr. Zuckerman's book remains most satisfactory as a description of politics on the local level in Massachusetts and as an account of the persistent force of certain social values, it succeeds in being enormously interesting and provocative, in the best sense of the word.

ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF
University of California, Berkeley

Beyond the European Community *by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1969.—247 pp.*

Europe: An Emergent Nation? *by Carl J. Friedrich. New York, Harper & Row, 1969.—xiii, 269 pp. $8.95.*

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance *by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969.—vi, 216 pp. $2.45.*

Britain Faces Europe *by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969.—xi, 228 pp. $6.00.*

Among scholars, enthusiasm for the European Communities, once so high, has slumped. Nearly everyone now notes that early Europeanists exaggerated the political potential of supranational bureaucracy and overlooked Europe's Eastern and Atlantic dimensions. Meanwhile, Europe seems ready for major new steps toward unity. Such are the leads and lags of scholarly fashion.

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Mr. Alting von Geusau argues that the present Communities represent a "disfunctional federation" which sacrifices outward-looking economic integration for inward-looking political integration. The latter, in the author's view, is neither useful nor even successful on its own terms. Any need for a distinct European federation has been withering away from the moment the U.S. and Europe began cooperating against the Soviet threat (p. 224). A European bloc only complicates trade policy, arms control, and detente without contributing anything useful or even distinctive in other relevant fields.

Whatever the desirability of a European federation, the author's strong bias against it greatly distorts his assessment of what integration has been achieved. To be sure, today's nascent European Community differs a good deal from the original federalist models. In a Europe split with each half under an alien hegemony, neither the nation-states nor their "power politics" have been absorbed into a national technocracy. But these Western states, crowded between rival giants, have nevertheless gradually built themselves a remarkable political organism, within which they increasingly coordinate their interdependent relations. The structure is not very tidy. There are innumerable galleries, cellars, closets, and back doors, but its gothic disarray is rather more akin to the spirit of genuine federalism than the classic models of so many federalist theorists. Perhaps some have good reason to oppose this new Europe. But they are on weak ground when they claim it does not exist.

Professor Carl Friedrich, at least, remains faithful to the old federalist enthusiasm. He sees a uniting Europe as part of an emerging polycentric world of large federal communities: Africa, Arabia, China, Britain and the Commonwealth, India, Latin America, the U.S., the USSR, and possibly Japan and Korea. As there is already a "framework for effective political cooperation and power-sharing, further consensus has been generated in all those life situations where formerly nationally isolated individuals and groups have come together and learned to work with each other" (p. 46).

The evidence in the book is not altogether compelling. By ignoring Europe's relations with East and West, the author misses the principal force for European solidarity. By contrast, the growth of community-wide business, labor, and agricultural associations does not seem as significant as the author suggests. While there is some rather ill-tempered criticism of the use of opinion data in the Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis, and Merritt study, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance—A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (1968), it is difficult to see why Professor Friedrich believes many of the same criticisms do not apply to his own study. In addition, his persistent ten-

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dency to equate support for the Common Market with support for supranational political integration is a fundamental theoretical confusion which cannot help but distort the evidence presented. The past ten years illustrate that many people favor economic integration in the Common Market, and even close political coordination among the member-states, without espousing a general supranational government for Europe or even a supranational governing body for the Common Market. Within the Market the national units have not so much ceded their powers, as come increasingly to exercise them together.

It is understandable that many American scholars might have difficulty perceiving the workings of this more subtle form of federalism, so different from the American pattern. But it is disappointing that Professor Friedrich, with all his deep knowledge of European history and philosophy, has not taken a fresher and more penetrating look at the new European scene and perhaps evolved a richer federalist theory to describe it.

Professor Pfaltzgraff's two books do, at least, deal directly with Europe in the world. The author paints a gloomy picture of Western Europe's relative military, technological, economic, and diplomatic strength. The gloom is overdone. It does seem excessive to compare Western Europe's military strength unfavorably with that of Czechoslovakia and East Germany (*Atlantic*, p. 24). After all, Britain, France, and Germany do have nearly 1,400,000 men under arms. More generally, the much touted "technology gap" is not all that apparent in many of the great industries—in steel, machinery, chemicals, or automobiles, for example. The author's suggestions for resolving the monetary quarrel seem somewhat obtuse in ignoring the political character of the issues.

Most puzzling is his complaint that the self-preoccupied Europeans are increasingly leaving to America the tasks of "assisting newly independent peoples to build viable political and economic structures" (*Atlantic*, p. 114). To be sure, if Vietnam is counted as part of our contribution to international development, then America's "outward-lookingness" is indeed unmatched by anyone. But by a more conventional measurement, the outflow of private and public capital to developing countries, Europe is far more generous relative to GNP than the U.S. In any event, should Europeans be criticized for concentrating on the great problems of their own continent? Has confederal Europe done so badly? The American performance in recent years suggests little cause for superior airs.

There remains, of course, the thorny problem of Britain. Professor

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Pfaltzgraff's analysis of Britain's confrontation with the Common Market from 1957 to 1967 focuses on the uncertainty of British public opinion and the generally precarious basis of Macmillan's position. The excellent summary of the negotiations resists the common idea that all had been resolved before de Gaulle's veto or indeed that it was French intransigence that was chiefly at fault. By 1967 the author believes the situation had changed and Britain was ready.

Why so long? The author blames the lack of leadership to educate public opinion. There was also the Channel: "The British Common Market experience lends credence to the contention stated in integration literature that there is a relationship between geographic proximity and integration" (*Britain*, p. 205).

Other factors are slighted. There is Britain's lingering addiction to transatlantic intimacies. And there are those deeply rooted ideals of the last century—the stern duties of world order and the glad benefits of free trade and open investment. If many Englishmen see the Common Market as the child of Colbert rather than Cobden, if more agree with Mr. Alting von Geusau than Professor Friedrich, it is understandable that they have not yet come to heel. By ignoring this cultural dimension, the author probably overestimates the change by Wilson's time. Heath, perhaps, is something else again.

DAVID P. CALLEO
The Johns Hopkins University

Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II *by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1969.—303 pp. $6.95.*

During an informal conversation several months before his death, Allen Dulles, one-time director of the Central Intelligence Agency, observed that despite all the current nonfiction devoted to the craft, other important books remained to be written. "A book on the intelligence blunders of the last war, for example, could be fascinating," he said. It could be—and is. In *Captains Without Eyes*, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., himself a former CIA official of lofty rank and now professor of political science at Brown University, has contributed exactly such a book. One after the other he analyzes five significant campaigns—the German attack on Russia, Pearl Harbor, the Dieppe raid, Arnheim, and The Bulge —not in terms of the conventional clash of arms, but of the related intelligence component. That mistakes were made by heads of state as

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well as individual field agents is putting it mildly. In the case of the invasion of Russia, for example, Mr. Kirkpatrick faults both Stalin and Hitler for not properly using intelligence materials their own services had supplied. Perhaps the single most arresting section (chap. 4), largely because all too little has been written about it, concerns the doomed Dieppe landings. In an intriguing reference to Hitler's seat-of-the-pants tactics (p. 259), the author blames Allied intelligence for anticipating German military moves on the basis of sound professional judgment instead of what Hitler himself would order in specific moments of challenge. While all the major powers were guilty of intelligence errors, the United States is especially criticized in an interpretive hindsight chapter (pp. 267-81) not for speckled intelligence results, which are, after all, inevitable in so dicey a business, but for having had virtually no existing intelligence structure at the time of Pearl Harbor. One wishes that the author had ignored Pearl Harbor entirely in view of the many published studies and included some other moments involving an intelligence short-circuit: the North African landings, the Battle of Britain, even Sicily. But this is a quibble. Mr. Kirkpatrick has written an important book—and it ought to be read.

ROBERT G. DEINDORFER
New York City

Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice *by David Butler and Donald Stokes. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1969.—xi, 516 pp. $10.00.*

For several years, students of British politics and of electoral behavior had been waiting for the appearance of David Butler and Donald Stokes's definitive work on Britain; their expectations are not disappointed. This remarkable book will clearly rank with *The American Voter* as a landmark in the understanding of the "forces which shape electoral choice." It is a study of change, indeed, not only because it is based on a panel which was reinterviewed three times between 1963 and 1966, but because it tells about longer-term evolutions, through a careful prodding into the respondents' pasts. Thus the authors can notice the slow generational build-up of the Labour party, irrespective of daily variations. Never has a study of British electors penetrated so deeply into the successive layers of partisan choice; with extremely fine analytical tools, the authors disentangle the maze of influences, age, religion, environment, class and thus both unearth and solve problems and paradoxes. To give only three

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examples. First, it is normally asserted that trade union membership is an "explanation" of the Labour vote; yet the authors show conclusively that, while the two phenomena are closely associated, the direction of the "causal influence" varies and that in many cases allegiance to Labour does precede trade union allegiance. Secondly, the swing is fairly uniform in Britain, as is well known; but it was little noticed that this could only be because the behavior of the voters was bound to be different in constituencies where Labour is strong from those where the Tories are strong: only the environment can account for the fact that, overall, 2 per cent of all the voters, for instance, should appear to swing to the Conservatives both in safe Labour seats and in safe Tory seats. Thirdly, the authors are able to examine very closely the extent to which the idea of "right" and "left" and the content of this idea are spread throughout the electorate; with care and patient analysis, they show with more rigor than ever before, how small is this content and how limited the scope of the understanding. Whether we like it or not, partisan choice which is deep-rooted is not a strict ideological affair. Thus, on these and many other crucial points, the Butler-Stokes study provides an almost perfect example of rigorous analysis, which only the survey could have made possible, but where both survey findings and statistical techniques are used with great elegance. Yet one large question remains: the strength of partisan choice does raise the basic problem of the meaning of politics for the average man. How much does politics count? How mechanical or active is it, and why is this the case? Thus, voting studies lead naturally to socialization studies and to the analysis of attitudes and perceptions of a "Lane-type" character. These will clearly have to be married increasingly to "Michigan" studies if we are to understand the deepest roots of human behavior in the political field.

J. BLONDEL
University of Essex

The Conquest of Violence: Order and Liberty in Britain *by T. A. Critchley. New York, Schocken Books, 1970.—xii, 226 pp. $8.50.*

Mr. Critchley, an assistant secretary in the British Home Office who has previously written on the history of the British police, takes a wider canvas for his present study, which seeks to answer the question, how Britain has come to occupy a position in which the incidence of domestic violence is very low and the degree of political liberty rather high. Although he speculates a little on the findings of ethologists and others

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about the role of violence in human societies, he is not, except incidentally, concerned with individual crimes of violence—why, for instance, there are so many fewer murders in Britain proportionately to the population than in the United States. Nor, which is perhaps more of a pity, does he extend his inquiry to Northern Ireland, where the British recipe for dealing with political violence seems to be breaking down. What he is most concerned with is to show how long a process it has been to establish order combined with liberty in England and how decisive was the creation of a wholly civilian, unarmed police force in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Before 1848, when England almost alone in Europe escaped large-scale violence, the English were regarded as among the most turbulent of peoples; since then, with brief exceptions just before and just after the First World War, England's record has been almost uniquely peaceful. Mr. Critchley's approach is largely an historical one, to look at the search for order combined with liberty from Saxon times, to see on what it was that the state relied for maintaining order in successive periods, what alternations there have been between periods of great turbulence and other, more peaceful ones, and what enduring principles have emerged after a number of false starts.

Mr. Critchley is concerned even in the earlier periods with violence as a product of popular discontent, rather than with the effect, for instance, of the resort to violence by rival nobles in the Middle Ages. He assumes that in any society where discontent exists with no obvious channel for its remedy some degree of violence is at least likely, though there have been periods—much of the eighteenth century, for instance—when acceptance of a status quo even of a not very agreeable kind seems to have been so deeply embedded in the population as to make it possible for order to be preserved with very little effort on the part of the authorities.

He distinguishes in an interesting fashion between violence directed against local wrongs and concrete local symbols of tyranny or economic oppression and that seeking for more general remedies, and again between reactionary violence seeking to restore a real or imaginary better past and forward-looking violence seeking to bring about new better conditions, between say, Luddism and Chartism.

For much of the time when the country was most disturbed both under the Tudors and during the Industrial Revolution, the only instruments of order were the military and spies. In a modern society, as Britain was becoming in the nineteenth century, this was not good enough. A civilian police which rested on the age-old obligation of all citizens to help keep the peace and which was under local control was less provocative to the aggrieved and less likely to cause violence to escalate.

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Combined with open political channels, it remains the best hope. The 1968 contrast between London and Paris is used as an apt illustration, which is not to say that complacency is ever permissible in this field.

MAX BELOFF
All Souls College, Oxford

Pay and Productivity Bargaining: A Study of the Effect of National Wage Agreements in the Nottinghamshire Coalfield *by R. G. Searle-Barnes. New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1969.—xxv, 190 pp. $8.50.*

The preoccupation of government, labor, and management with "incomes policy"—not only in Great Britain but also in other Western nations, including the United States—confers a timeliness and universality of interest on this book. The author presents a very informed and detailed, yet compact, description of the background, occasion, and consequences of a shift from incentive pay to day rates in Nottinghamshire collieries under the National Power Loading Agreement of 1966 (Appendix 2). This agreement allowed regional differentials, but it did look forward to a uniform national pay scale by 1971.

The important thing is that the 1966 change in mode of payment had an adverse affect on the Nottingham area's productivity. In the superseded 1957 Nottinghamshire Power Loading Agreement (Appendix 1), the National Coal Board had sought worker cooperation in mine mechanization through a system of payment by results. This agreement was "potentially prey to most of the evils associated with incentive systems of payment," yet "it was reasonably successful, successful enough to make it very difficult for any new Agreement, whether National or District, whether based on piecerates or dayrates, to achieve markedly better results" (p. 62). Thus, although the 1966 agreement might have served "the national interest" well enough, it proved definitely "prejudicial" to performance in Nottinghamshire (p. 169). "At worst," according to a postscript reflecting on statistics that extend through the last quarter of 1968, "it now appears that Nottinghamshire has lost no more than two years of progress as a result of a daywage system of payment" (p. 170).

The book is embellished by an introduction on wage-payment systems contributed by Professor Lupton of the Manchester Business School. This introduction cites some of the pertinent literature. Though

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it hardly pretends to completeness in this regard, it should have mentioned works by at least two fellow-Britons—*The Fawley Productivity Agreements: A Case Study of Management and Collective Bargaining* by Allan Flanders and *Equitable Payment: A General Theory of Work, Differential Payment, and Individual Progress* by Elliott Jaques.

A reader with less readiness than a wedding guest to hear out an ancient mariner would have welcomed a summary chapter. He has to be grateful instead for a generous index, which too few books originating in Britain include.

IRVING H. SIEGEL
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

From the Ancien Régime to the Popular Front: Essays in the History of Modern France in Honor of Shepard B. Clough *edited by Charles K. Warner. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.—vii, 211 pp. $7.50.*

It is a credit to the editor of this slender volume that he avoids any pretence as to its character. He frankly acknowledges his intention to present "a very private tribute" to a "great teacher and good friend." There is consequently little sense in repeating the reviewer's usual complaints about *Festschriften* and every reason to accept this one for what it is: a fairly random collection of ten essays in recent French history by students of Shepard Clough. As the title suggests, the arrangement is chronological and without claim to thematic unity other than the common reference to France. It is perhaps the greatest possible compliment to Professor Clough, in fact, that the alumni of his Columbia seminars display such a catholicity of interests: business (Ralph Bowen), political theory (Paul Beik), medicine (Dora Weiner), finance (Charles Freedeman), agriculture (Charles Warner), colonialism (Raymond Betts), and party politics on both the national (Joel Colton) and local level (Sabine Jessner). Two essays of more general and conceptual interest critically examine the validity of "*revanche*" (Frederic Seager) and "stagnation" (Martin Wolfe) as characteristics of the French national experience.

In the absence of a central theme, it is legitimate to ask whether this book reveals at least a certain viewpoint which might be attributed to a common training. What kind of history, in other words, are students of Professor Clough prone to write? The most striking similarity of the contributors is their reluctance to editorialize. They obviously regard the past as past, and they make virtually no attempt to garnish their

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accounts with "relevant" comments on contemporary problems. This by no means excludes awareness or analysis of current methodology, but it does indicate a certain sobriety—not to say conventionality—of judgment and a respect for the discipline which the authors share. One does not find here the historiography of derring-do but of careful research and cautious opinion, an effort to retain the impartiality of the third person. Flashes of humor are rare and there is not the slightest suggestion of cuteness. The essays thus convey an ambiance of professionalism and show an attention to the traditional craft of historical writing. The authors are, in short, all products of the American graduate school system of the past thirty years to which their essays pay a personal tribute. Professor Clough's own influential contribution to that enterprise is further attested to by an appended bibliography of more than forty books and articles.

ALLAN MITCHELL
Smith College

The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 *by Dietrich Orlow. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969—x, 338 pp. $11.95.*

The Limits of Hitler's Power *by Edward N. Peterson. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969.—xxiii, 472 pp. $12.50.*

In the first part of a projected two-volume study of the NSDAP Dietrich Orlow has traced the development of the party from its formation until Hitler's appointment as chancellor. Since he had at his disposal considerable documentation uncovered since 1945, his book marks a significant advance in terms of data over the only previous effort to deal comprehensively with the same subject, Konrad Heiden's *A History of National Socialism*, first published in 1932. Orlow is strongest in charting the formation and growth of the party's internal organization, showing it to have been a remarkably well structured and well staffed political machine, at least in its upper reaches. He is less successful at explaining its hold over its members, setting forth in the introduction a complicated theoretical model couched in social science jargon which is later occasionally invoked but whose validity is never empirically demonstrated. An even more serious failing results from Orlow's effort to clarify the development of the NSDAP's social and economic position. He maintains that from 1926 until 1928 the party's strategy was based on an "urban plan" which involved an effort to win the work-

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ers of Germany's industrial centers away from the "Marxist" parties. But by the summer of 1928, Orlow contends, the futility of this approach had become apparent, with the result that Hitler abandoned it in favor of a "rural nationalist" plan designed to gain the money of the business community and the votes of the middle classes and the rural population. Those who seek to make sense out of history and politics may well wish there had been such a neat and discernible development of Nazi policies, but unfortunately Orlow has failed to provide sufficient data to make his thesis convincing. The hitherto prevailing consensus, according to which the NSDAP remained a bewildering collection of conflicting socio-economic crosscurrents prior to its achievement of power (and even to some extent thereafter) thus emerges undemolished. By seeking to impose a clarifying schema on the socio-economic policies of the party, Orlow has succeeded only in obscuring one of its key distinguishing characteristics, for the indeterminate position of the NSDAP on social and economic issues was itself a major factor in the party's rise, enabling it to seem, if not all things to all men, at least many things to many groups.

Largely because of his concentration on the Munich *Reichsleitung*, or national headquarters, Orlow's book gives the impression that the NSDAP was an orderly, almost monolithic organization. His assumption throughout is that the directives of the *Reichsleitung* were faithfully implemented by the subordinate units and thus represent an accurate record of the internal life of the party. The questionable nature of this assumption is demonstrated by Edward N. Peterson's book. By cutting into the Nazi regime at a number of points from the highest reaches of the *Reich* government, through the ministerial and *Land* levels, down to the grass roots of city, town, and village, Peterson shows the great difficulties encountered by the NSDAP in its attempts to work its will as ruling party. Obstruction came not only from the state bureaucracy but also from the middle and lower levels of the party itself. And despite the regime's uncontested power, overcoming such obstruction proved no simple task. In the light of Peterson's findings, one is impelled to wonder about the extent to which the directives of the *Reichsleitung* cited by Orlow actually reflected the internal realities of the NSDAP in the period before it could back up its orders with the authority of the state.

The achievement of Peterson's book lies in its demonstration of the extent to which the "war of all against all," long recognized as the salient feature of the upper echelons of the Nazi regime, also characterized the middle and lower reaches of government in the Third Reich. Unfor-

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tunately, Peterson belabors this point long after it has become abundantly evident to the reader, illustrating it with excessive amounts of anecdotal and biographical material. In pursuing the worthwhile goal of demolishing the myth of the monolithic Nazi dictatorship, he also ends by overstating his case. By concentrating solely upon instances when official policy was obstructed or official authority challenged or disputed, he leaves the impression of a system so riven with dissension and disobedience as to be incapable of functioning. Yet we know that the Third Reich did function sufficiently well to rule a major industrial nation for twelve years, during nearly half of which period it was fighting an all out war, for a time with considerable success, against a formidable coalition of powers. What one misses in Peterson's book is an effort to come to grips with this apparent paradox of Nazi government.

Curiously, despite the title one learns nothing new from Peterson's book about the limits of Hitler's power. His examination of the dictator's role is based almost wholly on secondary sources and deals only with Hitler's idiosyncratic methods of exercising his authority, not with the extent or effectiveness of his power. Much work remains to be done on that important subject. The same is true of the history of the Nazi party, despite the definite article in Orlow's title and the publisher's rash dust-jacket claim that this two-volume work will be "definitive."

H. A. TURNER
Yale University

Frederick Barbarossa: A Study in Medieval Politics *by Peter Munz. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1969.—xxi, 422 pp. $11.50.*

The theme of this book, as the subtitle says, is medieval politics. Frederick Barbarossa is presented here not as champion of the old social order nor as a hero of the new chivalric culture, but as a highly pragmatic and realistic statesman, steering a shifting course amid the sands of twelfth-century politics and society and battered by the conflicting forces of spiritualism, naturalism, and sacerdotalism.

For the first few years of his reign, Frederick attempted to establish peace and order on a "conservative and traditional" plan, based on a "family compact." When this failed, he replaced it with the plan which Munz calls the Great Design and which governed Frederick's policy for

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the central period of his reign (1156-77). His purpose was to control Swabia, Burgundy, and Lombardy from a tightly organized *terra imperii* in the region of the headwaters of the Rhine, Rhone, and Ticino rivers. He hardly attempted to rule actively outside this area and allowed the German princes to establish their own territorial principalities. "As far as the Great Design is concerned," Munz says, "Frederick can hardly be considered a German ruler." In 1177, however, he was forced by the rising tide of feudalism to abandon this plan, and for the remainder of his reign sought to base his power on feudal principles. This was the cause, according to Munz, of Frederick's conflict with Henry the Lion, whose successful establishment of a territorial principality had been in accord with the Great Design but now constituted "a tangible threat to the feudalization of the monarchy." The increasing number of tenants-in-chief after Henry's fall marked the emergence of a new constitution for the monarchy. Frederick's death on the Third Crusade cut short his work, however, and the early death of Henry VI and the hostility of Innocent III soon brought "Frederick's carefully laid plans . . . almost to nought."

The view of Frederick as a consummate politician depends upon his conscious formulation of these three successive plans and, above all, of the Great Design, which Munz considers "one of the most constructive and imaginative political plans ever mooted in Europe." It was Frederick's own idea, of which the novelty was purposely concealed by Otto of Freising in the *Gesta Friderici* and of which Rainald of Dassel (whom some historians have considered the inspirer of Frederick's policy) was an instrument and sometimes, owing to his determined antipapalism, an obstacle. Frederick's opponents also come off badly. Hadrian IV is depicted as soft but stubborn, and Alexander III is called a politician rather than a statesman because, unlike Frederick, "he had no new conceptions and no grand plans."

Not all historians will accept this view, but they will agree that Munz has written an original, learned, and stimulating book. He argues his case well, with a full command of the relevant sources and secondary literature and with many fascinating sidelights on the history of the period. He resolutely strips away the myths with which Frederick has been surrounded by German nationalists and presents him for almost the first time as a medieval king, placed amid the realities of twelfth-century politics, rather than as a folk hero or villain.

GILES CONSTABLE
Harvard University

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The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 *by C.A. Macartney. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1969.—xiv, 886 pp. $14.95.*

In his preface to this volume, Professor Macartney observes that the bulk of historical literature dealing with the Habsburg empire has been parochial in nature. Czechs and Poles, Magyars and South Slavs have dealt with the histories of their own people under Habsburg rule, and even the German-Austrians, who might have been expected to take a broader view of the empire they so frequently dominated, have tended to confine themselves to a study of German Austria. These "tribal histories," Professor Macartney believes, cannot be completely satisfactory even for their own tribes, for the political, social, and economic development of each people was bound up with and largely conditioned by that of the others and cannot really be understood except in the context of the empire as a whole.

After forty years of study of the Habsburg realm, Professor Macartney has endeavored to write a history of the empire as a whole. Conscious of the magnitude of the task, he modestly confesses his awareness that he has not filled the gap, but hopes he has succeeded in putting something into it.

He certainly has. While restricting himself almost exclusively to domestic history, he has provided the most comprehensive coverage available in English on the political structure of the empire, legal and constitutional developments, economic and financial conditions, and the social and class structure. And he has done this for every significant segment of the empire, so that a picture of the development of the empire as a whole does indeed emerge. Students looking for an account of the abolition of serfdom in central Europe, the problem of the ownership of land, the dislocations caused by industrialization, the shift of the positions of the nationalities in the empire will find material that, at the very least, will provide them with a basis for further study. Specialists will inevitably carp at Professor Macartney's treatment of particular problems and will question his selection of facts, but they have been provided with a framework into which their own work may be fitted.

Unfortunately, Professor Maccartney's work cannot be acclaimed without reservations. In the first place, his writing is ponderous, and it is easy to bog down in his presentation of material. A more serious criticism may be leveled against his entire conception of Habsburg history. He has chosen to deal with the period after 1790, which he regards as the second great phase of Habsburg history—the downward phase. The earlier and longer period, he says, was one of "continued upward progress," a dubious proposition in itself. The tide, he believes, turned on

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January 28, 1790, when Joseph II, who had pushed absolutism and centralization further than any of his predecessors, admitted defeat at the hands of the Hungarian Estates and on his deathbed revoked most of the centralization measures he had imposed since the death of his mother, Maria Theresa. "The subject of this study is the history of the retreat," Professor Macartney writes, and in the manner of almost all students of Habsburg history, he has sought (and of course found) the reasons for the decline and eventual collapse of the empire. One is reminded of students of Byzantium who see the history of that empire as one long record of decline—a full one thousand years of it.

If Professor Macartney's central theme is indeed the history of the Habsburg retreat, his decision to avoid dealing in detail with diplomatic or military questions is almost incomprehensible, for surely the horrendous diplomatic and military mistakes committed by Habsburg leaders, especially in the period after 1850, had much to do with the decline of the empire. Moreover, a strong case can be made that the final collapse of the empire was not so much due to inherent weaknesses as to defeat in war.

Even more disturbing is Professor Macartney's failure to deal with the cultural history of the empire. For here, surely, can be found its most significant contribution to European civilization. Just as Paris attracted artists and writers from the entire Europeanized world, so did Vienna become a focal point for creative spirits among the diverse nationalities of central Europe. It is perhaps significant that, while neglecting the empire's cultural contribution, Professor Macartney at no time pauses to consider the contribution of the empire to the political stability or economic prosperity of Europe as a whole. Perhaps he does not feel the empire made any such contribution, or at any rate not a salutary one, which would explain his lack of appreciation for Metternich.

Finally, mention should be made that Professor Macartney has been unfortunate in his editors. His book abounds in infelicities of expression and in errors. For example, the typesetter evidently had difficulty in distinguishing between Russia and Prussia. A good editor might also have improved the bibliography, which is arranged in such a manner that it is almost impossible to find a book on a particular topic without combing the entire (lengthy) bibliographical essay. Professor Macartney himself is presumably responsible for some of the curious evaluations of the historical literature.

NORMAN RICH
Brown University

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Politics in Modern Greece *by Keith R. Legg. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969.—viii, 367 pp. $10.00.*

Keith Legg's book illustrates the limitations and distortions which can result from an inappropriate use of structural-functional analysis. The author states that there is a category of developing nations, including Greece, which does not fit existing models of transitional societies, but he himself presents a static analysis. Consequently, no insight is gained into the dynamics of Greek politics.

If the author had restricted himself to limited questions, some of his material would be interesting and unpretentious. His material on clientage relationships, political recruitment, and the political elite is informative, although one must question his notion of the Greek political elite. Mr. Legg, however, assumes that the Greek polity can be treated as an autonomous unit. Despite a background chapter, little recognition is given to the fact that Greek interest groups, political parties, or extraparliamentary politics cannot be discussed except in the light of foreign political and economic interests. The controversy over electoral laws in Greece, particularly in 1952, cannot ignore the direct involvement of the then United States ambassador to Greece, John Peurifoy. At a minimum, Mr. Legg should have extended his central theme regarding clientage relationships to a consideration of the clientage relationship between the United States and Greece.

From his central theme (the persistence of a network of clientage relationships) Legg derives the personalized nature of Greek political parties, the absence of ideological divisions, and the absence of meaningful associational interest groups. All this is valid, but whether it is a major determinant of Greek politics can be questioned. The clientage relationship does not account for the 1909 Military League, the rise of Venizelos, the Metaxas dictatorship, or the military coup of 1967. Nor does it explain the crisis of legitimacy which Legg denies despite his discussion of the Venizelos-King George split. In a sense, the current Greek military dictatorship represents a solution to the crisis of legitimacy. As Greeks over time transposed their loyalty from village and clan to the nation, they increasingly perceived the traditional ruling oligarchy, including the monarchy, as opposed to their interests. In fact, many Greeks initially perceived the current junta as a symbol of the nation.

Mr. Legg does not account for the processes of Greek politics. Most evident is the absence of systematic explanation of the military coup of 1967. He relies on the propaganda of the military coup, by attributing it to the military's reaction to the increasing strength of the Left. The electoral data, documenting the decline of EDA, the left-wing party, is

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ignored. Mr. Legg rightly asserts that Andreas Papandreou was committed to modernization, but he does not relate this to socio-economic changes. The rise of an indigenous middle class, the conflict among financial and banking institutions over whether to act in the interests of native or foreign capital, rapid urbanization, the absence of opportunity for technical training, the rise of a Western-trained intellectual elite, all this and more engendered social ferment, making for extensive reform.

By not analyzing the dynamics of socio-economic processes and the role of foreign interests, the author's discussion of the military coup is in a vacuum. Although he alludes to the fact that the Greek military is not monolithic, he ignores factions within the military. The social origins of the current military rulers of Greece are rural. They are committed to antimodern, peasant values. Many had been Nazi collaborators, and their particular brand of nationalism is best expressed in the regime's slogan, "Greece of Christian Greeks."

All in all, Mr. Legg fails to stipulate the relevant determinants which brought the military dictatorship to Greece in 1967, or, for that matter, to indicate what kind of military dictatorship it is. Nevertheless, given the lack of scholarly work on Greece, *Politics in Modern Greece* is a competent presentation of limited aspects of traditional Greek politics.

ADAMANTIA POLLIS
New School for Social Research

The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making *by Jerry F. Hough. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.—xiii, 416 pp. $12.50.*

This book is subtitled "The Local Party Organization in Industrial Decision-Making." The subtitle is misleading. The book is in fact of much broader interest. It deals with the role of the party official in the localities, thereby also discussing what the function of the party is in the Soviet Union. The result, in my view, is of quite exceptional value. In fact this is a book which political scientists ought under no circumstances to neglect, whether or not they are specialists in the USSR.

It is true that most of the examples do relate to industrial problems and that the agricultural and agitation-propaganda aspects receive little attention. However, it is precisely by a careful examination of how the party performs this or that function that its social purpose can be best

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identified. This requires the analyst to shed stereotyped concepts and prejudgments. The party is not unnecessary or parasitic; a civil service would hardly provide the necessary direction and dynamism. It is not enough to point to the power and vested interests of the *apparatchiki* and then assume that these are a type we know and understand. Most of the things done and decisions taken by the local officials have to be done or taken somewhere in every society. Hough is lavish in his quotations from Western administrative practice and political science, and rightly so. His parallel with the French prefectoral system is an effective one. State ownership of industry has inevitably led to the Soviet "prefects" having an economic role, in matters which would be largely outside the "political" sphere in the West. However, he also rightly notes that economic-technical functions affect the nature and *modus operandi* of the political organs at least as much as the latter affect the carrying out of party work in the economic-technical sphere.

This reviewer is usually allergic to the "biographical" approach to Soviet politics. Whether Ivanov served as second secretary under Popov in Tomsk seems to matter little, except perhaps to Ivanov and Popov. Hough is a collector of biographies. Yet he uses them in a most refreshing way. He accepts as a fact that, in the USSR as elsewhere, influence and personal acquaintance help in promotion. But his chief concern is with the types of officials who are the *apparatchiki* of today. He confines his attention to the "men of 1938" and their successors, those who took over after Stalin massacred most of the original party. He studies their educations and experience in economic management as well as in the state and party hierarchies. He notes the very strong tendency toward expertise; party secretaries in charge of industry (for example, in provinces and cities) often have engineering educations, have often been managers, with and quite plainly are selected in some part for their specialist knowledge. Many of them become first secretaries by promotion or move into ministries or other government jobs and then back into a party secretaryship. We are indeed far removed from proletarian *apparatchiki*.

The author describes the structure of the various party committees, and notes some apparent illogicalities in their behavior: duplicating or supplanting state organs in the solution of detailed questions, bypassing the party's own hierarchical ladder, and so on. Why should a city's party secretary appeal to Moscow for urgent deliveries of ball bearings or timber for some factory, when a whole pyramid of state supply organs exists for this very purpose? Is this irrational nonsense? If so, given the deeply felt need for administrative order and economic efficiency, why do such practices survive? They have survived, furthermore,

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with little change, under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, despite the regionalization of 1957 (*sovnarkhozy*), despite the abolition of *sovnarkhozy*.

One cannot do justice in a review to Hough's treatment of such questions as these. But no reader of his book will again be able to give simple answers. The system has a logic. The party officials are needed. The apparently odd misrouting of requests and instructions fulfils a purpose. Those who believe that it is not so had better have $12.50 ready and buy the book. This, needless to say, does not mean that either Hough or the reviewer have become apologists for Soviet one-party rule. One can understand without either forgiving or approving. Indeed one *must* understand. To take a very different example: I am told that reformers in Iraq who were against landlords never bothered to study the functions which the landlords and their agents, in fact, performed, and so there was much avoidable chaos when land reform was decreed. In a different Russia, many of the actions now performed by the secretaries would still have to be performed by someone.

A most valuable chapter examines the meaning of the words "rational-technical." Does party intervention disrupt the professional or expert view of rationality? By no means is this necessarily so, argues Hough. Many problems are not to be decided by an unambiguous appeal to "rationality." There are conflicts of interest, value-judgments, views of priorities, which it is the task of political men to resolve. In particular there are claims on financial or material resources familiar in all systems. The party officials themselves often identify with "their" locality or sector, and represent it in the competitive struggle for scarce resources, even while also representing the interests of the center in a centralized party machine. Of course, Hough does not claim that the Soviet party resolves problems in some optimal manner or that it always acts rationally in those cases when that much misunderstood word does have a clear meaning. However, he does give the reader a much clearer view of why and how the party officials operate in the way they do. They have ideological-political tasks, enforcing the official beliefs and repressing "incorrect" thoughts, that can be undemocratic or anti-democratic. Yet, as he puts it, they also serve "in an instrumental way to fulfil the needs of the administrative system," including the economic planning and allocation aspects of this system.

Hough's study would have gained in depth if he had devoted more space to early Bolshevik ideas and practices and any space at all to the tsarist administration, which surely had a quite considerable influence

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on its Soviet successors. He must be congratulated, however, on what he did do.

ALEC NOVE
University of Glasgow

The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917 *edited by Lionel Kochan with an introduction by Leonard Schapiro. London, Oxford University Press, 1970.— ix, 357 pp. $7.95.*

Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a "Third Force" in Pre-Nazi Germany *by George L. Mosse. New York, Howard Fertig, 1970.—260 pp. $8.95.*

Although neither book focuses exclusively on anti-Semitism, it is their one common denominator. Each of the seventeen contributions to *The Jews in Soviet Russia* (counting introduction and epilogue) treats a particular aspect of Russia's "Jewish problem" since 1917, resulting in a comprehensive picture despite occasional repetition. Only B.D. Weinryb's chapter is entirely devoted to anti-Semitism, but most contributors deal with it in some fashion, whether their topic is Soviet theory on the Jews, their legal position, their place in Soviet literature, their situation in World War II or after the Six-Day War. Compared to prerevolutionary times, the lot of Russia's Jews has improved. Officially and privately "it is consistently denied in the U.S.S.R. . . . that anti-semitism exists" (p. 315), and "countless Jews suffer not as Jews but as Soviet citizens. . . . [because] the . . . regime is intolerant of all minorities" (p. 6). Unlike German *völkisch* anti-Semitism, discussed by Mosse, or tsarist persecution of Jews, Soviet Russia's official attitude on this matter, though arbitrary and often politically motivated, rather resembles the position which Mosse ascribes to the French *philosophes:* "The Jew . . . faithful to Judaism was . . . an evil force in society, who must be reeducated to shed his religion and enter the age of progress and enlightenment" (Mosse, p. 40). Since 1917, periodic efforts to "assimilate" the Jews into Soviet society have led to suppression of their religious, educational, and cultural institutions, measures to which the closing of most synagogues, the prohibition to teach Hebrew, and the execution of prominent Yiddish writers in 1952 testify. While the initial onslaught on Judaism in the 1920s was part of a general Bolshevik campaign against all religious denominations, Jews proved more vulnerable than

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non-Jews. For although Jews constitute a recognized nationality, like Tatars and Ukrainians, they remain the only minority in the USSR without a territorial base of their own (the Biro-Bidzhan project, as C. Abramsky's essay shows, essentially failed), and because of their dispersal, they are unable to offer collective opposition to governmental repression. In turn, their failure to settle as a nationality in one part of Russia, coupled with charges that they are "cosmopolitans" with ties throughout the world, notably to Israel (although Zionism was subversive long before Israel existed), has served to justify the regime's treatment of the Jews as second-class citizens whose loyalty is suspect, their proportionally strong representation in the lower echelons (!) of the Communist party notwithstanding. Ironically, resumption of anti-Jewish measures in the 1960s has reversed a previous trend toward ultimate absorption. Increasing Jewish demands for cultural self-expression and permission to emigrate to Israel may leave the government with two alternatives: further repression or greater leniency, including a realistic emigration policy.

Mosse's book consists of seven essays, written between 1958 and 1969, which discuss various German political ideologies advocated by small elitist groups of both the Right and the Left, with nothing in common but their vision of a German society neither capitalist nor Marxist. Whether *völkisch*-anti-Semitic nineteenth-century writers, twentieth-century neoconservatives, or liberal intellectuals of Weimar Germany's "homeless Left," each group fancied itself a "third force" in politics, intent on realizing its particular objectives. Needless to say, they all failed. The only "third force" that succeeded was Hitler's National Socialism. The "third force" theme, designed to give unity to the book, does not apply to all the essays. Two deal with *völkisch* anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century; while here the book's title is appropriate, the theme expressed in the subtitle is not. In the essay on the influence of *völkisch* ideas on German Jewry, by far the best and most original one, the argument that the German youth movement constituted a "third force" may be acceptable, but not when applied to Zionist youth. The essays, qualitatively uneven, are a curious combination of shrewd insights and highly controversial generalizations. A number of inaccuracies and factual errors are annoying, and the author's repeated claim that most of the topics are pioneering ventures into intellectual history cannot be sustained. This is undoubtedly a stimulating book, but both title and subtitle promise more than the author delivers.

WERNER T. ANGRESS
State University of New York at Stony Brook

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Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 *by Mark Mancall. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.—xv, 396 pp. $12.00.*

There are a few debatable matters in this book and they might as well be briefly mentioned, leaving as much space as possible to discuss its exceptional merits.

In his treatment of the tribute system, Mancall follows the important pioneer work of John K. Fairbank. Both authors treat the subject institutionally, but neither of them delineates with sufficient clarity the economic realities on which the system was ultimately based. We may leave aside the southern "tributaries" of China, which are not here in question. Of the northern tributaries, Mancall says that China needed horses from the nomads, who in turn needed the products of China, and that "these exchanges were considered necessary for the stability of Chinese society" (p. 8). This is an inadequate statement. Throughout history, the grinding economic reality has been the inequality of the terms of trade between settled, agriculturally-based civilization and the "outer barbarians"—as much those outside the Roman fortified frontier as those outside the Great Wall of China.

Barbarians always wanted from civilization more goods than they could pay for by what they delivered to civilization. Therefore, in order to get more goods, they harassed the frontiers of civilization so that for political reasons they could get more goods than they could get on a sound basis of economic exchange. Horses? The Chinese had little use for horses. They plowed with oxen, and for transport they preferred mules. What they needed horses for was to fight the barbarian cavalry, and the acquisition from the enemy of what is needed to fight the enemy is nothing new.

China was a genuine example of a civilization which needed nothing from the outside. Anything traded to the outside was regarded as a real loss. Such trade was to be granted politically, not economically, a maneuver, for example, to set a favored tribe against a tribe regarded as more dangerous. "Tribute" was an institution which was based on this reality, but which attempted to disguise it. Reversing the order of prestige, this can be proved by the fact that as a Chinese dynasty weakened, the barbarians north of the Great Wall, instead of breaking off their payment of tribute, demanded the right to appear in China more often, paying more tribute than before, and expecting a greater noneconomic exchange in return. Zlatkin, for example, a Soviet authority cited by Mancall (but not in this connection), has shown that as the Ming dynasty weakened, the Western Mongols demanded the right to present as "tribute" more

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and more horses, more and more often, of poorer and poorer quality. Similarly, the ancestors of the Manchu conquerors of China, as China weakened, demanded the right to turn up more often, with more tribute.

Mancall cites, with a vast amount of entertaining and colorful detail, the confrontations between the Russians, with their "ideology" of the proper relations between sovereign states, and the Manchu-Chinese, with their "ideology" of a single civilization surrounded by barbarisms of different degrees. Alas, this American obsession with ideology—an outcome, perhaps, of the naive American belief that Marxist ideology is just something dreamed up, an idea that tries to impose itself on the facts, not an honestly attempted interpretation of the facts: an idea that should be countered by counterideas, not counterfacts.

Nevertheless, Mancall should be credited with a rich citation from contemporary documents. He enables us to understand how individuals felt—like Milescu, for example, otherwise Spapharii, Spatharius, etc., the Greek-Romanian-Russian civil servant who headed a Russian embassy to Peking in the late seventeenth century, just before the first boundary-deciding treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. It is intriguing to learn how Father Verbiest, a Jesuit in the Manchu service, tipped the Manchu hand to Milescu, on the grounds that both were Christians—though one was a Roman and the other a Greek Orthodox Catholic, theoretically hostile to each other.

These colorful personal details only embroider Mancall's main theme, which he sustains well. It is that when Muscovite and Manchu came into touch with teach other along the Amur, what developed was a process of feeling-out. Each side was trying to discover the dimensions and solidity of the other—and the Russians were a little more quick in sizing up the situation than the Manchus. They settled for a frontier that allowed them to take in tribal peoples, but held back from head-on confrontation with a powerful state. Mancall does us a service in reminding us today, when everything is treated in terms of sensational confrontations, that Russo-Chinese relations have a long history, in which change by gradual adaptation has been more important than eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.

OWEN LATTIMORE
University of Leeds

The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa *by W. Howard Wriggins. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.— ix, 275 pp. $10.00.*

The Ruler's Imperative brings order to a disorderly subject. Its main con-

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cern is the ways in which governing elites in the developing countries of Asia and Africa go about ensuring their political survival. Wriggins provides us with a typology of political strategies and the combinations of strategies employed by elites. Eight strategies are analyzed: the projection of the leader's personality, the use of political organization, the promotion of political ideologies, techniques of providing rewards, methods of intimidation, the use of economic development, the expansion and contraction of mass political participation, and the use of foreign policy.

The book is rich with brief, well written illustrative cases of how specific leaders have employed one or another combination of strategies, successfully or unsuccessfully. For his material Wriggins draws heavily upon dozens of studies written on the developing areas by political scientists during the past two decades, upon his own research in Southern Asia, and upon his experience as a member of the policy planning staff of the Department of State.

It is conventional for many writers on the developing areas to focus on problems of development, that is, on how governments and governing elites seek to achieve goals such as national integration or economic growth or social and cultural transformations. Wriggins prefers to see these development problems and objectives within the context of the elites' primary concern with their own political survival. Thus, as he sees it, the choice of a particular economic, educational, or defense policy may be dictated more by the political requirements of the elite than by the logic of economic or educational planners or by the requirements of defense. Rather than viewing these political considerations as impediments to "rational" policy-making, the starting point of the economic analyst, Wriggins makes these "imperatives" the center of his analysis. Wriggins's book is thus a major contribution to the science of policy analysis.

Economists view the study of policy analysis in terms of the ways in which elites allocate their resources, and they evaluate these allocations in terms of their growth or (under the prodding of radical critics) distributive effects. Wriggins takes a broader view in at least two respects. He sees "resources" as more than economic, and he evaluates effects in terms of their impact on the political position of the governing elite. Thus, what the economist may describe as "absurd" economics may strike the political scientist as "sensible" or at least "understandable" politics.

By providing us with a list of the range of alternatives available to political elites and by describing how these alternatives are employed, Wriggins has given us an excellent starting point for analyzing policy-

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making in the developing areas. To build on this analysis we need to add at least two additional dimensions. The first is to analyze why so many of the strategies chosen by elites to ensure their own survival have proven to be unsuccessful; Sukarno, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, U Nu, Prince Sihanouk, Bandaranaike pursued policies which proved to be both economically and politically disastrous. And the second, considered briefly by Wriggins, is to examine the impact which these strategies have upon the subsequent development of the political system and upon the policy options available to the successors to elites. The strategy chosen by the Pakistani military, for example, to ensure their own political survival needs to be analyzed not only in terms of whether the military survives or not, but also in terms of the long-range impact this strategy has on the Pakistani political system, if indeed a single political system survives at all.

Wriggins has written a book which is both theoretical and realistic, a mix not easily achieved in the literature on development. One would hope that his publisher will find it possible to prepare a less expensive edition that could be used more widely in courses in development, comparative politics and policy analysis.

MYRON WEINER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Land and the Constitution in India *by H. C. L. Merillat. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.—xv, 321 pp. $10.00.*

India: Planning for Industrialization *by Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai. London, Oxford University Press for the Development Center of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1970.—xx, 537 pp.*

The Crisis of Indian Planning: Economic Policy in the 1960s *edited by Paul Streeten and Michael Lipton. London, Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1968.—vii, 416 pp. $10.50.*

Though not, like the camel, put together by a committee, India, the result of centuries of successive waves of invasion, colonization, division, planning, scheming, rationality, tradition, ideology, and fecundity, is a sufficiently complex subject so that the fifteen authors involved in these three books come up with about as many different and seemingly incompatible aspects of their subject as the blind men did with the elephant.

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Merillat comes perhaps the closest to handling a definable segment of the subject, in tracing the history of the constitutional struggle to reconcile guarantees of personal freedom and the ability of the state to achieve significant economic reform, particularly land reform. When the Indian constitution was being framed (1947-49), interests in land in India were in an extremely complex and uncertain state, the result of varied and sometimes conflicting British colonial policies, developed in uneasy alliance with various indigenous elements, and superimposed on a wide variety of traditional arrangements. Advocates of land reform, some wishing to break up large holdings for ideological reasons, others more concerned with enhancing productivity, confronted the problem of retaining adequate freedom for action by government in the face of ideological demands for a bill of rights that would include guarantees against the taking of private property without due compensation. Draftsmen struggled for a form of words that would constitute some degree of guarantee against arbitrary action without making land reform impossible, given the practical limits on the taxes that could be levied for financing full compensation where reform is attempted on a broad scale. Given an insistence on retaining a degree of generality in the constitutional language and a legal tradition calling for interpreting the literal meaning of that language without overt aid from the legislative history, the courts were able to thwart the intent of the legislative leadership in many cases, at least temporarily, by declaring various reform laws to involve unconstitutional infringements of individual rights. When the Lok Sabha attempted to deal with this problem by the first, fourth, and seventeenth amendments to the constitution in 1951, 1955, and 1964, even the validity of the amending process was brought in question by the courts. The current prospect seems to be that the various state legislatures, subject to the approval of the central government, retain fairly complete freedom of action with respect to agricultural land, including exclusive jurisdiction over the taxation of land and agricultural income; this latter provision seems to assure that to some extent investment in land will remain a haven from the centrally imposed progressive income tax.

While many with a legal penchant will be fascinated by this tale of the marches and countermarches in the courts and legislative halls, he who would gain some knowledge of the impact of all this on those who depend on the land and its productivity must look elsewhere.

The Bhagwati-Desai volume tackles a considerably more complex subject, the sisyphean efforts of planners to make water run uphill in their attempt to promote industrialization according to various preconceived ideas rather than by encouraging what comes naturally. In this process

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planners had to contend with serious imbalances in foreign trade, an overvalued rupee, and continued uncertainty over the amount and terms of foreign investment and aid. Somewhat over half of the book is thus concerned with the relation between planning and foreign trade, a discussion that could turn out to have more historical than current interest in the event that the devaluation and liberalization policies embarked on in 1966 are carried through. Even as to the wholly internal aspects of planning, however, it was perhaps inevitable that planners imbued with a distrust of the market and great confidence in the power of administrative fiat should have had to go through a severe ordeal of learning that costs do matter, that there is more to planning than the setting of targets and priorities, and that growth and efficiency must go hand in hand, since, if growth is pursued first regardless of efficiency, inefficiency may result in little or no growth. On the other hand, planning could not have been eschewed in favor of laissez faire without giving up basic objectives of distributive justice and the eradication of material poverty that underlay the entire political atmosphere of the times.

In their analysis of this ordeal, the authors have vividly documented the inconsistencies and mistakes of the Indian planning process during the first three five-year plans, many of which are hopefully being corrected in the searching reevaluations that have accompanied the development of the fourth one.

Industrialization is not the whole story, however, and for a perspective on the Indian economic situation as a whole, one can turn to the somewhat earlier but still extremely valuable symposium edited by Streeten and Lipton. Here the entire background of the planning challenge is set forth in twelve chapters by as many authors dealing with aspects ranging from trade and aid to agriculture, population, defense, and political alignments. One can hardly appreciate the context within which planning had to operate without covering all these areas.

One of the most striking factors tending to undercut the success of Indian planning, according to Lipton, has been the bias in favor of industry and against agriculture, resulting in skimping opportunities for high-yielding investments in agriculture in favor of much less favorable opportunities in industry. One can explain this in terms of the intractable social structure of the Indian village, the predominantly urban background of the planners themselves, the difficulty of inducing qualified personnel to work in a backward and unattractive environment, the incompatibilities between parts of the ideology of land reform and the objective of increased productivity, and failure to allow fully for the risk-aversion of the peasant when urged to innovate, all of which had

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to operate under the uncertain legal structure described by Merillat; but such an explanation does not dispose of the tragic fact that here was a vast opportunity availed of only to a mediocre extent. The outlook for agriculture seems to have brightened considerably since this chapter was written, owing to favorable monsoons and the taking hold of the "green revolution," yet one is left with the feeling that, even so, agriculture will continue to get the short end of the stick as long as growth and progress are identified with industrialization and planners continue to have urban rather than rural aspirations, especially in respect to their personal careers.

No less vital to the success of Indian planning is the treatment of the population problem. While this has been given the highest priority in the appropriate public utterances, performance in converting this to progress in the field is said not to have kept pace with the need or the promise. Taking care of the health needs of the living and especially of the urban and industrial population rather than providing for those of the next generation seems to the person on the local level the more urgent need, and effective fecundity reduction proves more expensive than it sounds. There is also a danger of overstating the immediate results, to which Robert Cassen, the writer of the pertinent chapter, is not immune: gains from a birth control program are stated in terms of a 6 per cent increase in income per head by 1975 (starting from 1965), but no allowance is made in this computation for the fact that the divisor would contain a smaller proportion of infants and small children (reflected in a distribution of 32.7 per cent under fifteen years of age as compared with 41.9 per cent estimated under conditions of unchanged fertility) and a larger percentage of adults and older children with greater economic needs. Population control is an even slower yielding program than would appear from the figures presented.

Planning for education is also a knotty problem: the private returns to cultural and classical education, whether through social advancement, marriage, or priority of consideration for lucrative employment, combined with ideological pressures in the direction of equality of opportunity produce a political demand for the provision of advanced education that often goes far beyond or in directions other than what would be obviously justifiable on grounds of social productivity. Yet the generation of a large volume of educated unemployed may prove essential in inducing at least some of them to fill urgent needs in the rural areas. The provision of qualified teachers is also a problem, with a serious threat of expansion of the volume of education at the expense of its degradation. While teachers' salaries are said to be considerably higher in relation to per capita national income than in most other countries, they

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are still low relative to those of other civil servants and industrial managers. There is also the risk that if education is spread too thin, an acquired literacy that fails to reach a truly functional level is likely to relapse into illiteracy in short order.

One comes away from these books with a feeling that there is some hope that the planning process in India at last shows some signs of emerging from the web of preconceptions and biases that seem to have coalesced into a "planthink" ideology. Planthink was in part made up of obeisance to political idols: Panchayati Raj, socialist organization, planning from below, and in some quarters the dream espoused by Nehru, Mahalanobis, Trone, and others of combining a Soviet economy with a Western polity. Another component of planthink seems to have been a strong belief in the power of the Word: a target once stated is already half accomplished; untouchability is a thing of the past because there are laws proscribing it, regardless of what actually happens in the villages; no public doubt concerning the achievement of the targets of the current plan must be expressed in the course of preparing the next plan; high profit rates, though a necessary evil in the private sector, are to be eschewed in the public sector by reducing prices, even if this means rationing and allocation by administrative fiat and the transfer of the profits into private hands; setting of high targets will lead to their achievements by stimulating to heroic effort, rather than being disregarded almost entirely as hopelessly unrealistic; established tenants are to be given tenure and other rights in the lands they cultivate, regardless of the fact that loose administration results in tenants being less secure through landlords shifting them around to avoid such vesting. If Indian planners can learn from their experience and from critiques such as these, the impetus provided by recent spurts in agriculture can yet be turned into a real "take-off."

WILLIAM VICKREY
Columbia University

Australia, New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968 *by Trevor R. Reese. New York, Oxford University Press, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969.—376 pp. $8.75.*

The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History *by Alastair Davidson. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1969.—xiv, 214 pp. $7.00.*

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The Puzzled Patriots: The Story of the Australia First Movement *by Bruce Muirden. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1969.—xiii, 200 pp. $13.50.*

Knowledge of Australian affairs is very thinly spread in this country. Even where it does appear, it is infused with images of sun and surf, flocks of sheep, and a weird spectrum of unearthly mammals or pseudo-mammals. This reviewer knows of no institutes of Australian studies or university chairs in Australian history or politics in the continental United States (surely there must be at least a couple?). Yet Australians write many books, usually good ones, both about their own nation and about others, especially in the areas of politics and history. These three volumes are all meticulously researched and presented with style and gusto. They examine, in the first case, a very central aspect of Australian life—ties with the United States, her chief ally and financial benefactor—and in the latter two cases the extreme radical fringes of Australian life—both left and right.

Dr. Reese, whose book is subtitled "A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968," comes from that persuasion of thinkers who consider the study of international relations to be no more than "this end of history." This particular opus is a solid, in-depth history of the United States-Australian relationship, covering a broad range of related issues, including the declining Asian role of Britain, the importance of Japan and China in Australian perceptions, and the doubts and ambiguities thrown up by the Southeast Asian meeting point of Australia and the United States—Vietnam. As for the ANZUS treaty itself, in this study it figures as the backbone of the tripartite relationship, a relationship that would be much looser were it not for the insistence of successive Australian leaders in pursuing a United States-sponsored insurance policy. American readers will find the chapters on Korea, SEATO, and Vietnam of great interest, but may wish to spare themselves the detailed (though brilliant) description of other facets of the alliance. Australian readers should find ample evidence, in the last two chapters, of the fact that the weaker party in an alliance has very little to dictate to the stronger and may in some instances (Indonesia, Vietnam) be largely ignored in the crucial decision-making processes.

Dr. Davidson's book should be of interest to both scholars of Australian history and scholars of the international communist movement. It brings together and digests for the first time the large volume of pamphlets, documents, periodicals, newspapers, and recorded speeches produced by a relatively small party that yet managed to exert considerable control over a labor movement in a country far distant from the shores

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of Mother Russia. This theme—the troubles and turmoils of a party that knows not whether to turn inward on its own traditions or look outward at the successes of its older brothers—is followed throughout the book. The narrative commences with the first meeting of 26 members who founded the party in 1920 and follows its growth and schisms through the interwar decades, pausing to examine the party's contacts with the Comintern and the CPSU. On two important occasions the party had to retrace its steps because of its dependence on the Soviet Union. First, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, it opposed Australian participation in the war; then it was forced to make an about-face on the pact's subsequent disavowal. Second, during the Sino-Soviet conflict, it first supported Peking, then was obliged to return to the Soviet camp, severely splitting its own ranks. The narrative is broken, however, by two major omissions. What were the repercussions of the Hungarian invasion on the CPA and the membership at large? And how did the Vietnam war and its antiwar movement affect the party?

The author does not hesitate to look closely at intraparty disputes and the effect they had on the course of the party's development, though doubtless some of his assessments will be disputed by future historians of the Australian labor movement and by present CPA members. But then, though perhaps it comes very close to being so, this is not yet the definitive work on the Australian Communist party. The available material is concisely researched, admirably presented, and vividly footnoted. In fact, the footnotes themselves often make for fascinating reading, particularly those describing some of the illustrious personalities that shaped the party.

The last book in this triad spins a cautionary tale about the ease with which small groups of political agitators can be removed from public sight in an open, nontotalitarian society. The specific case examined is the rise and suppression of a right-wing, anti-Semitic, rabidly "pro-Australian" movement that survived for only a few months in 1942.

The Australia First Movement was harmless because it was small, uninfluential, and far from the mainstream of Australian life. Sixteen of its members were interned on extremely shaky evidence when four persons in Perth (2,000 miles away) were arrested for conspiring to assassinate political leaders and preparing to aid and abet a Japanese invasion. When it became clear, some years later, that the internments had been unjustified, a political storm broke out. Yet even this (or perhaps precisely this) failed to move the government into an admission of its wrong-doing. The story is capped, finally, by the revelation (p. xi) that the federal government will to this day not permit access to the tran-

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script of its official inquiry into the case. The author, fortunately, had the use of a copy kept in private hands.

R. MICHAEL PORDES
Columbia University

Technology and the Economic Development of the Tropical African Frontier *by Thomas R. De Gregori. Cleveland, The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969.—viii, 531 pp. $15.00.*

De Gregori employs in this volume his conception of a frontier (defined as the interface between areas with widely different levels of technological development) to explain movements of people, growth of population, the nature of social institutions, and the diffusion of technology in tropical Africa. In this exposition the course of development is traced by the evolution of technology and the consequent changes in man's ability to exploit different environments; the pace and character of development are governed by the diffusion of technology across a frontier and by the extent to which institutions, values, and habits of mind adjust to the requirements of technological evolution.

The author's central thesis is that technological diffusion occurs chiefly through education, effecting the requisite changes in values and habits of mind; the importance of international capital movements as a mechanism of technological diffusion (which he identifies with both "classical" and Marxist theories of economic development) is deemphasized and the conventional focus of attention on rates of saving, investment, and capital formation is attributed to misconception of the development process and of the nature of science and technology.

Institutional resistances, myths, and errors of policy have seriously restricted development in tropical Africa, chiefly by impairing the adoption of the new values and habits of mind required for accelerated technological diffusion. De Gregori vigorously attacks the myths and policy errors he sees in the structure of African education, the systems of industrial and labor discipline, trade and investment policies, and the planning of industrialization.

Four chapters are devoted to demonstrating the inadequacy of concentration on foreign investment as the basic method of technological diffusion and on the rates of saving/investment as the central explanatory variables of the economic development achieved in Africa. In frequent asides to the reader, De Gregori appears to express the view that his attacks on these doctrinal misconceptions are more than a critique of historical experience in Africa, but are also addressed to contemporary

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ideas, policies, and practices. In large part this effort to create an aura of contemporary relevance is misdirected, and the author is too often observed in the act of beating a dead horse. Few African planners or economic advisers at the time this volume was written (evidently in the middle 1960s) would have been offended by De Gregori's selection of key factors in the development process and few, if any, were seriously attempting to apply uncritically to problems of African development the theories of capital embodied in the "classical" models of Ricardo, Marx, or Hobson.

But if this volume is viewed essentially as a discourse in African economic history, the reader will find rewarding both the consistency of historical interpretation and the wide range of studies which De Gregori has integrated with his main theme. An essay on "The Technological History of Sub-Saharan Africa" composes one-third of the text and is much more carefully documented than the surrounding chapters in which the author defines and defends the concepts he employs in his interpretation of African economic history since the Stone Age. Nearly 100 pages are devoted to bibliographic citations.

ROBERT L. WEST
Tufts University

The OAS in Transition *by M. Margaret Ball. Durham, Duke University Press, 1969.—xxii, 721 pp. $19.50.*

The Movement Toward Latin American Unity *edited by Ronald Hilton. New York, Frederick A. Praeger in cooperation with the California Institute of International Studies, 1969.—xvi, 561 pp.*

Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making *by Harvey S. Perloff. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1969.—xvi, 253 pp. $8.50.*

The OAS in Transition is in the tradition of *The Organization of American States* by Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas Jr. (1963): "This is a book about the organization and functioning—and problems—of the OAS yesterday, today, and tomorrow" (p. v). It is written primarily from a viewpoint within the OAS; that is, the stress is on the organization—its structure and procedures—and on the scope of activities that the OAS and its specialized agencies may undertake. The significance of the word "Transition" in the title is that special emphasis

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is given to the constitutional changes in the OAS contained in the Revised Charter of the Organization of American States (1967), the full text of which is presented together with the Charter (1948) in the appendixes.

This is an important, scholarly book and an essential reference work for all those seriously concerned with the nature and activities of the OAS.

Briefly, a few caveats. Oddly enough, in a book of this type, two mistakes on arbitration are made on the same page (p. 431). The Chaco dispute was not settled through "*ad hoc* arbitration" but by a political agreement that was merely ratified by a comic opera arbitration. The Peru-Ecuador (Marañón) dispute was not "arbitrated" (if that means "settled"); it was disputatiously "settled" by a complete Peruvian military victory in 1941 followed by mediation and the signature of the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro in January 1942.

The author is one of a company of scholars that, by failure to define *intervention*, reduces readers to confusion through the use of such terms as "pure" intervention (p. 474) to describe the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; and "collective" (i.e., "impure" ?) intervention (p. 52), as suggested by the Rodríguez Larreta Doctrine. A joint clarification of concepts would be salutary. Finally on pages 368 and 419, substantial footnotes appear in Spanish, not yet, unfortunately, a second language in America.

The Movement Toward Latin American Unity is a symposium containing forty papers prepared by European, Latin, and North American scholars for a conference held in 1968 under the auspices of the California Institute of International Studies. Special emphasis is given to efforts to attain Latin American economic integration. In the words of the editor: "This symposium reflects the present unglamorous state of inter-American relations" (p. v); "In Latin America it is hard to discern progress. The goals of the Alliance are not being met. It is calculated that 250 million Latin Americans are getting less food than they used to. . . . On March 15, 1969, the Agency for International Development reported to Congress that the goals of the Alliance for Progress were neither realistic nor attainable until the people of Latin America took steps to control population growth."

The papers, the work of an array of talent, range in title from "Biomedical Communications: U.S. and Latin American Cooperation" to "Economic Integration in Latin America: The Next Fifty Years." There are extensive collections of tables and charts.

Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making is part his-

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tory, part analysis, and part exhortation. The exhortation comes early: "Can we do anything else but try to perfect a social invention dedicated to one of the most critical tasks of our day—helping the three-quarters of the world that is poor to achieve decent levels of living?" (p. x); "The accomplishments of the Alliance since 1961 have been poor indeed. . . . Despite its shortcomings and failures, the Alliance for Progress has enormous potential. If we turn away from it because we are impatient with our imperfectly working model, we will lose one of the truly great opportunities for forward movement in modern times" (pp. xv, xvi).

The author, a member of the "Committee of Nine," is intimately acquainted with the course of the Alliance. His mood is one of urging the necessity of going forward despite enormous problems. One wishes he had given more attention to the serious questions raised by Simon G. Hanson's *Five Years of the Alliance for Progress* than the simple reference in a footnote to "a highly critical view" (p. 65).

BRYCE WOOD
Social Science Research Council

The Latin Americans *by Victor Alba. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969.—vii, 392 pp. $10.00.*

Increasingly, I think it unfeasible to write books on Latin America as a unit. Without exception, all get trapped in overgeneralization and underspecification. Confronted with 18 to 25 polities (Alba quickly forgets Trinidad, Jamaica, Guayana and sketchily treats Puerto Rico, Haití, and Belize), authors forget or mistreat French Haití and Portuguese Brazil, which poorly fit the Hispanic American generalizations, treating all with stereotyped overgeneralized categories (for example, "the intellectual," "urban slums," "the latifundio") and concepts ("stability," "democracy," "populism") which prevent analyzing the structures, operations, and, especially, the differentiating processes among and within those countries, comprising our real analytic units. Furthermore, the attempt to treat *all* standard analytic spheres (economics, politics, labor, religion, etc.) in *all* the countries, singly, collectively, *and* historically, leads inevitably to profound stereotypy in interpretation.

Alba's book, although better than some (such as, Jacques Lambert's abysmal *Latin America* [Berkeley, 1967]) and, occasionally, approaching excellence, is no exception. The book quite unevenly answers nine questions. Answering the first two—"Is there a Latin America?" and "Is there a Latin American?"—and the last—"What do Latin Americans

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think?"—Alba produces stereotypes and other misrepresentations (see, for example, p. 44, the "more resigned, passive and pacific" Indian; the North American sociocultural homogeneity; the "uprooted city dwellers"; the family as the Latin Americans' only community, pp. 335-36) which perpetuate misunderstandings of Latin America.

Chapter 8, "Who Wants Social Change?," suffers less from stereotypes than from problems basic also to other chapters (for example, chap. 4, "Why Has Latin America Not Changed?"): (a) his repeated assertion that Latin America has not changed (overwhelmingly disproved in chapter 6, "Where is Latin America Going?," and chapter 7, fatuously entitled "Is Latin America in the World?"); (b) failure to delineate what the dimensions of true change would be; (c) psychological rather than sociocultural structural explanations (see p. 313); (d) failure to develop the pervasiveness of external, now mainly North American, control in accounting for internal phenomena (see, p. 149 on labor confederations or p. 226 on international banks and finance agencies); and (e) uncriticalness in areas unfamiliar to him.

The book is best where data are piled upon data. Two such passages are particularly revealing. In chapter 3, four subsections list rebellions of *encomenderos*, Indians, Negroes, and Creoles, which, collectively demonstrate *for all classes* a permeating history of social movements, contradicting stereotypes (Alba's included) concerning fundamental postconquest changelessness since the basic Latin American institutions were established. They document the pervasive quest, in ideology and action, for "social justice" as defined by each interest aggregate's ever-"risen" expectations: "rising expectations" are not new, although means for implementing them evolve—even in Latin America!

The second passage (in chap. 7) concerns North American, European, and Latin American interventions in Latin America, including military, diplomatic (especially recognitional), educational (for example, the Pentagon's training of military men), technical, and economic. One is amazed that Latin American countries survived, grew, and individuated at all. Given his systematic review, the extent and intensity of North American politico-economic control, which Alba otherwise underplays as being among *the* basic parameters of Latin American life, becomes impressive.

In conclusion, Alba's book, despite multifarious stereotypes and unresolved analytic problems, is useful and perhaps preferable to, for example, Stanley and Barbara Stein's analytically more sophisticated book, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America* (New York, 1970), or Lambert's elaborate obfuscations. Unlike the former, Alba has no overriding thesis to prove; unlike the latter, no all-informing dualistic

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metaphysics incontinently polarizing all data. Thus, many data emerge relatively unscathed, still relatively near our experiential cognition of Latin America, and usable for other analyses.

ANTHONY LEEDS
University of Texas

The Chasm Ahead *by Aurelio Peccei. New York, Macmillan, 1969. —xvi, 297 pp. $7.50.*

This book investigates a theme of such great significance with such passionate optimism that it is tempting to dismiss it as the poetic raving of an overextended systems analyst. If such a judgment were made it would be doubly unfortunate. First, the author has dared to write his own synthesis of the systemwide threats and conflicts which currently disturb the global environment and which promise to wreak incredible havoc within the next few decades. Admittedly, his work is liberally sprinkled with "planispheres of truth," *New Approaches* to socio-political tensions, *Great Changes of Direction in* macrosystems planning, and sweeping diagrams of "planetized interests." These conceptual splendors notwithstanding, the book provides a lucid and sustained analysis of the revolutionary transformation of contemporary history exerted by the technologies of war and industrial growth, thus allowing it to make a second distinctive contribution. Its author is a thorough-going optimist who not only believes that reason can preserve the global system and improve the conditions of human life, but also suggests a "Project 1969" which can immediately set about the task of redesigning the political controls of a divided and warring world.

Signor Peccei is a thoughtful industrialist, who is a director of Fiat, Olivetti, Italconsult (an Italian think-tank), and the Committee for Atlantic Economic Cooperation. He is well versed in the development of European technology, American industrial expansion, and the literature of technological forecasting. In the first part of his book, on the yawning "gap" between the rate of technological innovation and industrial growth recorded in the United States and in Western Europe, he has provided an Italian counterpart to Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber's *The American Challenge.*

Signor Peccei provides vivid data to demonstrate the manner in which American R & D, management procedures, computer and automation technologies, and corporate marketing strategies could reduce the "new Europe" to the status of an industrial satellite of U.S. industrial wealth. He extends the imaginative concepts of Marshall McLuhan to note that

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Europe has refused to move beyond the industrial GM age—which is "mechanical, linear and sequential"—while America has broken through to the "technetronic" (*pace* Brzezinski) or IBM age—which is "electronic and simultaneous." The implications of these divergent trends of development are sensitively explored, and shrewd remedies are advanced to bridge the gap.

The second emphasis in the book is placed upon bridging the gap between the expanding growth structures of the West and the nonmarket economies of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies. In this regard the author leans heavily upon the "convergence strategies" suggested by a Soviet nuclear physicist, academician Sakharov. In his clandestinely published manifesto, *Progress, Co-existence, and Intellectual Freedom*, Sakharov warned both the East and West that

> the division of mankind threatens it with destruction. Civilization is imperilled by a universal thermonuclear war, catastrophic hunger for most of mankind, stupefaction from the narcotic of 'mass culture' and bureaucratized dogmatism, a spreading of mass myths . . . under cruel and treacherous demagogues, and destruction or degeneration from the consequences of swift changes in the conditions of life on our planet.

Signor Peccei is resolutely optimistic in assuming that the rigid and unimpressive leadership in the Kremlin is so terrified of the looming potential of China as a superpower trouble-maker that it will cooperate with the Atlantic nations in attacking the political and economic instability ravaging the Third World. His plan for a "Project 1969" envisions the Soviets' full-scale cooperation in a conference to plan a systemwide attack on global misery and conflict. He fails to note that the Soviet Union is so constrained by its domestic inadequacy and its international insecurity that it shows no sign of venturing into such a risky and altruistic project. It, too, has failed to enter the IBM age and it shares Western Europe's resentment and distrust of America's technological leadership.

The virtue of *The Chasm Ahead* is that it brings together a systematic analysis of all the threats and challenges to our collective "future oriented history." The defects of the book are equally significant and instructive. First, it ascribes undue weight to technological change as an autonomous "vector or focal element" of political transformation. It thus implies that technological innovation can revolutionize political values and tradition-bound institutions; recent experience (for example, in nuclear or space technology) fails to bear out this hope. Second, the author underestimates the resistance of individuals or nations to the implementation of technological change; though he eulogizes the information specialization of the American university system, he does not mention the severe cultural lag manifest—for the most humane of reasons—by its student clientele

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and by the government which supports them. Third, Peccei is so swept away by his systems solutions for the world's ills that he ignores the power of political organizations (such as the nation-state, the capitalist economy, or the Communist bureaucracy) to obstruct the course of rational change. His book is reminiscent of the world government literature of the first nuclear era when it was generally supposed that the nation-state was no longer a viable entity. That he has designed an engineering blueprint for a better world is enormously to his credit. That we are politically incapable of implementing his design is likely to be the tragedy of the last quarter of this century.

WALTER GOLDSTEIN
State University of New York at Albany

Roads to Freedom: Essays in Honour of Friedrich A. von Hayek *edited by Erich Streissler, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich A. Lutz, and Fritz Machlup. New York, Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1969.—xix, 315 pp. $15.00.*

In an age that has begun to question sharply the dominant objectivist, positivist, and behaviorist methodology of the social sciences, this *Festschrift* for the seventieth birthday of F.A. Hayek has particular relevance. For Hayek, a founder and leader of the "neo-Austrian school" of economics, has been true to the humanistic orientation of the Austrian school in ranging far beyond the narrow confines of economics to focus upon problems of methodology, political theory, philosophy of history, and philosophy of the social and natural sciences. These wide-ranging interests are here reflected in the contributions of fourteen of Hayek's friends and students.

In contrast to the narrow, technically-centered, objectivist professionalism of twentieth-century economics and social science, the neo-Austrian school grounds economics—as well as the other disciplines of human action—upon a logical analysis of the purposive choices of the acting individual, the man who employs means to pursue his selected goals. It is these subjective valuations and choices of the acting individual that form the foundation for the myriad events of human history.

All *Festschriften* are necessarily spotty and uneven, and this one is no exception; but the most important of these essays exemplify the wide gulf between the Hayekian and the "orthodox" positivistic approaches to the study of man. Thus, Ludwig M. Lachmann of the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, employs the Austrian approach to challenge the dominant neoclassical orthodoxy by (a) focusing on Weberian

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methodological individualism as against the orthodox concern for groups and aggregates and (b) challenging the usual concentration on the totally unrealistic conditions of static equilibrium—focusing instead on the dynamic choices of individuals and the processes of the market. Peter T. Bauer, of the London School of Economics, in the longest essay in the volume, stresses methodological individualism and subjective choice as against the usual historicist and behaviorist attempts to predict the future; Bauer weaves these crucial themes into a summary of two decades of work in which he has challenged the reigning orthodoxy in the field of economic development.

Stressing a similar theme is the eminent philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper. Popper summarizes his well known critique of narrow professionalism and positivist methodology in the natural sciences and maintains that the historian's method of interpretative understanding, defended by Hayek for the social sciences, applies far more than anyone had thought to the natural sciences as well.

Also included in the volume are contributions by Erich Streissler, Jacques Rueff, James M. Buchanan, Gottfried Haberler, George N. Halm, Friedrich A. Lutz, Fritz Machlup, Frank W. Paish, Michael Polanyi, Günter Schmölders, and Gordon Tullock. Appended is a useful bibliography of Hayek's writings.

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn

The Crazy Ape *by Albert Szent-Gyorgyi. New York, Philosophical Library, 1970.—93 pp. $3.95.*

In order to get a book like this published you have to first win the Nobel prize. We are fortunate that Albert Szent-Gyorgyi won it because *The Crazy Ape* is a valuable human document. Szent-Gyorgyi poses a disarmingly simple question: "Why does man behave like a total idiot?" If man were really idiotic how could he have lasted through his first million years? Could it be that he no longer fits into his environment or has he always been self-destructive? Has man been saved only because he has lacked the means of his own destruction? Szent-Gyorgyi probes the reasons for the modern dilemma. The rise of science in the Renaissance improved man's knowledge of his place in nature; the industrial revolution improved the quality of life, but initially neither did much to reorganize man's social world or his sense of continuity with it. Modern science, however, is something qualitatively new. Man has become a stranger in the cosmos. He is now the potential victim of cul-

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tural lag, a lag of unprecedented proportions. The particular predicament of our time is that social needs and philosophy change but institutions don't. That is to say, they don't until man or society (to use Szent-Gyorgyi's metaphor) breaks out of its skin like a serpent to start again. Szent-Gyorgyi wants to help that serpent before it strangles itself to death.

Salvation depends upon a total reorganization of society's social, political, and economic structure. The first step is dependent upon education, which will require a revolution in what is taught. The majority of the world's people are young, while those who govern are old both chronologically and ideationally. Government by the old (predominantly old men) is undemocratic and stands as a corrosive example of minority rule. A condemnation of violence by the violent contributes to the generation gap.

The dangers facing man are threefold: war, pollution, and overpopulation. These can be overcome only through science. Science is truly international and seeks objective truth while avoiding the pitfall of chauvinism. Internationalism must develop on the basis of scientific cooperation for peace through the United Nations. The impetus for this revolution may come from the rising expectations of the world's poor. Mass communications make them aware of the difference between reality and promise, between their lives of misery and the lives of the affluent.

All this is the cry of an aged humanist-scientist who believes that intellect, if applied to concrete problems in a selfless way, can lead man out of his dangerous muddle. In spite of the simplistic (could we say refreshingly naive) analysis presented and in spite of Szent-Gyorgyi's faith in science which ignores the fact that scientists are part of the machine he condemns, I think the book is important and useful. First of all, it comes from a man trained before the era of the technocrats and thus reminds us that the value-free nature of the scientific pursuit could in fact be mobilized for positive social action. Second, the simple framing of what we know are complex problems serves to highlight for the layman how really stupid and dangerous our behavior has become. Third, Szent-Gyorgyi's defense of intellect comes at a time of growing anti-intellectualism from all parts of the political spectrum, even from within the university.

Szent-Gyorgyi sets the goals and outlines the resources which must be mobilized to overcome imminent catastrophe. He does not discuss methods or means in any detail, but no prophet ever did.

ALEXANDER ALLAND JR.
Columbia University

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Book Notes

The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969; xi, 328 pp. $8.50) by Walter D. Young grew out of a doctoral dissertation at the University of Toronto and still bears the marks of its origin. It is rigidly academic, devoid of stylistic adornment, full of learned references to the literature of party studies, not a book to keep on one's table for bedtime reading. Nevertheless the author deserves our thanks for his careful treatment of a political phenomenon whose interest for Canadians is obvious and which may lead Americans to ask why the United States has never produced a long-lived, national, left-wing party like the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Canada. Young finds the key to its history in the fact that it was both a movement and a party. Hence it could survive even though losing elections. Of course it was a failure in the sense that, so far from attaining power, it never won more than 31 seats in the Federal Parliament. When it merged its identity into the New Democratic party in 1961, the cooperative commonwealth was at least as far from realization as it had been when the CCF was formed by farmers, workers, and intellectuals in the depths of the Depression in 1932. Yet Professor Young shows that, like many third parties, the CCF was not without its achievements. It defended civil liberties, promoted the passage of progressive legislation, and provided effective opposition in Parliament, sometimes more than was provided by the official Conservative Opposition itself. The CCF members of Parliament won a good deal of respect for the wide range of exact information they displayed in debate and their discipline in action. Yet the reasons for the party's failure in its larger mission of transforming society are clear enough in Professor Young's account. It is the familiar story of a left-wing party whose members were not pragmatic enough to adjust themselves to the com-

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plexities of their country's politics and society. They talked too much about revolution for the trade unions and the Catholic Church and paid too little attention to the sensibilities of the French Canadians. Their constant stress on farmers and workers alienated the middle class. In the public mind the CCF was a party of revolutionaries and cranks. And so when it gained a good deal of support toward the end of World War II, it was only too easy for its opponents to mount a vicious anti-CCF propaganda drive with money provided by large corporations and banks. The party's high hopes for the postwar period were dashed in the federal election of 1945. Mr. Young appears to have been a member of the CCF in its later years, but he traces its story with scholarly detachment. —THOMAS P. PEARDON, *Barnard College.*

William Manners, author of this sprightly account of the political relations between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft—*TR & Will: A Friendship That Split the Republican Party* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969; xiv, 335 pp. $7.95)—is a writer, not a historian or political scientist, and his work reflects it. He has a fine gift for evocation and characterization as well as a sure instinct for discerning and sustaining the dramatic. But his interest is in the interplay of personalities rather than of ideologies or historical forces. Only to the degree that it points up the idiosyncratic influence of personalities upon politics and public policy is *TR & Will* of any value to political scientists; only because it assembles between two covers just about every human-interest item relating to Roosevelt and Taft is it of any possible use to historians. The influence of ideas on the two protagonists is mentioned but not developed. Elections are summarized but not analyzed. The same is true for a half-dozen other factors integral to the disruption of the Republican party in 1912—the extraordinary change in the national mood between 1910 and 1912; the irrepressibility of insurgency within the GOP; the growing progressivism of the Democrats; Roosevelt's continuing intellectual growth; Taft's failure to work for the passage of or to give moral support to several of the measures he eventually signed into law; and, above all, the enormous pressures Western leaders and second-line Republican politicians almost everywhere exerted on Roosevelt to enter the primaries against Taft. Despite gaps in his reading—the research is mainly in secondary sources—which cause him to miss many nuances and make important errors of omission, Manners is moderately sensitive to much of this. But by allowing his fascination with personality to dictate his emphases, he has produced an essentially one-dimensional account of an exceedingly complex historical episode.

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For all its literary quality, this book is dated on its own terms and is a mild distortion of historical reality on the political scientist's terms. Yet, one must fairly concede, it is eminently readable and, in a limited sense, informative.—WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, *University of Virginia.*

Marvin Alisky, professor of political science and mass communications at Arizona State University, has given us *Uruguay: A Contemporary Survey* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1969; vii, 174 pp. $6.50) at a time when there is a genuine need for a fresh and straightforward description of that country's state of affairs. Unfortunately, the book is merely a tired and superficial recital of Uruguay's past achievements and an uncritical summary of recent events. Professor Alisky's ability accurately to survey contemporary Uruguay is most seriously hampered by his failure to consult important recent works by Uruguayans. In this presumably wide-ranging study, the chapter on culture mentions not a single living Uruguayan novelist; the chapter on education ignores the most useful recent analyses and documents; and the chapter on the economy was written without reference to the series of indispensable studies prepared in the mid-sixties for Uruguay's ten-year development plan. The long list of materials neglected by the author also includes more than a score of recent publications by Uruguayan social scientists, historians, and essayists. The result of these massive omissions is a shallow, distorted, and overly optimistic view of present-day Uruguay, based not on the facts but on the author's feelings about the country's "destiny." Thus, Alisky's chapter on the economy does not discuss the origins of Uruguay's economic stagnation and decline; there is no examination of economic policy or, more important, of the variety of development strategies proposed by Uruguayans and others. This inadequacy makes it impossible for Alisky to understand contemporary politics in Uruguay. Having failed to provide us with a discussion of alternative development strategies, he cannot link these strategies to an analysis of the behavior of the political groups which demand their adoption. Instead of exploring the political consequences of Uruguay's economic crisis, the two chapters on politics do little more than recount recent cabinet changes and review some of the provisions of the 1966 constitution. Even the sections on the new constitution fail to assess the significances for the party system of such important changes as the return to a presidential form of government (as opposed to a nine-man collegial executive), or the abolition of *coparticipación*—the institutionalized sharing of patronage by the two largest political parties. Nor does the author ask whether the traditional patronage-based parties, *Col-*

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orados and *Blancos*, can generate and sustain support for policies that will lead to economic recovery, given the fact that most of these policies imply the cessation of all material political rewards. Finally, Professor Alisky never considers the possibility, which many Uruguayans have accepted, that the country's present political system is obsolete. Obviously, it is not necessary to ponder or lament the obsolescence of this book. —PAUL M. COHEN, *Teachers College, Columbia University.*

More autobiographical than historical, *Historian's Quest: A Twenty-Year Journey into the Spanish Mind* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969; ix, 235 pp. $6.95) by Gabriel Jackson shows one man's interest in his profession and his attempts to use his skills to understand the contemporary period. Although the book includes oral history which Jackson has accumulated in his studies of Spain, the greater part of the *Quest* deals with his own development: his education at Harvard, his introduction to Spanish literature, his French graduate work, his family, and his activities as a liberal professor dedicated to moderate social change and fearful of revolutionary violence. The book expresses the same intellectual interests and approaches that concern many contemporary Spaniards who continue to be preoccupied with cultural questions and imbued with a sense of the past. Jackson gives vent to these interests in the latter part of *Historian's Quest* where he deals with medieval Spain and Spanish literature. Throughout, the tone is one of nostalgia. Because it is romantic, the weakest parts of the book are its more theoretical portions—elementary discussions about the craft of the historian, how he structures his writing, and how he chooses between topical and chronological approaches. More interesting, Jackson presents us with the plight of oral history: how to dissociate one's personal regard for or antagonism toward an informant from the news he imparts. The author is conscious of the need to confront his own bias and is troubled by his inability to find conclusive evidence and means of verification. Another theme of the book is "the relationship between political democracy and social discipline" (p. 30), by which he means social order and social stability. His treatment of Spain and America in the early sixties is colored by his search for order, which he finds in Spain under Franco but not in America. He is also concerned, however, with democratic institutions, the one thing he cherishes beyond order. He finds the institutions in America but not in Spain. He becomes confused and somewhat pessimistic about the future of both countries, by the lack of democratic participation in Spain and by the increasingly virulent and sometimes valid criticism of American institutions made by the New Left. Overall, the

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book is about Jackson's poignant quest for perspective and equilibrium at a time when he has many questions but few satisfactory answers.—TEMMA E. KAPLAN, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

John C. Caldwell in *African Rural-Urban Migration: The Movement to Ghana's Towns* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969; xi, 257 pp. $10.00) asks "Who goes to the towns, and from where? What are the social characteristics of migrants? How do they travel? Why do they go? What is the nature of the complex links between urban and rural areas, and what are the effects, in towns and in villages, of migration? What are the attitudes to migration, in villages and in towns?" Caldwell, using the excellent 1960 Population Census of Ghana as a base, asked (in 1962-64) a series of open-ended questions of nearly 17,000 persons, four-fifths of whom were in 45 carefully selected rural areas, the others in the four main towns. He avoided the usual pitfalls involved in using questionnaires in Africa by having a thorough knowledge of the social structure of Ghana, by using extensive pilot-surveys, and by cooperation with his student-interviewers to eliminate linguistic or other misunderstandings. Ghana has one of the highest rates of urbanization in Africa, coupled with a remarkable mobility. Caldwell emphasizes the importance of the ubiquitous "mammy lorry"; 60,000 persons are employed in transport, three-fourths of the migrants travel by lorry, and "The lorry park fills the role of the cathedral square in older Europe" (p. 207). Migration is closely correlated with both education and size of locality, which are, of course, interrelated. Inevitably, migration will increase with education; by 1990, the urban population is likely to exceed the rural. This compact book includes perceptive examinations of the relationship between town and village and of the rural push and the urban pull. A rural-urban continuum exists, rather than a simple dichotomy; an increasing number of nuclear families is established on a long-term basis in the towns, though most individuals maintain close links with the villages—visits are frequent, a staggering amount of money and goods is sent to the villages, and nearly 90 per cent want to return eventually to their villages where they hope to build houses for themselves. When people do return, they rarely use town-acquired skills. Most people have realistic perceptions, saying that while village life is more manageable, it is less convenient, especially with the constant carrying of fuel and water and with the lack of electricity; town life offers more opportunities but at a considerable cost. This is a brisk, clear, and orderly book, with useful subheadings and summaries (though with a poor index). Reference to the work of other scholars of

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African migration, such as Schapera and Mayer (South Africa), and Epstein, Mitchell, and van Velsen (Central Africa), would have helped make the theoretical foundations more explicit. It is left to other scholars to use Caldwell's data on a higher analytical plane and to test some of the older theories against his data. Nevertheless, this book is highly readable and statistically satisfying and should interest students of West Africa as well as of urbanization in developing countries.—DAVID BROKENSHA, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

The jacket blurb describes the essays collected in *The Critique of War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations* (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1969; xxiv, 360 pp. $12.50) edited by Robert Ginsberg, as the "culmination and distillation of a mammoth project involving 192 philosophers in 40 countries." As far as can be judged from the introduction by the editor, who is an assistant professor of philosophy at the Delaware County campus of Pennsylvania State University, this may mean nothing more than that letters inviting papers on "the problem of war" and possible solutions to it were sent to 192 people and that the contributions of the 18 who responded became the chapters of the volume. Most of the contributors are Americans, but some Asians and Europeans are represented also. The chapters are grouped into sections on the philosopher's duty to fight against war; the causes of war; the nature of the "war system"; the unjustifiability of war; and plans of action to end war. (One of the plans proposed by the editor himself is the formation of "International Philosophy Peace Teams.") Particular chapters are worth the attention of social scientists for reasons that vary from chapter to chapter. Thus, John Nef's "Political, Technological, and Cultural Aspects of War" is useful as a summary of the conclusions that Nef has formed on the basis of four decades of study. Carl J. Friedrich's chapter is interesting as a presentation of the view that, because the etiology of war is multiform and complex, its prevention or limitation can come only from a multipurpose agency, which, for Friedrich, means a government. The chapter stands apart from others in the volume by virtue of Friedrich's explicitly stated avoidance of moral issues. The fact that there is considerable moralizing in the other essays is not surprising in view of statements in the editor's introduction ("War is the arch enemy of mankind. . . . And therefore, as the supreme champion of man for man, philosophy must take the field."). The authors of these other essays generally eschew consideration of the complex social, economic, and ecological factors and historical processes involved not only in war or peace but also in the acceptance of new moralities. Although most of

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these chapters have little direct value as social scientific analyses, some of them may be regarded as useful source materials on the various directions in which antiwar moralities have developed in different parts of the world. Thus, the discussions of possible paths to peace include not only the familiar prescriptions for world government and calls for constructing the defenses of peace in the minds of men, but also discourses by Asian philosophers on Gandhian nonviolence, the idea of the sovereignty of God, and the oneness of existence. The editor promises a second volume of similar studies.—ANDREW P. VAYDA, *Columbia University*.

Modern archaeology has its roots in the antiquarianism and explorations of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. When archaeology emerged as a scholarly discipline in the middle of the nineteenth century, it could not shake off its romantic forebears. Thus, in the nineteenth century, the work of Sir Austen Layard, as recounted in *Discoveries in the Ruins of Ninevah and Babylon: with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan and the Desert*, and Heinrich Schliemann's *Ilios: The City and Country of the Trojans* were part adventure and part archaeology. Today the writing of archaeologists is pure archaeology. This is not so much because modern archaeologists are suppressing accounts of adventure in the field, but because they do not perceive the events that occur as romantic, exciting, or even extraordinary. It is for this reason that *Looking for Dilmun* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969; ix, 383 pp. $10.00) by Geoffrey Bibby is an unusual book. Mr. Bibby is a professional archaeologist who experiences adventure. Unlike his nineteenth-century predecessors, however, he is able to separate adventure from archaeology, and in this book he is not concerned with presenting the results of his investigation but rather the circumstances under which it occurred. The primary elements in the tale are the alien land and the search for the lost civilization. The alien land is the modern Middle East with its eruptive politics and exotic life, in some ways more difficult to manage than the search itself. The lost civilization is Dilmun on the Persian Gulf between Mesopotamia and India. Dated at 3000 BC to 500 BC, it was contemporary with Babylonia and Assyria. Its settlements and artifacts revealed a complex society whose territory extended hundreds of miles and rivaled the civilizations of Mesopotamia. Mr. Bibby leads us through a maze marked by surveys, excavations, and artifacts, as well as the perils of life on an archaeological campaign. The account is the diary of the professional at work, a sound companion to the technical mono-

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graph, especially for those interested in research strategy.—SHIRLEY GORENSTEIN, *Columbia University.*

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

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

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